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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF 
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BLAKE WILLIAM WADDOUPS 
JAMES EDWARD SPARROW, 
JR. , 
Plaintiffs, 
vs . 
THE AMALGAMATED SUGAR 
COMPANY, a Utah 
corporation, et al., 
Defendants. 
Case No. 950900441 and 
Judge Stanton Taylor 
DEPOSITION OF 
JAMES E. SPARROW. JA 
The deposition of JAMES EDWARD SPARROW, 
JR., a witness in the above-entitled cause, taken 
before LANETTE SHINDURLING, Registered Professional 
Reporter and Notary Public in and for the State of 
Utah, at the law offices of PARSONS, BEHLE & 
LATIMER, 201 South Main Street, Suite 1800, Salt 
Lake City, Utah, on the 19th day of August, 1996, 
commencing at 9:00 a.m. 
AssnriafpH Professional Reporters 
Q What was your address in Twin Falls? 
A 182 F Street North. 
Q And how long did you live at that address 
in Twin Falls? 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
Sparrow? 
A 
Q 
A 
Two years. 
And where did you live before that? 
Before that, 196 Van Buren. 
Is that in Twin Falls as well? 
In Twin Falls. 
And how long did you live at that address? 
Ten years. 
Okay. Are you currently employed, Mr. 
Yes . 
And where are you employed? 
Barclay-- actually, it's Express 
Personnel, temporary service. 
Q So you're working for a temporary service? 
A Uh-huh (affirmative). 
Q And it's called Express Personnel? 
A Uh-huh (affirmative). 
Q And where is it located? 
A In Burley, Idaho. 
Q And how long have you worked for Express 
Personnel? 
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1 A For one year. 
2 Q And where are you currently performing 
3 your work? 
4 A I am contracted out to Barclay Mechanical 
5 Services. 
6 Q And where is that? 
7 A It's in Paul, Idaho. 
8 Q I'm sorry? 
9 A Paul, Idaho. 
10 Q And how long have you been working at 
11 Barclay Mechanical Services? 
12 A One month. 
13 Q And where did you work before that? 
14 A At Rain for Rent. 
15 Q I'm sorry? 
16 A Rain for Rent. 
17 Q Where is that? 
18 A Paul, Idaho. 
19 Q What kind of company is that? 
20 A Irrigation pipe. 
21 Q And how long did you work there? 
22 A Five months. 
23 Q And what did you do there? 
24 A We would make pipe, then load it on trucks 
25 and deliver it to farmers. 
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Q Okay. And while you were working there 
you were still working at Express Personnel? 
A It's all through Express. 
Q Okay. And prior to that job where were 
you working? 
A Koch Agri Services. 
Q Coke? 
A Yeah, it's in Rupert, Idaho. 
Q C-O-K-E? 
A It's K-O-C-H. 
Q And where is it again? 
A Rupert. 
Q What did you do there? 
A I loaded rail cars up with grain. 
Q And this, again, was while you were at 
Express Personnel? 
A Uh-huh (affirmative). 
Q And how long did you work at Koch? 
A Three months. 
Q Okay. And where did you work before that? 
A I didn't. Oh, no, through Express I 
worked at Oreida in a potato cellar. 
Q So your job before Koch was--
A At Oreida. 
Q And were you working at Express Personnel 
11 
at this time? 
A Yes 
Q And what were you doing at Oreida? 
A Running a-- what do they call them, a 
piler. 
Q And how long did you work there? 
A One month. 
Q And did you have any work before Oreida? 
A No . 
Q So was Oreida the first job you had 
through Express Personnel? 
A Yes . 
Q And you said that you had been at Express 
Personnel for about a year? 
A Uh-huh (affirmative). 
Q Okay. And before you went to Express 
Personnel, did you have another job? 
A No. 
Q So were you unemployed prior to going to 
Express Personnel? 
A Yes . 
Q Okay. Were you unemployed from the time 
you were terminated by Amalgamated Sugar until you 
went to Express Personnel? 
A No. I worked two weeks at a Jerome Cheese 
12 
Factory. 
Q What was the name of that company? 
A I believe it's Jerome Cheese. 
Q Okay. And this is a job you had directly 
with that company as opposed to going through 
Express Personnel? 
A Yes . 
Q Did you have any other job since you left 
Amalgamated Sugar? 
A No. 
Q So did you go through a period of 
unemployment before you went to Jerome Cheese? 
A Yes. 
Q And how much time was there between when 
you left Amalgamated Sugar and when you started at 
Jerome Cheese? 
A One month. 
And then how long did you work at Jerome Q 
Cheese? 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
Two weeks. 
And why did you leave Jerome Cheese? 
I quit. 
Why did you quit Jerome Cheese? 
Because of their unsafe practices. 
What were the unsafe practices at Jerome 
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call it? 
A Rain for Rent? 
Q Yes . 
A I went there, it was their busy season and 
it was a seasonal job and when we got laid off there 
I went to Barclays. 
Q With your current job at Barclay, do you 
know how long that will last? 
A It's just a temporary job. They're saying 
two to four weeks, but they're trying to get me on 
full-time as a bulk loader out there to fill green 
cars up with sugar because Barclays is a grain 
storage facility and that's what they'll be doing 
out there. They're trying to see if they-- some of 
the bosses are trying to see if they can get me on 
full-time out there. 
Q So it may happen that you'll become a 
full-time employee at Barclay as a bulk loader? 
A Yes . 
Q When do you think that will happen, if it 
does happen? 
A I would say two to four weeks. 
Q Does that mean you would become a regular 
employee of Barclay as opposed to working through 
Express Personnel? 
16 
1 A Yes. 
2 Q Do you think that your pay would change if 
3 you got that regular job? 
4 A Yes. 
5 Q Do you know what you would get paid if you 
6 got that regular job? 
7 A I would say $8.50. 
8 Q Is that what someone has told you? 
9 A Yes. 
10 Q Have you applied to work at any plant of 
11 Amalgamated Sugar since you were tired.-' 
12 A Yes. 
13 Q Where did you apply? 
14 A It was for a beet dump. 
15 Q I'm sorry? 
16 A It was at a beet dump in Paul, Idaho. 
17 Q What is a beet dump? 
18 A Where they store their beets for their 
19 plants. 
20 Q Okay. And when did you apply for work at 
21 this beet dump? 
22 A The day after I got laid off at Oreida. 
23 Q Okay. And what response did you get when 
24 you applied for a job at this beet dump? 
25 A The response was, the lady I talked to 
17 
No. 3 and you just don't recall it now? 
A 
Q 
No. 3? 
A 
Q 
I just don't recall it, but i t -
Is it possible that you received Exhibit 
Yes . 
Does the contents of Exhibit No. 3 seem 
familiar to you? 
A Yes. It sounds like something they would 
say. 
Q Looking at the second section of Exhibit 
No. 3 which is labeled Attendance and then looking 
at the last sentence of that paragraph, you see tha 
it says, "The maximum number of unexcused absences 
you can receive before being terminated is three." 
Do you see that? 
A Uh-huh (affirmative). Yes. 
Q Do you recall being informed of the rule 
that you could have no more than three unexcused 
absences? 
A Yes . 
Q When do you recall being informed of that 
rule? 
A All the time. 
Q All the time? 
A Uh-huh (affirmative) 
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1 Q You mean it was said to you--
2 A Well, people were always talking about it, 
3 you know, foremen, supervisors. 
4 Q Could you elaborate on that? 
5 A Uh-huh (affirmative). 
6 Q When did people talk about it? 
7 A At work. 
8 Q So you're saying your co-workers and 
9 supervisors regularly talked about this rule that 
10 you could have no more than three unexcused 
11 absences? 
12 A Yes. 
13 Q So you knew or you were familiar with this 
14 rule? 
15 A Yes. 
16 Q After you began working at Amalgamated 
17 Sugar did you join a union at some time? 
18 A Right away. 
19 Q Was that in 1989 when you were part-time? 
20 A Yes. 
21 Q Or 1993 when you were full-time? 
22 A Part-time back in '89. 
23 Q And so you were a member of this union 
24 during the entire time you worked at Amalgamated? 
25 A Yes. 
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1 Q Are you still a member of this union? 
2 A No. 
3 Q What is the name of the union? 
4 A Grain Millers. 
5 Q Was there a contract or a laborer 
6 agreement between this union and Amalgamated Sugar? 
7 A Yes. 
8 Q And did this labor agreement cover you? 
9 A Yes. 
10 Q Okay. Did you have a copy of the labor 
11 agreement? 
12 A Yes. 
13 Q Is this something that was published in a 
14 little booklet? 
15 A Yes. 
16 Q And did every union employee get a copy of 
17 this contract? 
18 A Yes. 
19 Q So you were familiar with the contract? 
20 A Uh-huh (affirmative). Yes. 
21 Q Did you read the contract? 
22 A Yes. 
23 Q Was there a representative of the union at 
24 Amalgamated Sugar? 
25 A Yes. 
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1 A No. 
2 Q Why was it that you never spoke to the 
3 union president? 
4 A About what? 
5 Q Well, about anything. 
6 A I never had to. 
7 Q Okay. Were you enemies? 
8 A No. 
9 Q You're saying you just never had any 
10 reason to talk with him? 
11 A No, no reason. 
12 Q I take it you didn't have any bad 
13 experience with him? 
14 A With him? 
15 Q Yes. 
16 A No. He was a coward. I thought he was a 
17 coward and he wouldn't do anything anyway. That's 
18 why I wouldn't go to him anyway. 
19 Q What is it that makes you think that the 
20 union president was a coward? 
21 A All the other talk from the other 
22 employees. 
23 Q And what was the talk from the other 
24 employees? 
25 A Not good. 
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Q But you just don't recall--
A I j ust don' t - -
Q You don't recall reading that portion of 
the contract? 
A I did. I remember reading it, but I don't 
think I understood it at the time. I understand it 
a little bit now because of the way you're bringing 
it out, but--
Q Okay. Going down to the last sentence of 
paragraph 14.1 it says, "An employee who believes 
his discipline or discharge is not justified shall 
have recourse to the grievance procedure under the 
agreement." Do you see that? 
A Yes . 
Q Did you know that an employee who is 
discharged who does not think it's fair or justified 
can have a grievance filed? 
A Yes . 
Q You knew you could file a grievance upon 
being discharged? 
A Yes . 
Q And did you know that there was a 
grievance procedure? 
A Yes . 
Q And, in fact, it's a three-step grievance 
43 
and arbitration procedure? 
A I'm not quite sure what the steps are, but 
I knew they were there. 
Q You knew there were some steps? 
A Uh-huh (affirmative). 
Q And did you know that it not only was 
steps for filing a grievance, but that there was at 
the end of the process an arbitration procedure? 
A Yes . 
Q And did you know these things in May 1995 
when you were discharged? 
A Yes . 
Q Now, this union agreement, labor agreement 
says that the company has the right to fire people 
for just cause, to discipline or discharge employees 
for just cause. Do you think you were discharged 
for just cause? 
A Yeah, could you explain that for just 
cause? 
Q Well, I'm just like you reading the 
contract. I don't have any secret meaning in mind. 
I'm just reading. 
A I know what they've told me and just 
cause, it's two different things. 
Q So what I'm asking for is what you 
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Q (BY MR. GAVRE) I don't care whose 
definit ion. 
A Just cause, I'm trying to think. I would 
say no. 
Q That's what I'm asking. 
MR. CARR: That's his answer. 
MR. GAVRE: Mr. Carr, I'll ask the 
questions, he'll answer. You don't have to comment 
that that was his answer. 
MR. CARR: It's on the record. 
Q (BY MR. GAVRE) Now, when you say that you 
believe there was not just cause for your discharge, 
Why do you say that? 
A Can you repeat that? 
Q Well, I'm not trying to put words in your 
mouth, but I believe you testified that in your 
opinion there was not just cause for your 
discharge. Is that correct? 
A Correct. 
Q Okay. Why do you believe that? 
A Because there were things going on at the 
factory. 
Q Can you elaborate on what you mean by 
there were things going on at the factory? 
A Illegal shipping of sugar. 
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Q Okay. What do you mean by "illegal 
shipping of sugar"? 
A Contaminated. 
Q Okay. So you believe there was 
contaminated sugar being shipped by the company? 
A Yes . 
Q And how was the idea that there was 
contaminated sugar being shipped by the company 
connected to your discharge? 
A Because they knew I was there when the 
comment was brought up to them and I was just in th 
room at the time so they knew I knew or thought I 
knew. 
Q Okay. You're referring to something very 
cryptically. Could you explain what you mean by th 
comment was brought up to the company and you were 
in the room? 
A We asked them if they sent some 
contaminated cars, if it was destroyed or actually 
shipped to customers and they didn't give us an 
answer. 
Q Okay. When you say "we," who are you 
referring to? 
A Blake Waddoups and me, and I. 
Q And you're referring to some particular 
4 7 
1 I the bagging area. I told Darwayne, That's not 
2 | right. We were loading cars at the time, you know. 
3 I That's about the only thing I said. He's not doing 
4 a thorough check. That's what he told him. 
5 Q Okay. Can you pin down when in particular 
6 this occurred? 
7 A It would have been like February 20th. It 
8 was like four days after his death. 
9 Q Are you sure about the exact date or is 
10 that just kind of an approximate time? 
11 A It's real approximate, but I can't say for 
12 sure because it took us three days to clean it up. 
13 We waited more or less a day after the accident to 
14 clean it up and we waited three days after the 
15 accident and then started right back up. 
16 Q So you're talking about a time when sugar 
17 was being pushed through the system? 
18 A Yes. 
19 Q And some of the sugar that was being 
20 pushed through the system was bagged? 
21 A Yes. 
22 Q And you're saying the microbiologist was 
23 checking some of that bagged sugar? 
24 A Uh-huh, because I was the one who went and 
25 got the bags to him and took it to where he was at. 
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head down and close my eyes for a while there, 
especially on the graveyard shifts. 
Q When you say Otto threatened you, can you 
take me through that. 
A I can remember about two weeks before I 
was terminated, Otto wouldn't show up to work until 
around eight o'clock, we had to be there at six. I 
was sitting at my desk filling out some paperwork. 
He walked in and slapped me up to the side of the 
head with that yellow notebook and he said, Well, i 
today the day I get to fire you? I said, What for? 
He said, For messing up. 
Q And that's what he said? 
A Uh-huh (affirmative). 
Q Did he say any more than that? 
A No. 
Q Did you say anything in response? 
A I just-- What for? 
Q And he said, For messing up? 
A Something like that. 
Q Do you recall exactly what he said? 
A No. I don't recall, just something 
similar to that. 
Q So he came into the office and asked, Is 
today the day I get to fire you? 
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A Uh-huh (affirmative). 
Q And you said, What for? 
A Uh-huh (affirmative) . 
Q And he said, For messing up? 
A Or something similar to that. 
Q Did you say anything further? 
A No. 
Q Did he say anything further? 
A No. 
Q Did he stay in the office or leave, or 
what happened after that? 
A He probably stayed in the office. 
Q And then what did you do? 
A I think I got up to go check my rail ca 
Q Do you remember when that happened? 
A About two weeks, if that long, right 
before I got fired. 
Q Okay. Was that the only time Otto said 
something like that to you? 
A There was one other time, but it was th 
death and it has nothing to do with this. It had 
something to do with where they thought I had 
flunked a car. 
Q Tell me what you mean by flunked a car. 
A I loaded up a rail car, I think it went 
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1 day we went there to turn in our stuff. 
2 Q What day are you talking about? 
3 A It would have been May 31st, I believe. 
4 It was after we were fired. 
5 Q This is after you were fired? • 
6 A Uh-huh. Because we said, We'll just tell 
7 the customers what you did. He said, Well, you're 
8 fired and we'll just say you're a disgruntled 
9 employee. 
10 Q After you were fired you saw Vic Jaro? 
11 A Uh-huh (affirmative). 
12 Q What did you say to Vic Jaro? 
13 A I didn't say nothing. 
14 Q Okay. And you were with Blake Waddoups? 
15 A Blake Waddoups. 
16 Q And what did Blake Waddoups say? 
17 A He demanded to see the shipping reports of 
18 where those cars went. 
19 Q By "those cars" you mean the two rail 
20 cars? 
21 A The two rail cars, yes. 
22 Q That were being filled on the day of Mike 
23 Davis's death? 
24 A Uh-huh (affirmative). 
25 Q And did he, in fact, get to see what he 
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wanted to see? 
A Yes . 
Q And what did those records show? 
A They show that it was shipped to a 
customer instead of being destroyed. 
Did it show what customer it was shipped 
to? 
A 
Q 
A 
Yes . 
What customer was that? 
Some pet place. I can't remember. He 
just-- we just got to glance at them, he just showed 
them. 
Q And it showed that it was shipped to a pet 
food manufacturer or animal feed manufacturer? 
A Something. I just looked up there. I was 
standing next to him, I just glanced at it. He just 
showed it real quick and closed it. 
Q Okay. And after the two of you got to see 
this shipping record, then what happened? 
A Nothing. He told us to get off the 
premises. 
Q You said that--
A Blake said, We'll just tell the customers 
what you've been doing. 
Q Is that all that Blake said, We'll tell 
127 
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Vic Jaro? 
A Blake demanded to. I was just with him. 
Q So where did you meet with Vic Jaro? 
A It started inside the lunchroom and ended 
out by the-- on the outside of the office there, all 
the way out to the front gate. 
Q So was this a conversation as people were 
walking or what? 
A Blake was kind of hollering, demanding to 
see certain paperworks, you know, wanting this and 
wanting to see that and things like that. 
Q So it started in the lunchroom? 
A Uh-huh (affirmative). 
Q And who was there? 
A I know Bill Stewart was because he was 
trying to calm Blake down. I believe Dan Taylor was 
and just Blake and Otto-- I mean Vic. 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
reports. 
Q 
A 
And you said that Blake was hollering? 
Uh-huh (affirmative). 
What was he hollering about? 
Demanding to see paperwork, the shipping 
Did he say why? 
Because he knows the sugar-- he already 
knew by then for sure the sugar had been sold to 
145 
somebody else besides being destroyed. 
Q How is it that Blake already knew this? 
A Because a week before that he was 
suspended and I guess when he was being suspended 
Otto brought up the fact-- Otto said something about 
the sugar was shipped to a pet supply. 
Q Okay. 
A Something to that effect. You'll have to 
ask him for sure, but that's what it was. 
Q How did you learn this? 
A He told me. 
Q Who is "he"? 
A Blake. 
Q When? 
A After he got suspended. 
Q Okay. So at this meeting when the two of 
you went back--
A And it was what we speculated before just 
came out the truth when Otto mentioned that to Blake 
when he got suspended. It was just something that 
we always thought and felt. And I don't know, if I 
had any questions I would ask Blake or if I wanted 
something fixed up there, I was always the quiet 
one, Blake, get this fixed, and Blake would get it 
fixed because he wouldn't stop until it was done one 
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way or another. So it was Blake, ask them this, ask 
them that, and he would. 
Q Okay. But going back to this meeting that 
you had when you and Blake Waddoups went back to the 
plant, I think you said it was on the 31st of May? 
A I believe it was. 
Q Okay. You said Blake was hollering to see 
some kind of shipping records? 
A Uh-huh (affirmative). 
Q And this started out in the lunchroom? 
A Uh-huh (affirmative). 
Q Then someone showed him the shipping 
records? 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
Vic did. 
And where did this take place? 
That took place out by the front gate. 
So how did you move from the lunchroom to 
the front gate? 
A Well, at one time they were telling us to 
get off the premises because it was private property 
so we were moving out. Blake is hollering as we go, 
and Vic finally must have give in and said okay and 
went and got them and showed them to us. I just had 
a quick glance at them. 
Q Okay. And after Blake was showing you 
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1 I Q Just focusing on yourself, at any time 
2 | after the Mike Davis accident did you bring up any 
3 I concern you had about possible contaminated sugar? 
4 A No. 
5 Q You never brought it up to anyone? 
6 A No. 
7 Q You didn't mention it to Darwayne? 
8 A No, because he said it was going to be 
9 destroyed so I figured they would destroy it. 
10 Q Okay. But whether it's about those rail 
11 cars or those two rail cars or any other area, did 
12 you at any time bring up any concern about 
13 contaminated sugar at any time after Mike Davis's 
14 death? 
15 A Once about the humidifier. 
16 Q Explain that to me. 
17 A The humidifier is a hose we hook up into 
18 the bottom of the cars that blows warm air into the 
19 cars. You can stand there and turn it on and put 
20 your hand in front of it and it's shooting 
21 particles. It's taking particles from where it sits 
22 at and it's blowing them into the cars. 
23 Q So some kind of dust particles could be 
24 getting into those cars through the humidifier? 
25 A Uh-huh (affirmative). 
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Q And did you raise that concern with 
anyone? 
A I just told Darwayne about that, you know, 
What good does that do? You know, Why do we have to 
do this? 
Q But did you tell Darwayne about dust 
particles getting into the car? 
A Uh-huh (affirmative). He went out and 
stuck his hand in front of it and he could feel it. 
Q What did he say? 
A Yeah, but there was nothing he could do 
about it . 
Q Did you tell anyone besides Darwayne about 
this? 
A No. 
Q Are you saying that there's some 
connection between your telling Darwayne about the 
dust particles and the humidifier and your getting 
fired? 
A Did I say that? 
Q Are you saying that? 
A No. That had nothing to do with the death 
so I didn't . 
Q So with respect to Mike Davis's death, did 
you raise any issue of contamination with anyone? 
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A No . 
MR. CARR: Just a point of clarification, 
I apologize because I did miss some here. It's my 
understanding from his previous testimony that he 
was in the presence of Mr. Waddoups when Mr. 
Waddoups brought these things up about the 
contamination from the accident. 
MR. GAVRE: I was only asking about what 
Mr. Sparrow himself did. 
MR. CARR: I understand, but they were 
together when this happened. 
MR. GAVRE: I haven't disputed that. I'm 
just trying to get information down. 
Q (BY MR. GAVRE) Mr. Sparrow, I'm not 
trying to argue with you about anything. I'm trying 
to learn what you know and what you think happened. 
So I'm asking a lot of questions just so I can get 
the story down in the level of detail I need, that's 
all. 
When you had that final meeting out at the 
plant after you and Blake had been fired and the two 
of you came back and you've described that Blake was 
hollering and asking about the shipping records and 
about those two rail cars and that eventually Vic or 
someone showed him the shipping records--
174 
A It was Vic. 
Q Vic, okay. Did Vic say anything? 
A Not that I can recall. 
Q Did Vic point out what the shipping 
records showed? 
A No. Because he just opened it and I can 
remember-- I just had a chance to glance at it, he 
didn't have it open very long, and just kind of 
asked us to leave. 
Q Okay. Did Vic show any reluctance to show 
either you or Blake those shipping records? 
A Uh-huh, yes. 
Q Did he say why? 
A No. Just something like it was company 
property and, you know, we were no longer an 
employee-- you know, employed there, you know, 
something like that. 
Q When you got fired did you file a 
grievance with the union? 
A No. 
Q Did you think about filing a grievance? 
A Yes . 
Q Why did you not file a grievance? 
A Because it would have been, I believe, May 
26th when I talked to Bill Stewart on the phone, I 
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there's no mystery there. 
A Yes . 
Q So you knew that. So why didn't you file 
a grievance to see whether you would get some 
success through the grievance process? 
MR. CARR: For the record, I want to voice 
an objection as asked and answered. He's already 
told you he talked to his supervisor who told him it 
wouldn't do any good. Can you answer? 
Q (BY MR. GAVRE) Aside from the fact that 
Bill Stewart told you whatever he told you, why 
didn't you file a grievance? 
A Because we feel like it wouldn't do any 
good . 
Q When you say "we"? 
A Blake and I. 
Q I'm really asking about you. 
A I didn't feel like it would either. 
Q Why is that? 
A Because I felt they wanted us gone. We 
were looking for any little excuse, they got one and 
they're got going to let go of it. 
Q Any other reason? 
A No . 
Q Can you briefly describe to me your duties 
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as a bulk loader? 
A Briefly describe. Just be a bulk loader, 
to put sugar in the rail cars and make sure they're 
in grade, proper sealed, paperwork, and take your 
samples like you're supposed to. 
Q What samples are you supposed to take? 
A You're supposed to take one at the 
beginning, the start, depending on the customer, you 
take one every 500 or even every 200, every 200 
bags, I mean, and you take them to the lab and be 
sure they're in grade, your sugar is in grade, it 
has to be between certain specifications. And I 
don't know, proper placement of the seals and the 
sanitation of the sugar. 
Q Okay. Did you do any sampling, take any 
other samples than the one you just described every 
200 or 500 bags? 
A No. 
Q Is there another sample that's taken to be 
tested for purity or anything like that? 
A Yes. It's called a composite. 
Q Okay. The composite sample? 
A Everytime I take a sample I take a little 
bit of that and put it into your composite bottle. 
When you're done you have a little bit of sugar from 
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the beginning, the middle and the end and you take 
it to the lab and they run the pads over it and 
check for ash or whatever. 
Q So the second sample, what you called the 
composite sample, is that test for purity of the 
sugar? 
Sure, yeah. 
And any contaminants and that kind of 
A 
Q 
thing? 
A 
Q 
A 
Sure . 
How is that composite sample taken? 
A little wand that you hold under the 
spout where the sugar is coming out. 
Q The wand is something that collects it? 
A Yeah, it has a little bucket on it and you 
fill it up and pour it into these little plastic 
bottles . 
Q If you're filling a rail car, how long do 
you take a sample with this wand? 
A To start, every 500. Okay. When you get 
to going, you take one at the start, then every 500 
or 150, or it could be at the start or every 200, 
depending on the customer, depending on what they 
want . 
Q Are there two different sampling 
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some lab people to do the testing of the sugar? 
A Yes . 
Q And for the composite test, you don't do 
any of that testing? 
A No. Well, some of them will sit there all 
weekend long before somebody comes in Monday and 
does it . 
Q So I take it that you're not in the 
position yourself to judge the quality or the purity 
of the sugar of any one shipment? 
A No . 
Q And as a bulk loader, do you fill out any 
forms? 
A Yes . 
Q You fill out just one form or multiple 
forms, or how do you do that? 
A We fill out three. 
Q Okay. Can you describe the three forms 
you fill out? 
A One of them is your shipping report. 
Q What do you fill out on a shipping report? 
A The seal numbers, what cell are you coming 
out of, the car number, the seals, the numbers you 
put on the car, what time you started, finished. 
Q And this is on the shipping report? 
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A Yes . 
Q Okay. What's the other form you fill out 
or second form you fill out? 
A Inspection report. 
Q Okay. What is that? 
A That's when you write down each number of 
the seals you put on the car, then you check, and on 
the bottom-- the top portion is supposed to be 
filled out by somebody else. It's supposed to be 
filled out by the foreman. I used to do it at one 
time and I was told not to do it no more. The 
bottom part that you fill out, was your car ready, 
cleaned, ready for loading, you write down yes. 
Q So do you check out the car and then you--
A Some cars you check more closely than 
others, but yes . 
Q Okay. And what's the third form you fill 
out? 
A Well, I used to fill it out but I wouldn't 
sign it, I would get it ready for my foreman, and it 
would be the seal report. 
Q This is another report? 
A Uh-huh (affirmative). 
Q Another piece of paper? 
A Uh-huh (affirmative). 
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1 A Yes. 
2 Q And on the seal report do you put down 
3 each seal number? 
4 A Yes. 
5 Q Is there anything else that goes on this 
6 seal report? 
7 A No. 
8 Q Is there a place for you to sign it? 
9 A Not for me. 
10 Q And the bulk loader doesn't sign the seal 
11 report? 
12 A No. 
13 Q And what do you do with this document, the 
14 seal report document, when you're finished? 
15 A I just set it out for my foreman. 
16 (Exhibit 5 marked for identification,) 
17 Q (BY MR. GAVRE) Mr. Sparrow, let me show 
18 you what's been marked as Exhibit No. 5. Will you 
19 take a minute to look at it? I'm not going to ask 
20 you anything about this particular document, but I 
21 was hoping you could identify for me the kind of 
22 document it is. 
23 A It's the inspection report. 
24 Q Okay. So is this one of the three 
25 documents that you, as a bulk loader, fill out? 
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A Uh-huh, yes. 
Q And I notice at the top it's labeled 
Initial and Final Inspection, Bulk Shipments. And 
then it's got several categories, the first one 
being Initial Inspection, the second one being Car 
Cleaning Report and the third being Car Loading 
Report. And does a bulk loader like yourself or Mr 
Waddoups fill out just the Car Loading Report 
section of this? 
A Yes . 
Q So this is one of the three reports you 
regularly fill out? 
A Yes, down here. 
Q Is that correct? 
A Yes . 
Q And you only fill out the section of the 
page that comes under the title Car Loading Report; 
is that correct? 
A Yes . 
Q And then after you check the boxes yes or 
no you put the date and time, and do you p u t -
excuse me. You don't put the date and time, that's 
under the next section, but would you normally put 
your signature where it says Signature - Bulk 
Loader? 
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1 A Yes. 
2 MR. CARR: Just so I'm clear, we're 
3 talking only about the 15 lines between Car Loading 
4 Report and Final Inspection and Approval for 
5 Shipment; is that correct? 
6 THE WITNESS: Yes. 
7 MR. GAVRE: Well, I don't know if it's 
8 15. I do see the numbering, although it looks like 
9 at least numbers 1 and 2 appear to be--
10 MR. CARR: You're right. 
11 MR. GAVRE: -- above the heading. 
12 Q (BY MR. GAVRE) But let me ask Mr. 
13 Sparrow, just looking at this document, No. 5, you 
14 see along the sides there is a place for seal 
15 numbers and I see on the left-hand side it's 
16 numbered 1 through 15 for top of car and then it's 
17 numbered 1 through 15 for bottom of car, and I see 
18 that some seal numbers on this particular one are 
19 filled in? 
20 A Yes. 
21 Q Do you, as the bulk loader, have any role 
22 in putting in these seal numbers on this page? 
23 A On this side, no. 
24 Q You're talking about, just so the record 
2 5 indicates - -
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A On the left-hand side, no. On this side, 
on the right-hand side, yes. These are the seals 
that we'll be putting on the car. These are inbound 
seals. When the car comes in they should be sealed. 
Q Okay. So in filling out thisreport, 
which is Exhibit 5, you fill in the seal numbers of 
the seals you put on--
A Yes . 
Q -- is that correct? Both on the top of 
the car and the bottom of the car? 
A Yes . 
Q So there's more openings to be sealed on 
the top of the car than there are on the bottom of 
the car? 
A Yes. 
Q So you put these numbers in on the 
right-hand column, but on the left-hand column over 
here, you don't do any of that? 
A No. 
Q Is that correct? 
A No . 
Q And then when you're through you would 
sign your name as bulk loader; is that correct? 
A Yes . 
(Exhibit 6 marked for identification,) 
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Q (BY MR. GAVRE) Mr. Sparrow, let me show 
you what's been marked as Exhibit 6. Again, I'm 
just using this as an example of perhaps the kind of 
form you were testifying about. I'm not going to 
ask you any questions about this particular one. 
But this looks to me like a shipping report or 
perhaps part of a shipping report. Does it look 
familiar to you? 
A Yes. It's a customer order. 
Q Okay. Is this one of the three documents 
you were describing before that you filled out? 
A Yes . 
Q And is this what's called an SR or 
Shipping Report? 
A Yes . 
Q And I notice on this form or on Exhibit 6, 
on the bottom third of the page there's something 
that's labeled Bulk Car Loading Chart. Do you see 
that? 
A Yes . 
Q And as a bulk loader do you fill out part 
of this chart? 
A Yes. 
Q And what part do you fill out? 
A All of it. 
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Q Okay. And you put your name down as the 
bulk loader? 
A Yes . 
Q And do you just put your name down or do 
you go ahead and sign it the way you sign the other 
form? 
A You just write down Sparrow. 
Q So you don't actually sign it, you just 
indicate that you were, in fact, the bulk loader? 
A Uh-huh (affirmative). 
Q Okay. Now, in addition to these two 
documents, Exhibit 5 and Exhibit 6, there's a third 
document that you fill out; is that right? 
A You don't have to. I used to just do it 
to help my foreman. 
Q And that's a form--
A The seal numbers, and you just write down 
the seal numbers. 
Q But that's not a form as bulk loader 
you're asked to fill out? 
A No . 
Q But you used to do it for a while? 
A Yeah. 
Q As a favor to your foreman? 
A Yes . 
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MR. CARR: Don't argue with me. 
MR. GAVRE: Just make your objection. 
That's all have you to do. I can go on. 
MR. CARR: Let me finish it before you 
keep talking, okay? 
MR. GAVRE: Go ahead. 
MR. CARR: The objection is you're asking 
him to interpret a legal document and he's not 
qualified, it would be pure speculation on his 
part . 
MR. GAVRE: I didn't ask him to interpret 
any document. 
Q (BY MR. GAVRE) Mr. Sparrow, you testified 
earlier about an occasion in which you called in and 
spoke with Bill Stewart and said that you would be 
in at a certain time and it turned out you fell 
asleep and you didn't get in until later. Do you 
remember that? 
A Yes . 
Q And you were testifying about that in 
connection with your working for the Target store. 
I believe you said that in fact you told Bill 
Stewart that you were tired and that's why you had 
fallen asleep? 
A Yeah. 
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Q Is it your understanding that that was an 
unexcused absence? 
MR. CARR: Same objection. You can 
answer. 
THE WITNESS: That it was an unexcused 
absence? 
Q (BY MR. GAVRE) Yes. 
A And that should have been my first one. 
The one dating back to September 10th, I have no 
recollection at all on that. 
(Exhibit 8 marked for identification.) 
Q (BY MR. GAVRE) Mr. Sparrow, let me show 
you a document that's been labeled as Exhibit 8. 
Again, I assume you have not seen this before. Let 
me just state for the record that this is a 
handwritten note that Bill Stewart made about the 
incident, I believe, Mr. Sparrow that you were 
talking about. If you want to--
A "I talked to James Sparrow about not 
being"- -
MR. CARR: Wait a minute. I interpose an 
objection, again, he has not seen this document. 
MR. GAVRE: I didn't say he had. 
MR. CARR: It's hearsay. Listen, you 
don't need to argue with me. This is just a 
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deposition, I can put my objections on the record. 
MR. GAVRE: I know, you're just slowing 
this down. No one is asking him to authenticate or 
corroborate this. This may be--
MR. CARR: He can read it silently, he 
doesn't need to read it into the record. 
MR. GAVRE: That's true, but I asked him 
too and he did. 
MR. CARR: Make it an Exhibit. 
Q (BY MR. GAVRE) It is an Exhibit. 
A "I talked to James Sparrow about not being 
to work on time. He called at 7:15 a.m., said he 
would be here at 8:00 a.m. He fell back to sleep 
and did not show up until 10:00 a.m. He was given 
four hours unexcused and explained what would happen 
if he had any more unexcused absences." 
Q Does that refresh your recollection of 
this incident? 
A Not the September 10th. I know that's 
what it's dated. As far as that's what more or less 
was said between Bill Stewart and I when we talked, 
but I thought it was at a later date. 
Q That's fine. But there's no question that 
this event happened? 
A Yes . 
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A I didn't drive. I rode. 
Q But your sickness, whatever it was, didn't 
prevent you from going to Nevada? 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
Nevada--
A 
Q 
No, it didn't. 
So you could have gone to work that day? 
No, I couldn't have. 
You were well enough to go in a car to 
That's also almost ten hours later. 
Okay. So are you saying you felt better 
by the time you went to Nevada? 
A Some better, but I was still in bed, 
though. 
Q Tell me again, how did you feel, what kind 
of illness did you have that led you to call in 
sick. 
A I just-- it was just nerves in my 
stomach. I just felt really queasy and I just 
didn't feel like going to work mostly. It was just 
the place had gotten to me and I just didn't feel 
like being there. 
Q So you called in sick? 
A Yes. 
Q And then you got on the road with your 
ex-wife; is that what you said? 
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A Yes . 
Q And the two of you drove to Nevada? 
A Yes. 
Q And then at some point you were stopped by 
police; is that correct? 
A Yes . 
Q And were you driving at that time? 
A The first time, no, the second time yes. 
Q So the car was stopped twice? 
A Yes. 
Q And the first time it was stopped it was 
ex-wife driving? 
A Yes . 
Q And why was the car stopped? 
A Speeding. 
Q And then did your ex-wife get a speeding 
et? 
A Yes. 
Q And then did you take over driving after 
•? 
A No . 
Q Okay. At some point later you took over 
driving? 
A I took over, yes. 
Q And then you were stopped by the police 
A Yes . 
Q And they saw that there was a bench 
warrant out for you and so you were taken to the Ely 
jail; is that right? 
A Yes. 
Q And that was because there was a bench 
warrant out from a prior incident and you hadn't 
paid the fine? 
A Correct, yes. 
Q So when you were in the Ely jail, did you 
ask someone to call in for you? 
A My sister. 
Q Did you tell her what you wanted her to 
say to the company? 
A I told her to say I'm in jail. 
Q And you spent four nights in jail? 
A Three or four. I can't say for sure. I 
know I missed the last three days of work. I think 
it was only three, but by the time I got back to 
Twin-- three nights for sure, it might have been 
four . 
(Exhibit 10 marked for identification.) 
Q (BY MR. GAVRE) Okay. Mr. Sparrow, I've 
handed you what's been marked as Exhibit 10, which I 
assume you have not seen before, although you may 
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1 have. Have you seen this? 
2 A No. 
3 Q This is what we obtained from the County 
4 of Elko, the record of the court proceeding 
5 involving you that you've just been testifying 
6 about. If you would turn to the second page of the 
7 document - -
8 MR. CARR: Again, same objections, this 
9 document is hearsay as to this witness. 
10 MR. GAVRE: That's fine. 
11 Q (BY MR. GAVRE) You see that there are 
12 dates running down the left-hand column and if we 
13 I get to the last two dates on the page you'll see 
14 that one says 5-21-95 and then it says, "Defendant 
15 was arrested and booked on warrant in Ely, County of 
16 Elko. State of Nevada." So the 21st is the day 
17 after you called in the first time so perhaps you 
18 were arrested around midnight? 
19 A It was something like that. Probably by 
20 the time they booked me or whatever. 
21 Q It was the next day? 
22 A The time I come in from the police, yeah. 
23 Q The next entry down, "Defendant released 
24 on cash bail in the amount of $675." So that 
25 indicates that you were released on the 25th of 
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2 
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May. Does that sound right to you? 
A Yes . 
Q What time of day were you released? 
A Was I released? It's about a four or 
five-hour drive. About one or two o'clock in the 
morning because I got back to twin at six o'clock 
because I went straight to the sugar factory and my 
shift had just gotten over at 6:00. 
Q So on the 25th of May you drove back to 
Twin Falls? 
A Yes . 
Q From were you in Elko or Ely? 
A Ely. 
Q And you said you went right back to the 
plant? 
A 
Q 
Yes . 
And your shift had just finished for the 
day? 
A Yes. I got there like at 6:20 in the 
morning and I worked a night shift and they was, I 
guess if I remember right, I can't remember what day 
it was, they had had like that Friday and Saturday 
and Sunday off. I just went out there and nobody 
was there. The other shift just came on, nobody was 
out there so I waited a little bit, called my 
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foreman at home, he told me to call Bill Stewart. 
Q I'm sorry, I couldn't hear you. 
A Then he told me to call Bill Stewart. 
Q Did you talk to anyone at the plant while 
you were there? 
A No. 
Q You phoned your foreman at home, and 
that's Wayne--
A Darwayne. 
Q Excuse me, Darwayne. What did you tell 
him? 
A 
Q 
A 
I asked him if I was fired and h e -
Why did you ask him if you were fired? 
Because I spent three days in jail and I 
should have worked. I worked Friday. I missed 
three days of work. That's unexcused. Plus I knew 
I had one before and that's four, and I knew I coul 
be terminated for that. 
Q You knew you could be terminated for 
unexcused absences and you had enough to be 
terminated? 
A Yeah. 
Q Did you say anything else to Darwayne 
besides asking whether you were fired? 
A No, not that I can remember. 
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something and I talked to him the next day. 
Q What did you tell Bill Stewart the next 
day? 
A I asked him what was going on. He said, 
Well, I had to sign the paper saying you were fired, 
discharged the 22nd. 
Q Okay. Did he say why? 
A I can't remember. I'm sure he did. 
Q Okay. What did you tell him? 
A That's when I asked him if there was-- he 
asked me if I wanted to take it a step higher. I 
said, Well, like what, talk to Vic? He says, Well, 
-I have already done that. I said, You have, Bill? 
And he said yes. I said, should I talk to Bill? 
Yes. Then I go, That won't make any difference, and 
he said, Yes, it does. Like I said before, I have 
respect for Bill Stewart and if he says, You're 
fired, then you're fired. So I just went along with 
him . 
Q Okay. Was anything else said? 
A No. 
Q Did you tell him anything about why you 
had been arrested or why you were in jail? 
A Not that I can remember. Oh, they came 
up. He asked me, he goes-- he asked me what time I 
219 
MR. CARR: Especially if he's reported it. 
THE WITNESS: Can you repeat it now? 
Q (BY MR. GAVRE) Was there any question in 
your mind that being absent from work because you're 
in jail is an unexcused absence? 
A I have always believed before that it was. 
Q It was always believed that it was an 
unexcused absence? 
A Yes . 
Q So by the time you got back to work on the 
25th and your shift was finished you had four 
unexcused absences; is that correct? 
A Correct. 
Q What happened next after you had this 
telephone conversation with Bill Stewart on the 26th 
of May, 1995? 
A What happened next? I went to Blake's 
house and--
Q What did you tell Blake? 
A I didn't know he was fired at the time. 
Actually, I went next door to Blake's house because 
I was seeing a girl that lived next door to Blake. 
And then I see Blake's truck there and I go over 
there because he should have been at work. I said, 
What are you doing? And he goes, Like I'm fired. 
222 
1 Bulk Car Loading Chart, did you do anything else? 
2 A No. 
3 Q Regarding this car? 
4 A No. Just the part I pointed about void 
5 and that, that's all. 
6 Q You wrote in that part. We're looking at 
7 Exhibit 6. Is any other portion of the handwritten 
8 portion of Exhibit 6 in your handwriting? 
9 A No . 
10 Q Do you recognize the other handwriting on 
11 Exhibit 6? 
12 A Blake Waddoups. 
13 I Q Okay. Did you ever tell anyone at 
14 Amalgamated that you did not want to sign off on 
15 shipments of adulterated sugar? 
16 A Well, those two cars, I don't think it was 
17 that big of a deal if he would have or not. It was 
18 supposed to be destroyed. 
19 Q But did you ever tell anyone at 
20 Amalgamated that you did not want to sign off on 
21 shipments of adulterated sugar? 
2 2 A No. 
23 Q On these cars or any other cars 
24 subsequently? 
25 A Well, like that one car where I thought I 
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lost the plastic, or the cardboard in, but that was 
taken care of, so just that. And a couple of months 
before that I was taking a hygrometer, I was taking 
a reading towards the end of the car and I was 
pulling it back up and I hit it along the side of 
the hatch and two little small batteries came out of 
it and one of them I found and the other one I never 
did find so I suspected it landed in the car. And I 
didn't want my name to go to that if they were going 
to send it to a customer, but those were the only 
times, you know, I wouldn't want to sign my name to 
paperwork if it wasn't going to be taken care of and 
it was. 
Q So you never told anyone at Amalgamated 
Sugar that you didn't want to sign off on shipments 
of sugar because it had sugar contaminated from the 
Mike Davis accident? 
A No. 
Q What is meant by the term "seal reports" 
or is that a term that means anything to you? 
A It's just a like another precaution of 
being sure when the locomotives-- you know, when 
they take the cars to be shipped, that they are 
secure. They're supposed to look to be sure that 
the cars are sealed and then on another piece of 
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Q Now, did you sign any reports or sign your 
name to any documents under duress? 
A Well, maybe you just haven't been there to 
feel the pressures and all this. Yes, it felt under 
duress. 
Q Did you ever object to signing some form? 
A No. 
Q And have someone tell you--
A I didn't object, I just went and did it on 
my own, I went and took my name off of these. 
Q You didn't care--
A I didn't care what anybody was going to 
•say, I wanted my name off of it. 
Q I just want to be sure with respect to 
what you're saying. With respect to the rail cars 
that were loaded on the day of the Mike Davis 
accident, you took your name off of the Bulk Car 
Loading Chart; is that correct? 
A Yes. Well, yes. Order form, I still call 
that the order form. 
Q That's fine with me. I'm not familiar 
with these forms the way you are. Now, at any later 
date did you refuse to sign some form? 
A No. 
Q Did you at any later date tell anyone at 
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Amalgamated that you didn't want to sign some form? 
A No. 
Q So as you continued to work as a bulk 
loader, for each rail car you would get a form like 
Exhibit 6; is that correct? 
A Yes . 
Q And you would fill it out as this one is 
filled out; is that correct? 
A Yes . 
Q And you would put your name down as the 
bulk loader? 
A Yes . 
Q And would you sign the form where it says 
Final Inspection and Sealed? 
A If I did. 
Q Yes, sir, of course. 
A If I started the car and left like an hour 
later, my name would just be there on Preload. If I 
had just started loading it, Preload. 
Q If you were the bulk loader? 
A From start to finish, yes, I would sign 
it . 
Q Then you would sign on the form that is 
Exhibit 6 on the line that says Final Inspection and 
Sealed; is that correct? 
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A Yes. I would sign it and the foreman 
would sign it. 
Q Is there any occasion when you refused to 
sign it? 
A Refused, no. 
Q Was there any occasion in which you said 
to anyone that you didn't want to sign it? 
A No. 
Q Was there any occasion in which someone 
pressured you to sign it? 
A No. If there was ever-- there was a 
couple of times, it seems like a Car Loaded By Blake 
Waddoups, sometimes it would have two people's names 
on it or three maybe, where it has happened in the 
past, but let's say head trims were not free of 
crusty sugar and I didn't want to load it. I would 
put my name there and I would go talk, because we've 
done it before, I would go, I don't like this. He 
would say, Load it and put my initials, and he would 
initial it to show it was like it was inspected by 
both of us. That's happened before. 
Q But that doesn't have anything to do with 
the Mike Davis accident, does it? 
A No. But I would have never stuck my name 
on it if he never would have initialed it, you know. 
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A No. 
Q In 1995 did you have problems or 
difficulties with any employees, management 
employees or nonmanagement employees at the company? 
A Management employees? 
Q Or nonmanagement. I'm asking, you know, a 
big question. 
A Just my co-worker. 
Q Is that Sam Garcia? 
A Uh-huh (affirmative). 
Q And you've explained that he wasn't a very 
good worker, in your view, and you were having 
difficulty with him because he wasn't doing his job 
well enough? 
A Correct. 
Q Aside from those difficulties, did you 
have difficulty with anyone at Amalgamated? 
A No. 
Q Have you been in good health since you 
left Amalgamated? 
A Yes. I just had a physical done two weeks 
ago . 
Q And what was the result of the physical? 
A She said I was very healthy. 
Q And have you been in good health since May 
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'95 when you left Amalgamated? 
A No. 
Q Pardon? 
A Not-- physically, yes, but emotionally, 
no . 
Q Can you explain that? 
A Well, just being fired it really bummed me 
out. It really made me feel like I was a nobody, a 
nothing, like I wasn't a worth a fight for, to stay 
on there at the sugar factory when I tried so hard 
to do them a good job. If they knew how many breaks 
I missed and how many times I missed lunch to make 
•them look good, and then they didn't try once for 
me. It just made me feel like I wasn't worth it and 
it just kind of made you go, Wow, you know. 
Q Okay. 
A I couldn't believe it. I still don't. 
Q Okay. But aside from being bummed out, or 
whatever term you want to use, from being fired, 
have you been otherwise in good health? 
A Well, physically, yeah. 
Q Have you seen a doctor since you left 
Amalgamated Sugar other than the doctor for the 
physical you just mentioned? 
A Just when I have to go take drug testing 
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1 to go to these different jobs. 
2 Q So different jobs require employee drug 
3 testing and you go and have that done? 
4 A That's the only time I've had to see a 
5 doctor. I've never had to get counseling or 
6 nothing. I thought about it, but me and Blake would 
7 help ourselves. We would talk to each other. We 
8 helped ourselves through a lot more than any of 
9 those people will ever know. 
10 Q So you haven't seen a psychologist or 
11 psychiatrist or therapist since you left 
12 Amalgamated; is that correct? 
13 I A Correct. 
14 Q Have you been on any kind of medication 
15 since you left Amalgamated? 
16 A No. 
17 Q When you left Amalgamated in May of 1995, 
18 did you immediately begin looking for work? 
19 A I would take a month. 
20 Q So you didn't look for work for about a 
21 month? 
22 A Correct. 
23 Q Were you able to work at that time? Aside 
24 from not looking for a job, were you able to work if 
25 you had a j ob? 
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1 reference? 
2 A Bill Stewart. 
3 Q Okay. What did you ask Bill Stewart? 
4 A Well, I went to Bill Stewart one day and I 
5 asked him, What the hell is this-- well,, okay. I'm 
6 going to refer to when I applied at the beet dump 
7 and they said no. When that lady talked to Clara in 
8 personnel she just said, No, we don't even want him 
9 on the grounds. After that I went and talked to 
10 Bill and I said, Bill, what the hell are you guys 
11 doing saying this? He says, From now on just tell 
12 them to call me and I'll give you a good one, and I 
13 said thanks. 
14 Q And do you know whether anyone ever called 
15 Bill Stewart? 
16 A As far as I know, I think one person has. 
17 Q Do you know who that would be? 
18 A I believe it would be Oreida Foods. 
19 Q And you worked at Oreida? 
20 A Just through the temporary service out in 
21 their cellars, not in the factory itself. When I 
22 did in the factory then I applied. 
23 Q You applied for a job at Oreida? 
24 A Yes. 
25 Q And you think that someone at Oreida may 
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have called Bill Stewart? 
A Yes. 
Q Why do you think that? 
A Well, they were going to-- they were going 
to hire me. They put me through their physical, 
drug testing and everything and everything passed, 
and I don't know if they talked to Bill Stewart or 
if they talked to somebody else. Then all of a 
sudden they just said, We don't need you, and they 
just let me go. I didn't even have a chance to work 
or nothing. But first they set up extra 
appointments and I went through their physicals and 
everything. I had to take two physicals, one that 
they gave there at the factory and one at a doctor, 
and it included drug testing, and everything came 
back good and the next think I know, I can't say for 
sure, it's like they called the sugar factory and 
the sugar factory kind of told them what was going 
on and they said, No, we won't hire you then. 
Q So you applied for a job at Oreida and you 
went through the physical exams, etc., and you did 
the drug test? 
A Yes . 
Q And then Oreida told you they weren't 
hiring; is that correct? 
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A Yes . 
Q Did they say why they were not hiring you? 
A They said they had everybody they needed. 
Q Okay. Did they say anything else? 
A No. She said I would be one of the first 
people they would call. They never did. 
Q Do you remember the name of the person you 
spoke to at Oreida? 
A Linda, the first name is Linda. 
Q And she was the person who told you that--
A She was the personnel office who called 
Clara at the sugar factory. 
Q This woman named Linda at Oreida said to 
you that they have everyone that they need right 
now? 
A Yes . 
Q And that you would be among the first 
called if they needed more people? 
A Yes, which she never did. And I went 
there and applied again just a few weeks ago because 
they had it advertised in the paper and everything 
they needed people and I have done that kind of work 
before, and at least I've got experience, and why 
they won't hire me, I have no idea. 
Q So you applied a second time at Oreida? 
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1 A Correct. 
2 Q So you don't know what went on at the 
3 factory during the days of those four days; is that 
4 correct? 
5 A Correct. It should have been .cleanup, 
6 though. 
7 Q Right. Before we took this last break you 
8 were talking about your application for employment 
9 at a company called Oreida. 
10 A Yes. 
11 Q Did anyone at Oreida tell that you Oreida 
12 had contacted Amalgamated Sugar about you? 
13 I A No. They just said they would, but as far 
14 as if they did or not, I have no idea. 
15 Q Do you know if anyone for Amalgamated 
16 Sugar was in contact with any of your subsequent 
17 employers or any of the companies you applied for 
18 work at? 
19 A Just what I told you about the beet dump. 
20 Q Right. 
21 A That's the only time. 
22 Q Okay. So you don't know of any 
23 communications between anyone at Amalgamated Sugar 
24 and any other employer regarding you; is that 
25 correct? 
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A Correct. 
MR. GAVRE: I don't think I have any 
further questions at this time. 
MR. CARR: No questions. 
MR. GAVRE: How do you want to. handle 
signing, any suggestions? Send it to him with 
instructions? Do you want to have it sent directly 
to Mr. Sparrow? 
MR. CARR: Or you can send it to us and--
probably send it to us. 
THE WITNESS: It will be best to send it 
to you because I'm moving real soon. 
(Whereupon, the taking of the deposition 
was concluded at 4:30 p.m.) 
--00O00--
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Tab 3 
INFORMATION SHEET FOR THE TWIN FALLS FACTORY 
SAFETY 
1. Work as safely and carefully as possible. If you are not sure 
if something is safe, ask your Foreman. 
2. Report all injuries, no matter how small, to your Foreman and 
the First Aid Station in the Factory Lab immediately. All 
visits to the doctor or hospital for work related injuries 
require prior approval of the Safety Director. 
3* In each work area, there is a list of special safety equipment 
needed in that area. You are responsible for checking out and 
using this equipment. The safety equipment is located in the 
Storeroom or Tool Crib. 
ATTENDANCE 
1. You must come in, on time, every day your shift is scheduled 
to work. If you will be late, or absent, you must call in to 
the factory to report it. Phone numbers are 733-6888 or 733-
4104. Failure to do this is grounds for immediate dismissal. 
It is your responsibility to get to work and be on time. All 
reasons that you may choose to miss work for may not be 
excused. For example if you do not have a ride to work and 
you miss the full shift this absence will be unexcused. It is 
your responsibility to clear all absences with your 
supervisor. The maximum number of unexcused absences you can 
receive before being terminated is three (3). 
GENERAL INFORMATION 
1. No pay advances will be given. 
2. The time clock and most lockers are in the locker room. 
Please keep all personal belongings in your locker that you do 
not need at your station. 
3. Lunch and break periods will be scheduled by your Foreman. 
Where breaks are authorized away from the work station they 
are limited to ten (10) minutes maximum and lunch is thirty 
(30) minutes maximum„ 
4. Tou may park your car in an unmarked spot in the parking lot. 
LOCK TOUR CAR. Employees are not allowed in the parking lot 
during working hours. 
5. Phone calls are permitted only during breaks and only from the 
pay phone in the locker room. 
6. With a few exceptions, everyone will be on a rotating shift. 
Tour scheduled days off will be according to what shift letter 
you are assigned to. 
7. All new employees are on probation for forty-five (45) days. 
8. The Storeroom is located in the center of the factory. 
9. AAyone completing campaign will be offered a campaign job next 
year before anyone new is hired. 
10. At the end of campaign, there may be a few intercampaign 
positions available. They will be given to the campaign 
workers who show an interest in year round employment, have a 
skill we need, have established good work habits which 
includes good attendance. 
11. Radios, tape recorders, etc. are not permitted in the Factory. 
*~~ *
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(a) quit, retires, or 
(b) is discharged for just cause, or 
(c) fails to report within the reasonable 
time specified in the notice for 
Campaign employment, which notice 
will be sent to the last address he has 
furnished to the Company. 
13.3 SENIORITY LISTS: The Company will 
provide two seniority lists at each factory on 
February 1, April 1, June 1, and September 1 
of any year, In addition, the Company will pro-
vide seniority lists at other reasonable peri-
ods providing notification is given the Factory 
Accounting Manager on a timely basis be-
fore the end of a payroll period. One seniority 
list would be for Regular Employees and one 
would be for Non-Regular Employees. The 
Regular Employee list will be based on the 
number of hours of continuous service. The 
Non-Regular seniority list will be based on the 
number of months of Campaign worked. 
These lists will be posted for thirty (30) days 
for corrections and, if no objections are made, 
will be accepted as authentic lists. The appro-
priate Union officer shall be furnished a copy 
of both lists. 
ARTICLE 14 
DISCIPLINE AND DISCHARGE 
14.1 The Company has the right to discipline 
or discharge employees for just cause. Dis-
charge shall be evidenced in writing which 
shall state the reason for the discharge and 
shall be given to the employee at the time of 
his discharge. An employee who believes his 
discipline or discharge is not justified shall have 
recourse to the grievance procedure under the 
Agreement. 
14.2 Written warnings are not required nor 
forbidden by this Article. A copy of ail written 
warnings (Incident Report Form) and dis-
charge notices will be given to the Union. The 
Union will acknowledge receipt of such copy 
by initialing the Company copy of the notices. 
Employee's signature does not constitute per-
sonal admission of guilt, but acknowledges 
receipt of document. 
ARTICLE 15 
EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATION 
15.1 STEWARDS: The Local Unions may 
designate at least three (3) of their members 
to act as Stewards. Such Stewards shall not 
assume any of the duties or powers of a su-
pervisor. They shall be empowered by the 
Union to aid in adjusting grievances between 
employees and the Company. All grievances 
involving employees shall be adjusted when-
ever possible between the immediate super-
visor or the foreman under them, and the 
Employee Steward. In case they are unsuc-
cessful In their efforts to adjust grievances with 
these officials, the grievance shall be submit-
ted to the Employee's Committee hereinafter 
provided for. 
15.2 EMPLOYEES'COMMITTEE: The Lo-
cal Unions agree to designate from their mem-
bership a workmen's committee of three (3) 
employees whose name shall be posted on 
the Bulletin Board. 
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15.3 GRIEVANCE PROCEDURE: 
Step 1, An employee claiming a grievance 
shall put his grievance in writing to his Stew-
ard within five (5) scheduled working days of 
the Employee's knowledge of the occurrence 
to be grieved. The Steward shall attempt to 
settle the grievance through discussions with 
the Grievant and his immediate supervisor. 
Within two (2) scheduled work days after re-
ceipt of the grievance, the Steward shall no-
tify the Employee's Committee that he has not 
succeeded in a settlement of the grievance. 
Step 2. If the Steward has failed to settle the 
grievance with the immediate supervisor in 
Step 1, the Employee's Committee within three 
(3) scheduled working days after receiving the 
grievance from the Steward, shall pass upon 
the grievance. In the event the Employee's 
Committee decides the grievance is entitled 
to further consideration, they shall within two 
(2) scheduled work days submit the written 
grievance to the Local Management. The 
grievance shall briefly state the nature of the 
grievance, violation alleged and settlement 
request. The Second Step hearing will be held 
within five (5) scheduled work days of the re-
ceipt of the written grievance from the 
Employee's Committee. The Company shall 
give the Union a written decision within five 
(5) scheduled work days of the Step 2 hear-
ing. Discharge grievances will start in Step 2 
and must be submitted directly to the 
Employee's Committee within five (5/ sched-
uled wonk days from the time the employee 
receives the written notice of discharge. 
Step 3. In the event the grievance is not settled 
in Step 2, either party, if they so desire, may 
within five (5) scheduled work days after the 
receipt of the second step answer, refer the 
grievance to the International Representative 
and/or the appropriate Company Official for 
further handling. If a satisfactory agreement 
cannot be reached between the International 
Representative and appropriate Company 
Official with thirty (30) days, it will then be re-
ferred to the local Union before proceeding into 
the arbitration procedure. Time is of the es-
sence and all grievances must be handled 
within the prescribed time limits set forth 
herein. Failure to do so shall constitute forfei-
tures of the written grievance by either party 
failing to do so. Time limits may be extended 
by mutual agreement between the parties. 
15.4 ARBITRATION PROCEDURE: If a 
grievance is to be carried to arbitration, either 
the Company or the Union shall notify the other 
party of its intention by Certified Mail within 
two (2) weeks after the parties have deter-
mined that a satisfactory settlement cannot be 
reached. 
If the Company and the Union are unable 
promptly to agree upon an impartial arbitra-
tor, the parties will request a list of arbitrators 
from the Federal Mediation and Conciliation 
Service. The impartial arbitrator shall be des-
ignated in accordance with the procedures of 
the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Ser-
vice. 
The Arbitrator shall have authority to act only 
with respect to grievances relating to the in-
terpretation or application of the provisions of 
this Agreement and his decision shall be final 
and binding on all parties involved. 
Each party shall pay its own expenses incurred 
in arbitration. The fees and expenses of the 
Arbitrator shall be borne equally by the Com-
pany and the Union. 
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15.5 EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATION: A 
Union representative may be present at meet-
ings involving disciplinary action by the Com-
pany if requested by the Employee. 
ARTICLE 16 
STRIKES AND LOCKOUTS 
16.1 It is mutually agreed that during the life 
of this Agreement If both parties to same abide 
by the terms of this Agreement there shall be 
no cessation of work of the employees or ac-
tion in any form taken or permitted by them 
impairing Employer's operation or affecting the 
distributions of his product, nor shall there by 
any lockout by Employer. 
ARTICLE 17 
SEVERANCE PAY 
17.1 SEVERANCE PAY GRANTED: In the 
event the operation of the sugar producing 
facilities of any of the plants covered by this 
Agreement is to be permanently discontinued 
by the Company, an Regular Employees, at 
the affected factory, with three or more years 
of continuous service shall be granted sever-
ance pay, unless the Company or Its succes-
sors offers the Employee employment either 
at the same or other location at a similar or 
reasonable rate of pay. The Employee will 
have the option of accepting the transfer to 
another factory or accepting severance pay. 
17.2 BENEFTTS ALLOWED: An eligible em-
ployee who has completed three (3) full years 
of continuous service shall receive severance 
pay of one (1) week's pay (40 hours) based 
upon the regular straight time base wage rate 
received by the Employee at the close of the 
last Campaign prior to the discontinuance of 
that factory operation. For each additional year 
of continuous service, an eligible employee will 
receive one (1) week's pay, on the same ba-
sis as indicated above, up to a maximum of 
thirteen (13) weeks severance pay. It is un-
derstood that upon receipt of severance pay, 
and employee relinquishes all recall, senior-
ity, and employment rights with the Company. 
ARTICLE 18 
MISCELLANEOUS 
18.1 BULLETIN BOARDS: The Company 
shall furnish employees suitable places for the 
posting of notices and bulletins pertaining to 
employee and Company affairs. Notices 
posted on the Union Bulletin Boards by the 
Union must bear the signature of the Presi-
dent or Secretary of the Local Union. 
18.2 UNION AFFAIRS: It is agreed that no 
Union activities or Union business of any kind 
be carried on by Stewards or other Union 
members during the time they are gainfully 
employed on shift by the Company. It Is fur-
ther agreed that Stewards or other Union of-
ficers may, if they wish, solicit Union members, 
collect membership dues, contact new employ-
ees, or otherwise carry on Union business in 
the Company locker room prior to and after 
the close of each shift, providing all parties 
concerned are off shift. In case of emergency,.. 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF 
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BLAKE WILLIAM WADDOUPS 
and JAMES EDWARD SPARROW, 
JR. , 
Plaintiffs, 
vs . 
THE AMALGAMATED SUGAR 
COMPANY, a Utah 
corporation, et al., 
Defendants. 
Case No. 950900441 
Judge Stanton Taylor 
DEPOSITION OF: 
BLAKE WILLIAM WADDOUPS 
The deposition of BLAKE WILLIAM WADDOUPS, 
a witness in the above-entitled cause, taken before 
LANETTE SHINDURLING, Registered Professional 
Reporter and Notary Public in and for the State of 
Utah, at the law offices of PARSONS, BEHLE & 
LATIMER, 201 South Main Street, Suite 1800, Salt 
Lake City, Utah, on the 13th day of September, 1996, 
commencing at 8:30 a.m. 
Associated Professional Reporters 
the process of what we're doing here today? 
A No. 
Q Mr. Waddoups, would you state your full 
name and address for the record? 
A Blake William Waddoups, HC66 Box 3-C, 
Declo, Idaho, 83323. 
Q Is that the address you just gave, is tha 
a mailbox or is that where you actually live? 
A That's a mailbox. 
Q Okay. And where is your residence? 
A It's close to that. It's in the country. 
Q Okay. You live somewhere in the vicinity 
of Declo, Idaho? 
A Yes. 
Q How long have you lived there? 
A For approximately-- right at about a year 
Q Okay. And where did you live before that 
A Twin Falls, Idaho. 
Q And where in Twin Falls, Idaho? 
A I can't remember the address. 588 1/2 
Adams, yes. 
Q Okay. And how long did you live there? 
A For seven years. 
Q Mr. Waddoups, are you currently employed? 
A Yes, I am. 
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Q And where do you work? 
A I work through Express Personnel Services 
Q What is Express Personnel Services? 
A A temporary personnel services. 
Q And where is that based or where does it 
have an office that you use? 
A Burley, Idaho. 
Q Okay. And are you working on a particula 
job through this temporary service? 
A Yes. 
Q Okay. Where are you working now? 
A For Darrell's Welding. 
Q Where is Darrell's Welding? 
A 165 500 South, Burley, Idaho. 165 East, 
guess it would be. 
Q And how long have you worked at that 
place? 
A Approximately six months. 
Q And how much are you being paid on that 
job? 
job? 
A $8 . 50 an hour. 
Q Are you receiving any benefits on that 
A Through Express I've got very minimal 
insurance that will cover my newborn child. 
Q So you have some medical insurance? 
A Yes . 
Q Does the medical insurance cover you as 
well? 
A Yes. 
Q And does it cover your wife? 
A I'm still not sure on that one. We're not 
legally married. 
Q Excuse me? 
A We're not legally married at this time. 
Q Okay. But you have a child? 
A Yes . 
Q And your current medical insurance does 
cover your child? 
A Yes. 
Q Do you have more than one child? 
A No. 
Q Are you currently looking for any other 
work? 
A I can't answer that. I haven't thought 
about it . 
Q Okay. But I take it you're not right now 
actively searching for another job? 
A At this exact moment, no, I'm down here. 
Q But you said you had been working for 
1 about six months at a welding company. 
2 A Yes. 
3 Q And do you anticipate that that job will 
4 continue for a while? 
5 A Not necessarily. I'm on through a 
6 temporary agency. 
7 Q Okay. So have you, while you've been 
8 working at this welding company, have you been 
9 looking for any other job besides the one you're on? 
10 A Yes. Earlier in working for him I looked 
11 for other welding, you know, positions. Not in the 
12 last probably two months. With the baby and these 
13 depositions, he's easy to work for. 
14 Q So I take it you have a new baby?-
15 A Yes. 
16 Q When you were looking for other jobs while 
17 you're at Darrell's Welding, do you recall what 
18 other jobs you looked for? 
19 A Welding jobs. 
20 Q Do you recall what companies or employers 
21 you applied to? 
22 A Idaho Sheet Metal. Mostly just looked in 
23 the papers for welding positions opening up. I went 
24 in and tried at Kodiak in Rupert and didn't get that 
25 job. 
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Q Is that a welding job? 
A Yes. 
Q Have you been looking specifically for 
welding jobs? 
A Yes. 
Q Is there some particular reason why you're 
focusing on welding jobs? 
A I'm good at it. 
Q So you haven't been looking for other 
types of jobs except for welding jobs? 
A Yes. 
Q Now, you said that you were good at 
welding. Did you get some training in welding or do 
you have prior job experience as a welder or how is 
it that you're good at welding? 
A It's just naturally something that you can 
do or you can't do. 
Okay. When did you first do welding as a 
job? 
A 
Q 
A 
As a job? 
Yes . 
That would have been November of last 
year. I came down to Ogden, lived with my parents 
and was working for Integra Manufacturing in 
Clearfield at the Freeport Center. 
Q What was the company again? 
A Integra. 
Q What kind of company is that or what kind 
of business is that? 
A It's a manufacturing company. A lot of 
welding goes on. 
Q And so when did you start working at 
Integra at Clearfield? 
A When? 
Q Yes. 
A In November of last year. 
Q November of '95? 
A Yes . 
Q And how long did you work there? 
A Approximately a month and-a-half. 
Q Okay. What happened after a month 
and-a-half? 
A They laid off swing and graveyard crews. 
I was on graveyard. 
Q So you got laid off? 
A Yes . 
Q Okay. In terms of employment, what did 
you do after you got laid off by that company? 
A I went back to Declo and got a job through 
Express within a matter of hours. 
13 
Q Okay. So I'm trying to figure out just 
the time frame. If you got that job in Integra in 
November of '95, is that what you said? 
A Yes . 
Q So was it in December of '95 when you got 
laid off? 
A Yes, approximately the 28th. Right after 
Christmas . 
Q Okay. So you went back to Declo and you 
got a job within, you said, a few hours? 
A Yes. 
Q Do you recall what company you worked for? 
A I went to work for John Smith, he owns an 
implement company, welding for him. 
Q Okay. And where is his company? 
A Burley, Idaho. 
Q And how long did you work for John Smith? 
A Off and on for probably two months. 
Q When you say off and on, you mean it 
wasn't a regular job? 
A It was not a full-time position. 
Q Was it a part-time position where you 
worked a few hours each day? 
A No. It was a week here, a week there, a 
few days there . 
14 
1 Q Okay. 
2 A It's a temporary service that sent me out 
3 on it. 
4 Q Right. Did you have any other work during 
5 the period you were doing the sort of on and off 
6 work for John Smith? 
7 A Not that I can recall. 
8 Q And when did your work for John Smith come 
9 to an end? 
10 A Boy, it had to have been around March 
11 somewhere. 
12 Q Of 1996? 
13 A Yes, of this year. 
14 Q And then what did you do for work after 
15 that? 
16 A I then, around then got on with Darrell's 
17 Welding. It was a few weeks later. 
18 Q So were you unemployed for a few weeks? 
19 A Yes. 
20 Q Did you collect any unemployment benefits 
21 during that period? 
22 A Yes, I did. 
23 Q Do you recall how many weeks of 
24 J unemployment benefits you have received? 
25 I A Overall, probably six. That spanned some 
-i c 
1 time into working for John Smith. 
2 Q Okay. So when you say overall six weeks 
3 of benefits, you don't mean they came in a six-week 
4 block? 
5 A No. 
6 Q But it came on more than one occasion? 
7 A Yes. 
8 Q But your recollection is it totaled about 
9 six weeks? 
10 A Yes. 
11 Q Okay. So then you went to work for 
12 Darrell's Welding, and that's where you're working 
13 today? 
14 A Yes. 
15 Q Okay. Let's go back a little bit further 
16 in time. My understanding is you left Amalgamated 
17 Sugar what, the end of May 1995? 
18 A Yes. 
19 Q And then you've described working in Utah 
20 in late '95? 
21 A Yes. 
22 Q Tell me what jobs you had after leaving 
23 Amalgamated Sugar up to the time you got that job in 
24 Clearfield that you described. 
25 A It was a few months after I was laid off, 
l 6 
fired, excuse me, a few months after I was fired I 
took a temporary job through Intermountain Staffing 
in Twin Falls. That lasted a few weeks and then I 
was unemployed again. 
Q What kind of job was that that you had 
through Intermountain Staffing? 
A I worked at Plastic Slip Sheets USA. 
Q What kind of work did you do there? 
A I was mixing their plastic resins for 
their process. 
Q Okay. And why did that work come to an 
end? 
A I decided to leave Twin about that time. 
Q So you voluntarily quit that job? 
A Yes. 
Q And when you left Twin Falls where did you 
go? 
A To Declo. 
Q Okay. How far is Twin Falls from Declo? 
A Approximately 50 miles. 
Q So after you moved to Declo then did you 
have a job in Declo when you moved there? 
A Not when I moved, but shortly afterwards, 
yes . 
Q And what job was that? 
17 
A I went through Express Personnel and they 
had a few little ones once in a while for a few 
days, different-- just any job. 
Q You don't recall, though, right now? 
A I worked for Petersen Construction for 
about a week and-a-half, two weeks. I worked for 
Rain for Rent for approximately three weeks. 
Q Why did these jobs come to an end? 
A They were a temporary job. The work was 
done . 
Q You earlier said that you moved from Twin 
Falls to Declo. Why did you leave Twin Falls? 
A Because of the way I had been treated and 
the way I felt in Twin Falls. 
Q When you say by the way you were treated, 
what are you referring to? 
A I'm referring to Michael Davis's death. 
Q Okay. Now, you said you moved to Declo 
and you got a few jobs? 
A Yes . 
Q And then did you get any additional jobs 
while you lived in Declo? 
A What do you mean, additional? 
Q Well, you said you had a few jobs and you 
described a couple of them and then at a later point 
18 
you moved down to Ogden and you said you lived with 
your parents and got a job in Clearfield. So have 
you described all the jobs that you had while you 
were at Declo? 
A I believe so. I don't recall any others. 
Q So, then, when did you move down to Ogden? 
A In November. 
Q And why did you leave Declo for Ogden? 
A I was going to come down here and go to 
welding school and get a job. 
Q Okay. Where were you thinking of going to 
welding school? 
A My parents had a few places picked out. I 
don't even know where they were. 
Q Did you actually apply to any welding 
program? 
A No, I hadn't. The job gave out before I 
had a chance to get into it. 
Q Okay. And that's the job in Clearfield 
that you referred to? 
A Yes . 
Q But are you saying that when you were in 
Declo and you decided to move to Ogden, at that 
point were you already thinking of going to welding 
school? 
19 
A Yes . 
Q And was that why you moved to Ogden, to be 
closer to some welding school? 
A It's where I could find a job. 
Q Okay. So you actually moved to Ogden 
first to find a job or to go to welding school? I'm 
just not clear, that's all. 
A To go to welding school, but to do that I 
had to have a job. I came down on a weekend, I got 
a job. I went back up, got my stuff and then stayed 
with the parents for as long as that job lasted. 
Q What was it that made you pick Declo as a 
place to move after you left Twin Falls? 
A My mother's brother lives there. 
Q So you have family there? 
A Yes . 
Q Were you living with your family members? 
A I was living with my uncle, yes. 
Q And are you living with your uncle now? 
A No. 
Q It's my understanding that after you were 
fired by Amalgamated you applied for unemployment 
benefits; is that correct? 
A Yes . 
(Exhibit 1 marked for identification.) 
20 
penalties for false statements made for the purpose 
of obtaining benefits." Do you see that? 
A Yes . 
Q Do you recall whether you read that 
statement at the time you filled out this form? 
A I don't remember. 
Q Okay. Did you, in fact, fill out this 
form truthfully? 
A To the best of my knowledge, yes. 
(Exhibit 2 marked for identification.) 
Q (BY MR. GAVRE) Mr. Waddoups, let me show 
you what's been marked as Exhibit 2, which consists 
of three pages regarding your claim for unemployment 
benefits. Why don't you take a minute to look over 
Exhibit 2. 
A (Reviewing document.) 
Q Mr. Waddoups, do you recognize Exhibit 2? 
A Yes . 
Q Looking just at the first page of Exhibit 
2, is that filled out in your handwriting? 
A Yes, it is. 
Q And at the very bottom of the page, does 
that appear to be your signature? I know it's a bad 
copy, but this is the best I could get. 
A There is no signature on this. 
22 
Q There's not? Okay. I was looking at this 
part down here. Does that-- this unfortunately is a 
xerox of a fax so it's poor quality. 
A No, that doesn't appear to be my 
signature. 
Q But you did fill out the first page of 
Exhibit 2; is that correct? 
MR. CARR: May I see that? 
THE WITNESS: I believe so. 
Q (BY MR. GAVRE) And did you fill out the 
first page of Exhibit 2 truthfully? 
A I believe so. 
Q If you would look near the bottom of page 
1 of Exhibit 2 there's a paragraph that's unnumbered 
number 11 and it says, "Additional Claimant 
Statement." Could you read the handwritten 
statement into the record? 
A It says, "Getting up in the morning after-
three months of trouble sleeping due to Mike Davis's 
death that occurred on my shift from equipment that 
I am empowered to operate on an every day basis. It 
was hard to do without"-- and it was supposed to say 
sleep in there somewhere. 
Q So it ends with the words "hard to do 
without," and you think--
o -* 
correct, the word yes is written in. 
A Yes. 
Q You signed this statement? 
A Yes . 
Q So I'm asking you if this is correct, and 
it is correct, right? 
A That's what it says, yes. 
Q Question 6 says, "If you were dismissed 
because of absences, had you been warned your absent 
rate was reaching unacceptable levels? How many 
warnings," and it has handwritten into it "2-3 
times." Is that a correct answer? 
A I guess so. 
Q Moving on to the next question, it said, 
"What time were you scheduled to begin," and it's 
written in "6:00 a.m." Is that correct? 
A Yes . 
Q And it goes on, "What time did you call in 
and let the employer," I believe it says "know you 
wouldn't be in," and the handwritten statement says, 
"I called in when I knew I was going to be late." 
Is that correct? 
A Yes . 
Q Question 9 says, "What happened on the day 
of discharge to cause dismissal," and the 
11 
about this particular conversation with Vic Jaro? 
A I'm not sure. Maybe I will have something 
later. I can't remember anything right at this 
moment. 
Q Okay. You said something to the effect 
that you asked Vic Jaro how he would like you to go 
to the public with this issue? 
A That's not what I said. 
Q Okay. Tell me what you said. 
A I asked him how he would feel about the 
public knowing about the way they've contaminated 
the silo and continued shipping as a food grade 
product with blood in it. 
Q Okay. 
A That was about all I said. 
Q Had you--
A Oh, I did mention the FDA, the news with 
that as it being the public. 
Q Were you saying you were thinking of going 
to the news or to the FDA? 
A I never said that. 
Q Okay. So in what respect did you make 
reference to the FDA or the newspaper or the news? 
A I asked him how he would like that 
personally, where it would put his job. 
65 
as he was absent. 
Do you know why he was absent? 
I couldn't speculate on that. 
Okay. You mentioned a Bobby Stone? 
Bobby Smith. 
Bobby Smith, excuse me. Who was Bobby 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
Smith? 
A He worked out in the mill on the same 
shift I did before I transferred out to the sugar 
warehouse. 
Q When did you transfer to the sugar 
warehouse? 
A I can't remember the exact time. It's 
when I went to do bulk load there, it must have been 
'94, I believe, '94-'95. I can't remember. 
Q How long were you a bulk loader? 
A I bulk loaded off and on through juice 
runs and summers off and on for probably eight 
years, but I had other jobs at the same time in the 
mill . 
Q I'm a little confused. Bobby Smith worked 
in the mill; is that what you said? 
A Yes . 
Q And you worked in the sugar warehouse as a 
bulk loader? 
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A Towards the end, yes, but I had worked 
with him out in the mill. 
Q And did the people in the mill work the 
same kind of shifts that the people in the warehouse 
worked? 
A Yes, they did. 
Q And so what are you saying about Bobby 
Smith, that he too was late for work? 
A I know that he missed a lot of time. 
Q By missed a lot of time you mean what? 
A I mean a lot of time. As far as I know, 
he had been, I guess, let go or whatever and brought 
back once before. 
Q Okay. I'm just trying to get it clear. 
When you say missed a lot of time, do you mean he 
missed days or late coming to work or was absent? 
A Yes, that's what I mean. 
Q Which of those things? 
A All of those. 
Q And how would you know that Bobby Smith 
was being late to work? 
A I answered that question. I worked with 
him in the mil1. 
Q Okay. And are you saying you would see 
him come in late? 
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Q L recalx xu being distributed to 
you? 
A No I' t h a t I i:an e m e m b e r , no . 
Q Do you recall seeing any s i nil i 1 u l« i I 
memos from the company about attendance, etc.? 
A Not necessari ] y , r1 
Q Waddoups, after you came to work at: 
Amalgamated Suga 
A Yes, 
Q 
A AFL- ~3 0. 
Q i d Hit: l u x L U C u u x G i i 
that w a s t h e r e * * :i^  -vr . - '^"NO 
A "" Miiiers. 
TV P 13 . I'lTl, ° ^  T* *•" 
THE WITNESS: Grain Millers. 
Q ( B Y II lll« J A \ HE I A i I w a s I II i f J < mi II . i l l " 
a g r e e m e n t b e t w e e n t h e g r a i n m i l l e r s u n i o n and 
/Vina I vj .ifiia L C,MJ 
A Y e s . 
Q A n ci 11: :i a t: ] a b o r a greement covered you? 
A 1 g uess so 
Q And did you ever receive copies w*. 
1 a b o r a g r e e m e n t ? 
^ j received one. 
Q L i e b o o k l e t ? 
A Y e s . 
Q ! in I ! 1 i, i r P i;i 11! 1 11, ! I a b o i a q r e e m e n t ? 
A I f e a d q u 1tr e , i I; - i t * "J J' . ' \r ^ r 
(Exfa narked for identification.) 
ft Q (BY MR. GAVRE) Mr Waddoups , ] et me show 
"' yo ii 11.11 • been marked as Exhibit 9 I • P t me tell 
H» you, !, hat this is a few pages out of. the la bur 
y agreement between your union and Amalgamated Sugar 
10 covering t lie " 'J Jf ' > > "| - pt1 " J " M.1 . IJI »*'«•• | x h i 11 i i "i" I i i o ) < 
11 familiar to you? 
1 2 A W e 1 I I i i in in I i I I 'j in y' < " i 111 i " " I i 1 
13 real book. 
1-11, , Q Yes , 
15 pamphlet Does . - caw; . ..: . \ •. .* 
1 6 A N O I L U l b U U C
 ; J J U L x J V I I W W W a e i ' c ' A^ o.'^ 
1 7 h e a d i n g , y e s . 
18 Q D i d y ou know t h a t --)d^v r h p " : abo r 
19 I a g r e e m e n t t h a n c o v e r e d you • • - . . l, l h e n 
2 ) i was a j u s t : c a u s e s t a n d a r d f o r d i s c h a r g e ? 
: . A 
2 2 ; Q Mi - , W a d d o u p s , i f y o u w o u 1 d t u r n :i n t o p a g e 
f :::: i f ill s p a g e s i n , 
\ d o y o u s c e t h a t " ? 
A 11 III In nil hi ( .1 M i l : ma f i v o ) . 
1 11 1 GA VR E : Make t i i e objection. 
M R . C A P R : T object to ^ h e form, of t: h e 
qu0'-'1 " " " '" ' L iL s vague and ambiguous. IL " i:» not 
c 1 ear w h e thni you're i s k i n g h i m w h e t h e r h e r e a > :i ' t" \ e 
win! il " nist c a u s e " in Exhibit Q » i w h e t h e r he has 
formed an o p i n i o n as to wHqf MI,-,! I ciu,.-- i >• i | , | 
it's the l a t t e r I o b j e c t „. .he b a s i s if c a l l s for a 
1 e g a 1 c o n c 1 u s i o n . 
Q (BY ] • 
i ii t e r p r e t: a t i o i: I 
just cause mean, 
t In :i s ] a I: • o i: a g i: < 
a n d i t s a y s t h a t 
d :i s• :: :i p ] :i ne o r d i s c h a r g e e T 
I ' in i us t a s k i n g y ou w h e t l : 
labor agreement that cover 
Amalgamatec J u gar 11 < i di d 
discharge 
, z ' a .* * a s K -119 
m r e a d i n g 
o n i p a i . v ha**" •: h& i - q ; 
*veeo ioi j uL> v- :a 
n w^r^ awarp t 
K 
& i; j> u t 
v ^ u. are 
e r e a t 
THE WJ'INESb: No 
Q ^' in. viAv'REy Dxd you kn^w that the 
labor agrees*-;:: . ^^ntained n grievance process? 
A JL uau neara abuu ;i levance process 
Q Had you ev^r reaa ^c;u" - h< :r ievance 
process in the c^xxcctive bargaining agreement 
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Do you recall him saying anything at a 11 •' 
HP 'irini What are we here for? T told him 
if the company wanted him *-~ tT,ow they woulii i <> i i 
him. .: L LuxnK x L ..c*^  ...7 place • e . : i 
that the , . 1 - -
 w©-*-o. contaminates 
.ridL s wiiy x wao s a v i n g a l i t t l e . problem 
t h e r e . 
So vi,u didn L LuJ I. Ken Weismore that? 
N'.\ ' Nil i . 
Do you recall anything more about what Ken 
we ib MI ,,ii(i ,ii IIII un:'i-it i [114 with Larry 
Dayley? 
I 111 111 ' I In' I ii'vc : e un, inyt h i nq . 
Do you recall him saying anything more 
I: ho *mat you've just recounted? 
* T. (don'1: recall him saying any I. h i iu.| . 
Q Did you have any other interaction w i t. h 
Ken weismore? 
A Nr. 
Q Wiii' t In' i ( in nllni ii ii i i i n •• I »•'wards oi an ' 
other union officials at. the plant, besides Ken 
W i i , i in i P ^ 
When? 
Q 
A 
dl any time. 
1
 *"imes there's supposed t^ b<=> n^^ > o" 
ua e x unexcused absence 
w: , resul1 .::s^:p inary ,i~ti~~ n Do yon ^^^a 
port diiuuc an unexcused 
absence about • n L 
A 
G r i r t r 
uu . JL i i ad n e v e r w o r k e d f o r B r e c k 
- —
 n ; f e a n d ho c a l l e d ni€ i MI « 
dLiiu feuctxucv-i jLo ••*: i g on m e . T h a t ' s w h a t I 
r e m e m b e r a b o u t i t . 
Q Do y o u r e c a l l n o t c a l l i n g i n ">i ri1'! c o m i n g 
i n ? 
A I d o n ' I r e c a l l . 
Q I I i I i ! , I  II I 
A 1 d o n ' ! r e c a J i . 
I \ Mil inn . i n 
may : : '. r; -i ve , y o i J ] u s 
iiciu uo c a x x i n oi: } ou 
A 
s c r e w - u^ 
s t a ^ t - "* 
s h i r t . , 
L l i d 
I j u s t d o n ' t r e c a 1 1 1 i rn a y h a v e D V L* I I .. I 
" c h e d u l i n g . A b o 111: t h e n t h e y u s e d t o 
w h <• 11 ' \/ e J y Ihi H I \ fti, i ", i In «i ii i i L n g 
r
.' x u : : an ' t: r e m e m b e r e x a c t: 1 y wha I 
Q O k a y D L d y o u t. h i n k a b o u t f i 1 i n g a 
y i l *. v ,ui i 11, 11 i t i n i, i n «"" j -1 «•' n l I'efiorf. ? 
1 I V il III i i • auii L MIUW dijuut g i i e v a n c e s 
a 
had 
unnmg and i 
i s U ^ *- -, r^  /^ 
e wuu w i ' doing 
some rea. :angert lings a ~~*" ^ad A ,rew 
re around me and that many peopl- * ryino *-^  dc: 
Q Waddoups, let m^ eV»ow von 
marked as Exhibit lb. „*i2 ^~~ w ^_J tane et moment 
just to read i t. 
A (Reviewing document.) 
Q Again. t 
think you wou1d. have seen before. 
Il !: R 0 b j €i <::: t :i :::) i i , f :: • i i n • :i a 1: i o n , 
h e a r s a y . 
Q ) ijt^L me j u a u D t a v • c h a t 
t h i s i s \. r y T) a y l e y **? ^  n t ^ ** mf* r e a d 
.lLu me iecora . L O d a t e d ^ - 2 8 - 9 3 , a p .m , 2 - B 
S h i f t " T T . a r r y _ 4 i ^ v v e r b a l I y wa I IK-I! \\ I «:i k H 
Waddoups a b o u t h i s p o o r a t t e n d a n c e o n t h e d a t e , " and 
11 in f 1 11 M i i i i
 t in i i u" ! i« y , A s .'::• i I J ( <i n i : 
Superintendent D o y o u r e c a 1 1 L a r r y D a y 1 e y t a 1 k i n g 
i iii e :i i :i S e p t: e in b e :i : 1 9 9 3 a b o i 11: a 1 1 e i I d a n c e ? 
A Y e s , I w f.i s 11 o !,; w o r k i n g f o r L a, r r y 
Q 
A d i f f e r e n t shi: ' -r T Jl _ ^ 
. U l l lC . r e a s 
Q h Larry Dayle ; . .-- * * -?bout 
POM 1 "Ml I, t I ? • 
A I remember h im coming **~ ^  ~ ^  saving 
b o rn <' l I i i 11" s h o r t: , x L couian L ixdv<^  *• ^ ^ ** more 
than f i v e or s i x words and took off He was m^d 
Q And he was t a l k i n g to you abo^ut you:
 e JOT 
a t t e n d a n c e ? 
A I b e 1 i e v e t h a t ' s w) \ a t 1 i e s a i d . I t w a s s o 
q u i c k a,nd s o ma d 1 y t h r o w n i, t l I 11 m i I 11* I i i v i • 
"I d i d n ' t know L a r r y D a y l e y h a r d l j H » L I at t h a t 
(Exhibit ^ marked for i d e n t i f i c a t i o n ! 
Q ) tfaddov icL me show 
you what r s been marked as -.x n . T*~ c o n s i s t s 
y aun L. ywu ucuvo « oeconcl Lw look 
a i i I 
A ( R e v i e w i n ~e r i o c u n ^ r 
Q M r , lAlac 
E x h i b i t ] ; , a r e t h o s e y o u r i n i t i a 1 s a t t h e b o 11 o m o t: 
I. he pel'J e ? 
A I b e l i e v e so . 
Q E ::: } ::: • i i i: e c o -: • 
7 
8 
9 
1 3 
1 i l 
1 5 
1 6 
1 7 
1 8 
1 '» 
2 0 
2 i 
2 2 
? 1 
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And t h e n von ^ 
n a v e a f i n r t x o x i nit- r h e d»-ty in i t '» 
T 1 in l j. f»vp t lit1 I *"  in ci i ucif r y * 
And w h a t d i d Bob K i n c h e l o w t e l l y o u ? 
He , 1 ' i | 1 " j » ) 111 , i" * i 11 ",* '' K n o w 
^ " ** up with t h Li-, unt I ! he found out that 
i i" j I i < ii i ' ij hnili v i nchelow was 
L Otto Schwarz and Bob had been okaying 
I"" n i \\ .ii I i b o u g h t he said 
route to tlnd out, lie wasn't in charge, 
,i ,, j | i t t o j e t m e gQ a n (| then this 
Don' L £Igore. 
When did you t i r u i out I ii a t B o b ci 1 d n ' t hav e 
the authority to let you MM > 
A When 1 i ame back, 
Q T" In, I s I, x 11 i 11 i l I 11 / u u 
that you needed t o gel; Vince' s appro v a 1 a ri d t h a t y o u 
I I ! ! '• i I I 
A 
where **„ 
he wasn' 
subbing 
yea! 
i 
came up. 
Q 
Q 
A 
l i e u : 
is;,' C K i n c h e l o w . 
Q O k :3 * L,^^ o u k: n c»w 1; h a f y o 11 h a d r e c e I v e d 
an unexcuso a o s e n c ^ :.or t: h i s i 11 c i den! ,' 
A
 A aeard * ..JS going to, yes. 
A I believe that was the shift. The Larry 
Dayley shift. 
Q That's a 12-hour shift you were working at 
the time? 
A Yes, it is. 
Q Were you working at least during days from 
6:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m.? Is that the shift? 
A Yes . 
Q And on the day of Mike Davis's accident 
you were working days? 
A Yes, I was. 
Q And so you started that day at 6:00 a.m. 
and the shift would normally go to 6:00 p.m.? 
A Yes. 
Q And then it's my understanding that 
starting the next day, the day after Mike Davis's 
accident, you had seven days off; is that correct? 
A Yes. 
Q And you took those seven days off? 
A Yes . 
Q And then you returned to work after your 
seven days off? 
A Yes. 
Q And it's also my understanding that Mike 
Davis's accident occurred on a Thursday, February 
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16, 1995? 
A Yes, it did. It happened through my lunch 
hour, which I had complained to supervisors about 
having to keep our system running. I was not there 
to keep an eye on it. I had to-- I was supposed to 
keep that thing running through lunch while I went 
to take my break and I complained about that before 
and I was not happy with it and it really made me 
not very happy when I find out somebody actually got 
killed in it after I complained about it. 
Q Okay. Can you tell me briefly what your 
job involved as bulk loader? 
A I would go through the orders when I get 
there, depending on whatever is running, but go 
through the orders, figure out railroad cars we had 
in stock that could be brought in for the next 
loading. And with the system the way it is you have 
to have the right car in the right end at the right" 
time with the other right car for whatever customers 
you've got, which is a lot of decision making there 
to do to make everything work out. 
You have to keep them in grade the whole 
time you're loading them. You have to inspect them 
before you load them. You have to seal them, the 
bottoms and the tops before they're shipped out. 
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And they like the bottoms to be sealed up 
immediately as soon as you start the car. You have 
to run the whole system, which I think is around 52 
pieces of machinery from one end to the other, you 
start up the computer board. 
You have to take subsequent samples, 
depending on the quality-- the specifications of 
that car for the customer, you have to take samples 
anywhere from every 200 bags to just every 500 bags, 
plus a composite, plus your start samples. Plus all 
at the same time you have to run through and set up 
your own machinery, you have to make sure it's 
running right, you have to set the sugar. The mixed 
sugar that you're setting to grade has to be sent to 
the bagging machines, which comes directly out of 
the system you're running. You determine which 
sugar they get because by law it's supposed to be 
whatever it says on the bag, which company policy 
says we do that, which they didn't. 
A lot of times the sugar was way out of 
grade and was shipped anyway. Things like that you 
would find. When you would first come on shift you 
would find out that they had loaded and sent out 
truckloads of sugar that's out of grade, which means 
it does not meet company specs that the company says 
1 is for that- If it says extra fine and they've got 
2 coarse sugar in there, that's illegal. They would 
3 do that all the time. You would have to come on and 
4 fix mistakes. You would have to keep yours in line 
5 the whole time there. 
6 The foreman of the shift, in my case it 
7 would have been Bob Kinchelow, would have to come up 
8 and find out what you were going to load on the bulk 
9 loading so he could tell his baggers what to run. 
10 But you had to get it all set up so that they had 
11 the right sugar going to those bagging machines so 
12 you didn't have that mistake in the type of sugar 
13 going into the bags. 
14 Q Let me ask about that. As a bulk loader 
15 you are in charge of loading rail cars; is that 
16 right? 
17 A Yes, bulk sugar. 
18 Q Okay. And then there's also sugar that is 
19 being loaded into bags? 
20 A Yes. 
21 Q And are you in charge of that or are you 
22 directing that as well or just the loading of the 
23 rail cars? 
24 A You are determining what sugar they get to 
25 bag. If you've got a certain-- certain cars you 
T -* n 
wake him up and he said she had a fight with him and 
stayed over her parents. I asked him if he went to 
the doctor and he said no. I asked him if he was 
coming in and he didn't think so. He said he needed 
to get his check and pay some bills. I informed him 
that we needed to be informed of illness and that I 
considered it unexcused. He said okay." 
Do you recall this incident that's 
described in Exhibit 23? 
A Not the way he puts it. 
Q Okay. On March 3rd, 1995, did you, in 
fact, not come in to work that day? 
A I don't recall . 
Q Okay. Do you recall having back spasms 
and taking some pain pills or pills of some kind to 
deal with your back spasms? 
A I don't recall. I was asleep at the time. 
Q What does that mean, you were asleep at 
the time? 
A I don't recall what happened. I don't 
know what he said. I really don't care. And if he 
said I was unexcused I would say okay. 
Q Okay. 
A There's no use fighting it. They're going 
to say what they want. They're going to consider 
243 
two and-a-half day suspension? 
A Yes, I did. 
Q And then did you come back to work? 
A Yes, I did. 
(Exhibit 26 marked for identification.) 
Q (BY MR. GAVRE) Mr. Waddoups, let me show 
you what's been marked as Exhibit 26 and let me ask 
you a question about this. You'll see at the bottom 
of Exhibit 26 there's an entry that says "5-28-95. 
Blake Waddoups, 10:00 a.m., sick." Did you call in 
sick on May 28, 1995? 
A Yes, I did. 
Q And did you call in about 10:00 a.m.? 
A I don't know when it was. It was after 
the scheduled time to be there. I had been up ever 
since the suspension, and coming back to work for 
two days before this day I was pressured a lot by 
all bosses, made to feel like I wasn't worth 
anything, and I was just plain sick from my nerves 
of having to go in there and deal with these people 
again. 
Q Okay. When you said you felt pressured i:-y 
the bosses, what do you mean? 
A I had been set up once and been warned 
about it so they could fire me. 
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about to go in and tell these people that did it to 
me exactly what my problem was, but I ended up 
telling them the last day when I ended up turning in 
all my stuff- I told Vic Jaro that I didn't like 
the way things were handled and that they should 
have actually done something and looked after me a 
little bit. If you go out and start a machinery and 
you drag somebody into it, you may have a few 
problems too. Like you said, nobody knows when the 
accident actually occurred. It could have been me 
starting that system. And they didn't care. They 
actually added to every last bit of it. And I hope 
they go to hell for it. 
(Exhibit 27 marked for identification.) 
Q (BY MR. GAVRE) Mr. Waddoups, let me show 
you what's been marked as Exhibit 27. Again, this 
is something that I don't think you've seen before. 
MR. CARR: Standard objection, hearsay, 
lack of foundation. 
Q (BY MR. GAVRE) Let me just state for the 
record that Exhibit 27 are notes prepared by Larry 
Dayley. I'll read them into the record. It's dated 
Sunday, 5-28-95, 6:00 a.m. "Blake Waddoups didn't 
show up. He finally called in at 9:55 a.m. and said 
he and his wife had a fight and that she had broke 
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into his house and shut his alarm off causing him to 
oversleep. I checked with the lab and he told them 
he was calling in sick and they said he would have 
to talk to Bob Kinchelow who transferred the call to 
me. He did not say anything to either Bob or I 
about being sick at that time. Larry." 
Do you recall on this date of the 5-28-95 
speaking to Larry Dayley by phone? 
A Yes, I do. 
Q Do you recall telling him that your wife 
had turned off your alarm clock and caused you to 
oversleep? 
A I told him that I had personal problems. 
I didn't know why the alarm didn't go off, but I had 
overslept. I had called in sick because I wasn't 
feeling well. I don't know how he added the rest of 
this up. 
Q Okay. So you don't recall telling him 
that--
A It may have sounded something to that 
effect when he heard it. I don't know what he was 
thinking at that time. I know I was sick to my 
stomach, I was just not feeling good and I hadn't 
felt good for quite a while. 
Q Had you and your wife had a fight? 
O C T 
Amalgamated Sugar have been in contact? 
A I wouldn't have any idea. 
Q Okay. Did you ever ask Amalgamated Sugar 
for a reference or ask Amalgamated Sugar to talk to 
any employer or prospective employer? 
A No. I wouldn't, not after I heard what 
they said to James. 
Q Okay. So as far as you know, Amalgamated 
Sugar has not been in contact with any of your 
employers since--
A As far as I know. 
Q Do you know if Amalgamated Sugar has been 
in contact with any of the companies you applied at? 
A I would not know that. 
MR. GAVRE: Okay. I have no further 
questions. 
MR. CARR: I have nothing. 
MR. GAVRE: Thank you, Mr. Waddoups. 
(Whereupon, the taking of the deposition 
was concluded at 6:23 p.m.) 
--00O00--
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'"rf^— 2>^£~ -T7D /P/Z/<r- T^iSS' £>&FX* 7Xt 
Additional Claimant Statement. 
^_ ^ - ^ . ^ A/ ^ »« lrt#rtrt ,mamt\i*un%*M tf^urmhcs. xnowtfiQ in^rme taw OTOvttet pen^fuBs for taiZB ttmtemems or VH 
U. I. DIVISION 14)01 09-06'96 10:42 Q20S 334 6301 
Hoi iZaToii/realons was given for the^ch, 
^uid you have continued working had you waived to 
WHo discharged you? J ^^J f ' - f ^ %f ~ T^sf^fw^ 
name*^ , *, Ute tr so what ^vas the result of f^^ 
you discuss your dismiss* mth your « / O T g / W W " ^ £ g ' „ ^ <*.* <L2± 
One you give miner, °r verbal notice of dismissal?Jy< 
f-hem (ner employee's handbook, pc if^x^grsziz %£ £*&* * °fcompany poiic; * *' * 
Bad vou been earned before about your conduct?^ V». * » " " • * ^ - ^ _ 
' ^_^_^ and how many times? ^  -J 
Ifyou .ere disced because of absences. had you been, earned your absence rate was reaching , 
*k ? How many warnings?—2-^J—d.(/WLLa - • 
~* ^ scheduled did you call in and give your er.pl 
Ifvau were discharged for nor reporting to ™ * * f ^ a " 7 
kg) _ if not what was the reason for not gmng notice 
Whatha 
• -,
 A , ; WW time did you-call in A let me em?.o>t 
•cheduled to begin: J> AM. rT.™" liM.fti.iJ S &<** <$> 
fto of discharge to cause the dismissal?^ ' i ^ ' * , „ /~7Z \%Pel£on^ofdUchcrgetocouse*e^g?J' ' ^ 4 ^ ! . ^ * 
What time we 
Mddn't be in: 
''• ,: - I T ^ fU :IA^ >"n^.. 
1 Please provide any other information you feel may help in resolving this matter 
penalties for false statements « " f ^ g ^ ^ J AZ^T- *>*-
SIGNATURE. 
Interviewer Statement^ 
DATE^ (f~Z* 
j K J i c m * * ^ ^ * * m-mm*4**7*'' t
J U J K * W * * * S 
-ORK HISTORY: Start with your most recent work: include every 
work, military and part-time. 
joo tor the last two years, including self employment, contract 
JomDariyrtsflipwy* NeWTW 
AmL&h**V7&?\ ^("b? X CompHW Mtfng - . 
Sox' /Z7_ 
Onmftal Him Oam (**- On W 
•n-io-fs 
Ram of Pay fWou * * - W 
J/JO/ 
Last Day W o w c M * * . * * * ** ' 
Total Qiott t»"«Q* 
e«y 
apCeot 
•Tli/V FAIL <r /A ,££*? / r-£ 
jjao-naa 
LOAtZJ 
1—inn For L—vmg 
F't&b £P 72? J3IEW6--44-7ZT 
Coitipaffy/&nploy*r Nam* 
Compmrn Mating Aoomaa 
C*y S U M apcoM 
Raaaen For LaavaiQ 
CorflftajfiyrTfTipirfyaf Na/wa 
| Cumpmt Mattng Adoraaa 
Dty Zip C O M 
R«aiOfi For Laaving 
Comoany/Emoioyar Nama 
Compiat* Mailing AOdraaa 
Qtv Stat* ZipCooa 
Raaaon For Laav«ig 
C*mpany/Emoioyar*am* 
Compmm Maikng 
City to Coot 
OflQnai Him Dam fAte. Day, re; u u Day wor*ad fftfo. Oar. " J 
Raw of Pay tMo„W*L.Hr.) Total GfOtt Ea/nangs 
$ 
JoeThta 
Qnorai * ra Dam /Ma. OW W U f i Day wor*ao (*•&-. Day. W 
Ram of Pay ( * * . * * . > * > 
Wham Worn PaHonnao 
Total Grata Eaminaj 
Is 
JodTiOa 
Origmai Mim Dam (Mo.. Of. rr) j Laas Day woncaa (Ma, flay, m; 
RamotPayfm.H*..Hrj Total Oroa* fcarrwiga 
$ 
jooTtoa 
OnoMi Htf» Dam (Mo. Oay. rr.; 
RamofP'yfMa. " f t " * * ' 
Laai Day Wonmd (MCL. Day, Yr.) 
Total Groaa Earning* 
s . 
yyntfvj *or* Partofmad JooTtta 
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AGREEMENT 
between 
The Amalgamated Sugar Company 
and 
The American Federation of Grain 
Millers Local Unions 
Nos. 282, 283, 284 & 290 
Affiliated with the AFL-CIO 
TERM AUGUST 1, 1993 TO JULY 31 , 1996 
(a) quit, retires, or 
(b) is discharged for just cause, or 
(c) fails to report within the reasonable 
time specified in the notice for 
Campaign employment, which notice 
will be sent to the last address he has 
furnished to the Company. 
13.3 SENIORITY LISTS: The Company will 
provide two seniority lists at each factory on 
February 1, April 1, June 1, and September 1 
of any year. In addition, the Company will pro-
vide seniority lists at other reasonable peri-
ods providing notification is given the Factory 
Accounting Manager on a timely basis be-
fore the end of a payroll period. One seniority 
list would be for Regular Employees and one 
would be for Non-Regular Employees. The 
Regular Employee list will be based on the 
number of hours of continuous service. The 
Non-Regular seniority list will be based on the 
number of months of Campaign worked. 
These lists will be posted for thirty (30) days 
for corrections and, if no objections are made, 
will be accepted as authentic lists. The appro-
priate Union officer shall be furnished a copy 
of both lists. 
ARTICLE 14 
DISCIPLINE AND DISCHARGE 
14.1 The Company has the right to discipline 
or discharge employees for just cause. Dis-
charge shall be evidenced in writing which 
shall state the reason for the discharge and 
shall be given to the employee at the time of 
his discharge. An employee who believes his 
discipline or discharge is not justified shaJJ have 
recourse to the grievance procedure under the 
Agreement. 
14.2 Written warnings are not required nor 
forbidden by this Article. A copy of ail written 
warnings (Incident Report Form) and dis-
charge notices will be given to the Union. The 
Union will acknowledge receipt of such copy 
by initialing the Company copy of the notices. 
Employee's signature does not constitute per-
sonal admission of guilt, but acknowledges 
receipt of document. 
ARTICLE 15 
EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATION 
15.1 STEWARDS: The Local Unions may 
designate at least three (3) of their members 
to act as Stewards. Such Stewards shall not 
assume any of the duties or powers of a su-
pervisor. They shall be empowered by the 
Union to aid in adjusting grievances between 
employees and the Company. All grievances 
involving employees shall be adjusted when-
ever possible between the immediate super-
visor or the foreman under them, and the 
Employee Steward. In case they are unsuc-
cessful in their efforts to adjust grievances with 
these officials, the grievance shall be submit-
ted to the Employee's Committee hereinafter 
provided for. 
15.2 EMPLOYEES'COMMITTEE: The Lo-
cal Unions agree to designate from their mem-
bership a workmen's committee of three (3) 
employees whose name shall be posted on 
the Bulletin Board. 
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15.3 GRIEVANCE PROCEDURE: 
Step 1. An employee claiming a grievance 
shall put his grievance in writing to his Stew-
ard within five (5) scheduled working days of 
the Employee's knowledge of the occurrence 
to be grieved. The Steward shall attempt to 
settle the grievance through discussions with 
the Grievant and his immediate supervisor. 
Within two (2) scheduled work days after re-
ceipt of the grievance, the Steward shall no-
tify the Employee's Committee that he has not 
succeeded in a settlement of the grievance. 
Step 2. If the Steward has failed to settle the 
grievance with the immediate supervisor in 
Step 1, the Employee's Committee within three 
(3) scheduled working days after receiving the 
grievance from the Steward, shall pass upon 
the grievance. In the event the Employee's 
Committee decides the grievance is entitled 
to further consideration, they shall within two 
(2) scheduled work days submit the written 
grievance to the Local Management. The 
grievance shall briefly state the nature of the 
grievance, violation alleged and settlement 
request. The Second Step hearing will be held 
within five (5) scheduled work days of the re-
ceipt of the written grievance from the 
Employee's Committee. The Company shall 
give the Union a written decision within five 
(5) scheduled work days of the Step 2 hear-
ing. Discharge grievances will start in Step 2 
and must be submitted directly to the 
Employee's Committee within five (5)' sched-
uled work days from the time the employee 
receives the written notice of discharge. 
Step 3. In the event the grievance is not settled 
in Step 2, either party, if they so desire, may 
within five (5) scheduled work days after the 
receipt of the second step answer, refer the 
grievance to the International Representative 
and/or the appropriate Company Official for 
further handling. If a satisfactory agreement 
cannot be reached between the International 
Representative and appropriate Company 
Official with thirty (30) days, it will then be re-
ferred to the local Union before proceeding into 
the arbitration procedure. Time is of the es-
sence and all grievances must be handled 
within the prescribed time limits set forth 
herein. Failure to do so shall constitute forfei-
tures of the written grievance by either party 
failing to do so. Time limits may be extended 
by mutual agreement between the parties. 
15.4 ARBITRATION PROCEDURE: If a 
grievance is to be carried to arbitration, either 
the Company or the Union shall notify the other 
party of its intention by Certified Mail within 
two (2) weeks after the parties have deter-
mined that a satisfactory settlement cannot be 
reached. 
If the Company and the Union are unable 
promptly to agree upon an impartial arbitra-
tor, the parties will request a list of arbitrators 
from the Federal Mediation and Conciliation 
Service. The impartial arbitrator shall be des-
ignated in accordance with the procedures of 
the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Ser-
vice. 
The Arbitrator shall have authority to act only 
with respect to grievances relating to the in-
terpretation or application of the provisions of 
this Agreement and his decision shall be final 
and binding on ail parties involved. 
Each party shall pay its own expenses incurred 
in arbitration. The fees and expenses of the^ 
Arbitrator shall be borne equally by the Com-
pany and the Union. 
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15.5 EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATION: A 
Union representative may be present at meet-
ings involving disciplinary action by the Com-
pany if requested by the Employee. 
ARTICLE 16 
STRIKES AND LOCKOUTS 
16.1 It is mutually agreed that during the life 
of this Agreement if both parties to same abide 
by the terms of this Agreement there shall be 
no cessation of work of the employees or ac-
tion in any form taken or permitted by them 
impairing Employer's operation or affecting the 
distributions of his product, nor shall there by 
any lockout by Employer. 
ARTICLE 17 
SEVERANCE PAY 
17.1 SEVERANCE PAY GRANTED: In the 
event the operation of the sugar producing 
facilities of any of the plants covered by this 
Agreement is to be permanently discontinued 
by the Company, all Regular Employees, at 
the affected factory, with three or more years 
of continuous service shall be granted sever-
ance pay, unless the Company or its succes-
sors offers the Employee employment either 
at the same or other location at a similar or 
reasonable rate of pay. The Employee will 
have the option of accepting the transfer to 
another factory or accepting severance pay. 
17.2 BENEFITS ALLOWED: An eligible em-
ployee who has completed three (3) full years 
of continuous service shall receive severance 
pay of one (1) week's pay (40 hours) based 
upon the regular straight time base wage rate 
received by the Employee at the close of the 
last Campaign prior to the discontinuance of 
that factory operation. For each additional year 
of continuous service, an eligible employee will 
receive one (1) week's pay, on the same ba-
sis as indicated above, up to a maximum of 
thirteen (13) weeks severance pay. It is un-
derstood that upon receipt of severance pay, 
and employee relinquishes all recall, senior-
ity, and employment rights with the Company. 
ARTICLE 18 
MISCELLANEOUS 
18.1 BULLETIN BOARDS: The Company 
shall furnish employees suitable places for the 
posting of notices and bulletins pertaining to 
employee and Company affairs. Notices 
posted on the Union Bulletin Boards by the 
Union must bear the signature of the Presi-
dent or Secretary of the Local Union. 
18.2 UNION AFFAIRS: It is agreed that no 
Union activities or Union business of any kind 
be carried on by Stewards or other Union 
members during the time they are gainfully 
employed on shift by the Company. It is fur-
ther agreed that Stewards or other Union of-
ficers may, if they wish, solicit Union members, 
collect membership dues, contact new employ-
ees, or otherwise carry on Union business in 
the Company locker room prior to and after 
the close of each shift, providing all parties 
concerned are off shift. In case of emergency, 
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Tab 10 
c** Employee 
Employee's Fi le 
Industrial Relations 
Supervisor 
Uhlan 
THE AMALGAMATED SUGAR COMPANY 
INCIDENT REPORT 
EMPLOYEE'S NAME B l d k e W*ddo"PS FACTORY Twin Falls 
DATE OF INCIDENT 1986 
INCIDENT: EXCESSIVE ABSENTEEISM 
Amalgamated considers attendance very important- When someone is absent 
their workload has to be carried by someone else. This is not fair to 
your fellow employees or to the Company. Blake your absenteeism has become 
excessive. If you have developed a health problem it is important that you 
get it taken care of so you can be a dependable employee. 
September 28, 1986 (8) - called in 
family emergency 
October 6f 1986 (8) sick 
Listed below is the days you have missed 
January 8, 1986 (8) sick 
January 9, 1986 (8) sick 
January 12, 1986 (8) sick 
January 15, 1986 (4) excused 
January 29, 1986 (8) sick 
February 3, 1986 (8) sick 
DISPOSITION: 
Before being granted an excused absence for sick leave a doctor's 
verification is required. If excessive absenteeism continues you 
will be discharged. 
RECEIPT OF THE FOREGOING IS 
ACKM^CEDGE TILES /<r> rtf ^,:- ^c.n 
DAY OF t*-,<>6 
JL& 
pFeaietent, Local No. 
-L<'-3_ 
SUPERVISOl 
I have been informed of the above 
incident. Signature does not 
constitute personal admission of 
guilt but acknowledges receipt 
of document. 
/o-i&* 
Employee /" 
Tab 12 
Errplcyee 
Employee's Fi le 
Industrial Relations 
Supervisor 
Uhian 
THE AMALGAMATED SUGAR COMPANY 
INCIDENT REPORT 
EMPLOYEE'S NAME Blake Waddoups FACTORY T w i n ^ l l s 
DATE OF INCIDENT March 19, 1988 
INCIDENT: UNEXCUSED ABSENCE 
On Saturday, March 19, 1988, you did not call in . You were called at 
11:15 a.m. by the Breck G r i f f i t h , Assistant Superintendent. I t is 
your responsibility to call in i f you cannot come to work before shif t 
change. 
DISPOSITION: March 19, 1988, is an unexcused absence, 
w i l l result in disciplinary action. 
Another unexcused absence 
unvn>r OF TOE FOREOOINCIIS 
ACKNOWLEDGE THIS ^PS 
Pres ident , Local No. ^ P S ^ 3 
SUPERVISOR' 
I have been informed of t h e above 
incident. Signature does not 
constitute personal admission of 
gu i l t but acknowledge 
of document 
Biplqyee 
Tab 15 
i<\ t.JftHJ 
fc DEPOSITION 
EXHIBIT 
:• 
Tab 17 
THE AMALGAMATED SUGAR COMPANY 
INTER-COMPANY CORRESPONDENCE 
TWIN FALLS, IDAHO 
December 28, 1993 
ATTENTION: Blake Waddoups 
SUBJECT: Attendance 
In reviewing your sick leave for 1993, I find it necessary to 
reinstate the requirement for doctor's verification of illness 
according to the letter you received October 28, 1991. The 
doctor 's verification is to be on the first day of illness and it 
is your responsibility to make sure either your supervisor or 
personnel receives the verification, sick leave vill not be 
granted without verification and an unexcused absences could 
result. 
Larry Dayley ' 
Assistant Superintendent 
cc: personnel file 
union 
AS000040 
NAME i3)ay<>Aj)aAdnriC£s EMPLOYEE MQ. </39// 
| JANUARY | 
S U N ™ 
J 3 
[10 
M7 -
24 
I 31 
lUOt 
1 4 
11 
18 
25 
IDES 
5 
12 
19 
26 
*GT 
6 
13 
20 
27 
[TOUR 
I 7 
14 
21 
28 
IFRI 
P 8 
15 
22 
29 
|SAT 
2 
! 9 
16 
23 
30 
| FEBRUARY | 
I SUN 
7 
14 
21 
28 
UON 
i 1 
8 
© 
22 
TUES 
2 
I 9 
16 
*a> 
3 
10 
17 
23 [24 
TVtUH 
4 
11 
18 
25 
n« 
5 
12 
19 
26 
SAT 
6 
13J 
20| 
27 
| MARCH | 
SUM 
7 
fe 
K 
28 
UON 
1 
# 
15 
22 
29 
[rue 
2 
! 9 
16 
23 
30 
wQ THUft 
* I * 
10 
17 
><: 
31 
11 
18' 
25 
W 
5 
12 
19 
26 
:SAT 
6 
"13 
20 
27 
[ APRIL 
SUN 
14 
11 
|18 
[25 
UON 
i 5 
12 
IS 
X 
TUB 
! 6 
13 
20 
27 
SEF 
7 
14 
21 
28 
USA 
1 
i 8 
15 
22 
29-
J"" " MAY "J 
["SUB" 
2 
9 
16 
23 
130 
I UON 
3 
10 
17 
24 
®! 
I TUES 
4 
11 
18 
25! 
WED 
5 
12 
19 
26 
TOUR 
6 
13 
20 
27 
FW 
7 
14 
21 
@ 
SAT 
1 
! 8 
15 
22 
29 
f " JUNE | 
§uu 
I 6 
| l 3 ~ 
20 
|27 
UOH 
7 
14 
X 
28 
rrue 
1 
8 
!15 
22 
29 
[v«a 
I 2 
9 
* 
23 
30 
THUS 
| 3 
10 
17 
24 
;nu 
| 4 
11 
18 
25 
SAT 1 
5 
12 
19 
26 
( JULY ] 
SUN 
4 
11 
MT 
\2S 
rudN 
© 
12 
19 
26 
TUB 
6 
13 
20 
27 
*e> THOU w x© 
XlXK 
14 
X 
28 
T5 16 
-22f23 
29 30 
I S A T 
[3 
10 
171 
24 | 
"iil 
AUGUST 
SW 
15 
22 
M 
if 
16 
23 
30 
10 
17 
24 
31 
9BT [TORI 
11 
18 
25 
12 
19" 
26 
SEPTEMBER 
sTJJT 
E 
12 
19 
BS 
EST TIDE? 
13 
20 
27 
14 
21 
28 
mm, 
15 
22 
29 
16 
23 
30 
10 
17 
24 
sTT 
11 
18 
25 
| OCTOBER ] 
isuTl 
3 
10 
17 
24 
| 3 1 ! 
UON 
4 
11 
18 
25 
TUES 
5 
12 
19 
26 
WED 
6 
13 
20 
27 
I M A 
7 
14 
21 
28 
, F R I 
1 
8 
15 
22 
29 
SAT I 
T 
9 
16 
^ 
30 
| NOVEMBER | 
SJN 
. . . 
U4 
21 
28 
UON 
1 
8 
115 
22 
29 
TUES 
2 
9 
16 
23 
30 
WED 
3 
10 
17 
24 
THUR 
4 
11 
18 
©' 
[FRI 
5 
12 
19 
26 
SAT 
i" 
"13] 
120 
271 
[ DECEMBER 
fsnr 
5 
[12 
M9l 
26 
UON 
6 
13 
"20l 
27! 
TUES 
7 
14 
VCD 
1 
8 
15 
xte 
28 29 
TOUR 
2 
9 
16 
23 
30 
•a 
S 
« 
SICK LEAVE J 
(RED) 
VACATION 
(8LACK) 
I I EXCUSED 
ABSENCE (BLACK) 
I I INDUSTRIAL 
ACCIDENT (PURPLE) 
I ) LEAVE OF 
1 ABSENCE (BLACK) 
I ) UNEDCCUSED 
1 ABSENCE (GREEN) 
11 LATE (BLUE) 
j 1 DLO (BROWN) 
| J N A T L CAURD (BLACK) 
1 IFUNFB4J ICAW: ion ».r**y 
<J-3L\ 
ifo 
\&~3 
\W] 
J2L 
f^n 
Mil 
\W] 
s£' 
ran 
$£j 
~w\ 
Jsi 
am 
2L-
& " 
9f'\ 
<7T> 
MLi 
;• 
HEP 
J 
AQOn0041 
Tab 18 
i 
DEPOSITION 
EXHIBIT I 
—B)&ke* (jdaAoaj0.JL : 
U',fY\ jJo ^ Aii (ILkc^ ^flu/JJtj/i/g,/?^ 
*«y rmori. /!+- 3:36 M. ALL r*;J He, 
(Tthsfice, • 
Ofj^diXjrtZ^ 
Tab 21 
CAR NUMBER L U D ' T - ' M D A T E ^ - ' — j FACTORY~U ^ / ^ " 
• - w L ^ 
In-Bound Seal tf's 
(Top of Car) 
l.ftfeT .^ A r 1 / g ^ r 
2.ftfe)> &^fr** 
7 
8., 
9 _ 
0.. 
!
 m 
2._ 
3 _ 
* -
INITIAL INSPECTION 
A. Amalgamated or customer-assigned car? 
B. Inbound seais in place? If missing, how many? T o p _ B o t t o m _ 
C. Gates/hatches closed? If open, how many? T o p _ B o d o m _ 
D. Gaie shields in place? If open or damaged, how r n a n y ^ 
E. Air caps in place? If missing, how many? 
F. Mechanical condition satisfactory j o r use (brakes. ladder, couplers)? 
Signature - Locomotive Operator: * j . j ' ~ - -
__CAR CLEANING REPORT 
Car Cleaned By: 7 , ' : - - - - r\ • ~~ 
7
 ^ Date • • Zi 
A. Sanitary condition satisfactory? 
B
 J S £ S ? - p S S S l J 2 ? m f ^ r A i M s d C a n " d f ~ <"" « - « e d sugar and 
C. Intenor free of .rash. soil, insects. pa.n, ch.ps. and abnormal odors? 
D. Body cracks absent? 
E. Water marks or roof leaks absent? 
F. Airslide fabnc intact, no holes? 
G. Sugar removed? How much? 
Yes No 
X o 
D a 
D D 
2 
3 
4 
5 . 
6 
Out Bound Seal V s (Top of Car) 
/rti/yo 
Yes No h 7-Hi^Svi 
8 
9 
•i K- c^ 
-C< 0_ ^ o I I A » . • , 
T3 O V ^ i 2 ' SV-, \ ?rr, 
(Bottom of Car) _ _ .._ ... 
f i S n O l R A I ^ H. Car is clean and ready for loading? 
Signarure - Car Cleaner: T_. r . 
j
 ') ~) PnunHc 
• o 
13 a 
D. D 
Q D 
13 , 
15 
CAR LOADING REPORT 
Car Loaded Bv: 7&**^J!^2>AJ&T D a t e ^ ^ ^ Z 
A Inner gate is in closed position? 
B. Hatch nms are clean and free of crusted sugar? 
C. Before closing hatches, checked for contamination on top of sugar? 
0 Hatches and gates are protected with plastic? 
E. Three-way valves in closed position? 
F. Top of car is clean. Loose sugar and tools removed? 
G Sample of sugar provided to Laboratory? 
H. Car is ready for final inspection? 
I. Was car dehumidified? Relative humidity level in car % 
Car temp after loading 
Signature - Bulk Loader^ 
FINAL INSPECTION AND APPROVAL FOR SHIPMENT 
Date: J}~ps)'47<r Time: 4!06 M Customer: 
Location: 
A. All seais in place, locked, verified 
B. Gate shields and hatches protected with plastic? 
C. Top of car is clean? 
D. Three-way valves closed? Air caps in place? 
E. All canvases and bags accounted for? 
Grains H?0/lb_ 
Yes No 
0 D 
D D 
D D 
D D 
D D 
D D 
D D 
D D 
0 D 
2.. 
.3 _ 
4._ 
s ._ 
6 _ 
7 _ 
8 _ 
9._ 
I0._ 
11. 
lK 
14._ 
15. 
(Bottom of Car) 
Yes No 
O D 
D D 
D D 
D D 
D D 
• • • • • • • • 
QUALITY ASSURANCE 
Sugar meets customer 
specifications? 
Yes O 
No Q 
Chemist initials 
CAR REJECTION RECORD 
(Use this side ONLY if car is to be rejected) 
Warehouse Date 
Car Number Foreman 
Reason car cannot be loaded: 
Location of defect (Mark oo car type below, looking down from top.): 
Brake End 
Brake End I— 
Np 
U-~~ K ... 
\A: K... . 
U~ 
~7| 
x 
—A 
"zy 
—A 
•\i 
AIRSLEDE CAR CENTERFLOW CAR 
FOR GENERAL OFFICE USE: Dale Received 
Next Loading Location Date 
INSTRUCTIONS 
REIECTTNO mCATTON; 
When a car is being rejected, complete this side of the report. Send a Xerox copy to Traffic 
Department - General Office, Ogden. 
TRAFFIC DF.PARTMF.NT-
When the car is released from the RR shop send a copy of this report to the location loading the 
car Tor the first time. 
NEXT T o A r>mr> i nr ATTON-
CAR M i . x x n P R u G ^ dOL,On DATE£-/r-*<T F A C T O R Y J ^ J ffi HZ!!? CA 
In-Bound Seal Ms 
(Top of Car) 
3 poster 
4. r j j " ) ^ 
5. -?Q^)^Q?_ 
6. OQQl$S~ 
7. O Q O f t ) ^ 
8. OOQ191 
w.Oc)0~>9f 
II 
12. 
13 
14. 
15. 
(Bottom of Car) 
4. ^ ^ C - 6 ' ^ '" 
; LMT 
WT 
(Q^ <re 
INTTIAL INSPECTION 
A. Amalgamated or customer-assigned car? 
B. Inbound seals in place? If missing, how many? Top Bottom 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Plaintiffs are former union-represented employees of The Amalgamated Sugar Company 
("Amalgamated Sugar" or "the Company") who worked in Twin Falls, Idaho. On May 22 and 28, 
1995, plaintiffs were separately discharged by the Company for excessive absenteeism. 
Specifically, they each had more than three unexcused absences, the maximum allowed by 
Company policy. Plaintiffs did not contest their discharges as they were entitled to do under the 
collective bargaining agreement between their union and the Company. 
Now, plaintiffs claim that they were potential "whistleblowers," who were discharged for 
threatening to publicize the Company's alleged criminal shipping of contaminated sugar. On this 
basis, they claim that they were wrongfully discharged in violation of Utah public policy. Plaintiffs 
also assert claims for tortious infliction of emotional distress, interference with prospective 
economic relations, and conspiracy. There is no factual basis or legal merit to any of plaintiffs' 
claims. 
Plaintiffs' claims are governed by Idaho law because all the events — plaintiffs' 
employment, their discharges, and the alleged shipment of contaminated sugar — took place in 
Twin Falls, Idaho. Nothing at issue in this case happened in Utah. Accordingly, plaintiffs' 
"violation of Utah public policy" claim fails because Utah law has no application to the instant 
case. The claim would also fail if it were governed by Utah law because plaintiffs did not report 
the alleged shipment of contaminated sugar (which is a federal crime) to outside authorities. Under 
Utah law, a "public policy wrongful discharge" claim based on whistleblowing of alleged criminal 
o 
conduct requires that the employee have reported the alleged conduct to outside authorities, which 
plaintiffs did not do. 
Plaintiffs' emotional distress claim should be dismissed because (a) it is barred by the 
exclusive remedy provision of the Idaho workers' compensation statute, (b) it is preempted by 
federal labor law, and (c) it lacks elements essential under Idaho law. Plaintiffs' interference with 
prospective economic relations claim fails because there is no identified business relationship with 
which Amalgamated Sugar could interfere. Plaintiffs' conspiracy claim fails because only one 
person, Amalgamated Sugar, is accused of wrongdoing and it cannot conspire with itself. 
II. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiffs5 Employment 
1. Amalgamated Sugar hired Blake Waddoups ("Waddoups") in 1985 and 
James Sparrow ("Sparrow") in 1989 to work at the Company's sugar manufacturing facility in 
Twin Falls, Idaho. Complaint ffl[ 8,10. 
2. "Plaintiffs, Mr. Waddoups and Mr. Sparrow, at all times material hereto 
worked and resided in the County of Twin Falls, State of Idaho." Complaint % 7. 
3. Plaintiffs1 employment with Amalgamated Sugar was governed by a 
collective bargaining agreement between The American Federation of Grain Millers Union ("the 
Union") and the Company, and both plaintiffs were members of the Union. Deposition of 
James E. Sparrow, Jr. at 28-29 (hereinafter "Sparrow Depo. at "); Deposition of Blake William 
Waddoups at 95-96 (hereinafter "Waddoups Depo. at "). 
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4. Under the collective bargaining agreement, employees may be discharged 
only for "just cause," and a discharged employee may file a grievance if he believes that his 
discharge was not justified. The grievance process culminates in binding arbitration. Ex. 4, at 
pp. 4-5, to Sparrow Depo.; Ex. 9, at pp. 4-5, to Waddoups Depo. 
5. Plaintiffs' employment was subject to the rule that "The maximum number 
of unexcused absences you can receive before being terminated is three (3)." Ex. 3 to Sparrow 
Depo. Plaintiffs were familiar with this rule. Sparrow testified: 
Q. Do you recall being informed of the rule that you could 
have no more than three unexcused absences? 
A. Yes. 
Q. When do you recall being informed of that rule? 
A. All the time. 
*** 
A. [P]eople were always talking about it, you know, foremen, supervisors. 
(Sparrow Depo. at 27-28.) 
Sparrow's Unexcused Absences 
6. Sparrow had unexcused absences on September 10, 1994 and March 24, 
1995. Sparrow Depo. at 201-03 and Ex. 7, at pp. 1-2, thereto. 
7. On May 20, 1995, Sparrow did not report to work, but called in sick. 
Sparrow explained: 
A. I just — it was just nerves in my stomach. I just felt really 
queasy and I just didn't feel like going to work mostly. It 
was just the place had gotten to me and I just didn't feel like 
being there. 
Q. So you called in sick? 
A. Yes. (Sparrow Depo. at 210.) 
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8. On the afternoon of the same day, Sparrow drove to Nevada and was 
caught speeding. Because he had an outstanding warrant for a prior unpaid speeding ticket. 
Sparrow was arrested and not released from jail until May 25, 1995. Sparrow missed four days 
of work, May 20, 21, 23, and 24, 1995. Sparrow Depo. at 211-16. 
9. Sparrow knew that his absences were unexcused and that he had exceeded 
the maximum number permitted. When he returned to Twin Falls, Sparrow telephoned his 
foreman and asked him if he was fired: 
Q. Why did you ask him if you were fired? 
A. Because I spent three days in jail and I should have worked. 
I work Friday. I missed three days of work. That's 
unexcused. Plus I knew I had one before and that's four, 
and I knew I could be terminated for that. 
Q. You knew you could be terminated for unexcused absences 
and you had enough to be terminated? 
A. Yeah. 
*** 
Q. Was there any question in your mind that being absent from 
work because you're in jail is an unexcused absence? 
A. I have always believed before that it was. 
Q. [You] always believed that it was an unexcused absence? 
A. Yes. 
Q. So by the time you got back to work on the 25th and your 
shift was finished you had four unexcused absences; is that 
correct? 
A. Correct. (Sparrow Depo. at 217, 222.) 
10. Sparrow was discharged on May 22, 1995 by Assistant Superintendent 
Bill Stuart for having more than three unexcused absences. Sparrow Depo. at 219. 
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11. Sparrow did not file a grievance with the Union as permitted under the 
collective bargaining agreement. Sparrow Depo. at 31, 43-44. 
Waddoups' Unexcused Absences 
12. On October 10, 1986, Waddoups received a written warning for excessive 
absenteeism because of the large number of sick leave days he had taken. He was told that he 
would need medical verification for any future sick leave absences. He was also warned: w'If 
excessive absenteeism continues you will be discharged." Ex. 10 to Waddoups Depo. 
13. Waddoups had an unexcused absence on March 19, 1988. Waddoups 
Depo. at 113 and Ex. 12 thereto. 
14. On September 28, 1993, Waddoups was verbally warned about his poor 
attendance. Waddoups Depo. at 118-19 and Ex. 15 thereto. 
15. On December 28, 1993, Waddoups received another written warning 
about his attendance, and he was again required to have medical verification for sick leave 
absences. Ex. 17 to Waddoups Depo. 
16. On June 29, 1994, Waddoups had an unexcused absence. Waddoups 
Depo. at 123 and Ex. 18 thereto. 
17. On March 3, 1995, Waddoups had an unexcused absence. Waddoups 
Depo. at 243 and Ex. 23 thereto. 
18. On May 28, 1995, Waddoups did not report to work. At 10:00 a.m., four 
hours after his work shift had begun, Waddoups called in saying he was sick. Waddoups then 
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spoke to Assistant Superintendent Larry Dayley, and gave him a different explanation: "I told 
him that I had personal problems. I didn't know why the alarm didn't go off, but I had over 
slept. I had called in sick because I wasn't feeling well." Waddoups Depo. at 258, 260-61 and 
Ex. 26 thereto. 
19. Assistant Superintendent Larry Day ley terminated Waddoups for 
excessive absenteeism. Waddoups Depo. at 22-23 and Ex. 2, at p.l, thereto. 
20. In his application for unemployment benefits, Waddoups admitted that he 
had been warned "2-3 times" that his absence rate of reaching unacceptable levels. Waddoups 
Depo. at 31 and Ex. 2, at p. 2, thereto. 
21. Waddoups did not file a grievance with the Union over his discharge. 
Waddoups Depo. at 107. 
Plaintiffs' Whistleblowing Allegation 
22. On February 16, 1995, there was a fatal accident at the Amalgamated 
Sugar Twin Falls, Idaho facility. The facility was shut down and cleaned for three days after the 
accident. Sugar that was being loaded on the day of the accident was subsequently shipped to an 
animal feed manufacturer. Complaint ffl[ 15, 22; Sparrow Depo. at 64, 126-27. 
23. Plaintiffs claim that sugar stored at the Twin Falls facility was 
contaminated by the fatal accident, and was subsequently shipped to customers for human 
consumption, a criminal violation of the federal Food, Drug and Cosmetics Act. Complaint f 44; 
Sparrow Depo. at 46-7. 
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24. Plaintiffs claim that they "threatenjed] to expose the [Company's] illegal 
activity" of shipping supposedly contaminated sugar. Complaint % 40. However, neither 
plaintiff ever contacted the Food and Drug Administration, any public authority or the media 
about the Company supposedly shipping contaminated sugar. Sparrow Depo. at 173-74; 
Waddoups Depo. at 65; Complaint ffif 23-44. 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD 
Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure mandates the entry of summary judgment 
when the moving party makes a showing which precludes, as a matter of law, the awarding of any 
relief to the other party. FMA Acceptance Co. v. Leatherbv Ins. Co., 594 P.2d 1332 (Utah 1979). 
If plaintiffs cannot prove an essential element of a claim, there can be no genuine issue as to any 
material fact, and summary judgment is appropriate. For the reasons described below, defendant is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law because plaintiffs cannot make a sufficient showing on 
essential elements of their claims. 
ARGUMENT 
III. PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS ARE CONTROLLED BY IDAHO LAW. 
Because Utah is the forum state, Utah's choice of law rules determine which law 
applies in the instant case1. Records v. Briggs, 887 P.2d 864 (Utah App. 1994). Utah has adopted 
the most "significant relationship" standard, as set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Conflict 
Because Idaho and Utah law differ on several issues in the instant case, including workers compensation 
preemption and tortious infliction of emotional distress, it is necessary for the Court to resolve the choice of law 
question. 
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of Laws § 145, for determining choice of law questions. Forsman v. Forsman, 779 P.2d 218, 
219-20 (Utah 1989); Records v. Briggs, 887 P.2d at 867; Doe v. Nevada Crossing. Inc., 920 F. 
Supp. 164, 166 (D.Utah 1996). 
To determine whether the law of Idaho or Utah applies, the following factors should be 
considered: (1) the place where the injury occurred; (2) the place where the conduct causing the 
injury occurred; (3) the dominie, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of 
business of the parties; and (4) the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is 
centered. Forsman, 779 P.2d at 219 (citing to Restatement (Second) ot Conflict of Laws § 145). 
In the instant case, it is undisputed that plaintiffs were hired in Idaho, worked in Idaho, 
engaged in the conduct for which they were allegedly wrongfully treated in. Idaho, were 
terminated in Idaho, suffered their injuries in Idaho, and resided in Idaho The only connection 
Utah has to the dispute is the fact that Amalgamated Sugar is a Utah corporation, headquartered 
in Utah. Even this connection is weak because all of the Company's alleged acts took place in 
Idaho, not in Utah. When, as here, an emploj ee lives, works and is terminated in one state and 
brings claims against his employer because of his discharge, the place of the employer's 
incorporation or headquarters is not significant. The governing law is the law of the state in 
which the discharge occurs. See Pacheco v. Hercules. 61 FfcP Cases (BNA) 825, 826-27 
(D.Utah 1993) (under Utah's choice of law rules, Georgia law governs wrongful discharge 
claims (tort and contract) where plaintiff was discharged in Georgia, worked and lived in Georgia 
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at time of his discharge, and employer had a place of business in Georgia, despite fact that 
plaintiff was hired and worked in Utah for many years).2 
In sum, the alleged injuries and wrongful acts occurred in Idaho, the plaintiffs worked 
and lived in Idaho, the defendant does business in Idaho, and the relationship at issue 
(employment) was centered in Idaho. Accordingly, under Utah's choice of law rules, Idaho law-
should govern plaintiffs' claims. 
IV. PLAINTIFFS1 CLAIM THAT THEIR DISCHARGES VIOLATED UTAH 
PUBLIC POLICY LAW FAILS BECAUSE IDAHO LAW GOVERNS THE 
INSTANT CASE. 
In their First Cause of Action, plaintiffs allege that their terminations violated the 
common law of Utah, and specifically that they were wrongfully discharged "in violation of 
vital, overarching fundamental, permanent, clear; and substantial public policies of the State of 
Utah." Complaint f 39 (emphasis added). This claim, based on Utah law, is without legal basis 
because Idaho law governs plaintiffs' claims. For this reason, plaintiffs' First Cause of Action 
should be dismissed. 
V. PLAINTIFFS' PUBLIC POLICY CLAIM WOULD FAIL EVEN IF IT 
WERE GOVERNED BY UTAH LAW. 
Under Utah, law only public policies that are "clear and substantial." can give rise to a 
civil cause of action. Consequently, "not every employment termination that has the effect of 
2
 See also Caton v. Leach Corp. 896 F.2d 939, 942-43 (5th Cir. 1990) (under significant relationship analysis, 
Texas law applies to claims arising out of employee's discharge when employee worked, lived, and was terminated 
in Texas, despite the fact the employer was incorporated and headquartered elsewhere); A.M. Capen'sCo. v. 
American Trad. & Prod. Corp.. 74 F.3d 317, 321 (1st Cir. 1996) (Puerto Rico law governs tort and contract claims 
arising out of termination of distributorship where termination occurred in Puerto Rico, despite fact that the 
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violating some public policy is actionable." Fox v. MCI Communications Corp., 931 P.2d 857, 
860 (Utah 1997). Where criminal conduct is alleged, it is the "enforcement" of the "criminal 
code" that "constitutes a clear and substantial public policy." Hence an employee may have "a 
cause of action for wrongful termination based on termination of the employee for reporting 
criminal activity to public authorities." Id. At 861. Consequently, even if an employee is 
retaliatorily discharged, there is no actionable public polic} violation if the employee reports the 
criminal conduct only to the employer: 
However, if an employee reports a criminal violation to an 
employer, rather than to public authorities, and is fired for making 
such reports, that does not, in our view, contravene a clear and 
substantial public policy. 
Id. (holding that no public policy wrongful discharge claim stated where employee complained 
only to employer about alleged criminal activity). 
Because plaintiffs allege that Amalgamated Sugar engaged in criminal conduct (shipping 
contaminated sugar in violation of the Food Drag and Cosmetics Act) but did not report this 
alleged crime to the FDA or any other public authority, plaintiffs fail to state a public policy 
claim under Utah law. 
company was incorporated and headquartered elsewhere and did not have any offices or facilities in Puerto Rico). 
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VI. PLAINTIFFS' EMOTIONAL DISTRESS CLAIM SHOULD BE 
DISMISSED ON MULTIPLE GROUNDS. 
A. Plaintiffs' Claims For Negligent And Intentional Infliction Of Emotional 
Distress Are Barred By Idaho's Workers' Compensation Statute. 
Plaintiffs' cause of action for negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress 
alleges that Amalgamated Sugar engaged in workplace conduct that caused plaintiffs emotional 
and physical injury. Complaint at ffl[ 47-50. In Idaho (as in Utah), the workers compensation 
statute provides the exclusive remedy to employees for injuries arising out of employment: 
[T]he liability of the employer under this [Workmen's Compensation] law 
shall be exclusive and in place of all other liability of the employer to the 
employee, his spouse, dependents, heirs, legal representations or assigns. 
Idaho Code § 72-209(1). See also Keamev v. Denker, 760 P.2d 1171, 1173 (Idaho 1988) ("Our 
worker's compensation law is a legislatively prescribed exclusive system of compensation for 
employees who are injured on the job." Affirming summary dismissal of tort claims against 
employer for events allegedly occurring at the workplace). 
The Idaho Workmen's Compensation Act contains an exception to its exclusive remedy 
provision which applies "where the injury . . . is proximately caused by the willful or unprovoked 
physical aggression of the employer, its officers, servants or employees." Idaho Code § 72-
209(3).3 If any such "physical aggression" does occur in the workplace, it "shall not be 
The Idaho Workmen's Compensation Act necessarily bars a negligence claim for the obvious reason that 
negligent conduct does not meet the requirements of "willful or unprovoked of physical aggression." Kearney, 760 
P.2d at 1173. Plaintiffs' claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress fails for the additional reason that, under 
Idaho law, "For a claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress to arise, there must be physical injury to the 
plaintiff." Walston v. Monumental Life Ins. Co.. 923 P.2d 456, 464 (Idaho 1996). In the instant case, there is no 
claim or evidence of any physical injury to plaintiffs. Complaint tH 47-48. 
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imputable to the employer unless provoked or authorized by the employer, or the employer was a 
party thereto." Id. 
In the instant case, Waddoups does not allege tnai he Has injured by any "physical 
aggression." Complaint f47. Accordingly, Waddoups' emotional distress claim does not come 
within the statutory "physical aggression" provision, and is therefore barred by the exclusive 
remedy provision of the Idaho Workmen's i oinpcTisation \et. 
Sparrow alleges that on one occasion a supervisor "slapped [him] up the side of the head 
with [a] yellow notebook." Sparrow Depo. at 98. Sparrow does not claim that he was injured or 
suffered emotional distress as a result of this incident. Rather it passed quickly with a few 
words between him and the supervisor. Id. at 98-99. Sparrow also testified that he has been in 
"good health" since leaving Amalgamated Sugar, except for being "bummed out" as a result of 
being fired. Nor has Sparrow seen a doctor, psychologist, psychiatrist, or therapist. Id. at 268-
70. 
In sum, even if a slap with a "yellow notebook" constitutes "physical aggressio * r^ 
no evidence that Amalgamated Sugar provoked, authorized or was a party to the incident or that 
Sparrow was injured, physically or emotionally, by the incident. Accordingly, Sparrow's 
emotional distress claim is also barred b> the Idaho Workmen's Compensation \ct 
B. Federal Labor Law Preempts Plaintiffs5 Emotional Distress Claims. 
The federal Labor Management Relations Act ("LMRA") exclusively governs 
collectively bargaining agreenieiiis and preempts all state-law claims that relate to collective 
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bargaining agreements. 29 U.S.C. § 185(a). The purpose of this "expansive" preemption of state 
law is to ensure that uniform federal law governs the negotiation, interpretation and 
administration of collective bargaining agreements. Retherford v. AT&T Communications, 844 
P.2d 949, 968 (Utah 1992) (citing U.S. Supreme Court decisions). The LMRA preempts tort as 
well as contract claims in order to uphold the federally-created system of collective bargaining. 
The justification for this expansive view of [federal labor law] preemption 
is the ease with which an aggrieved employee otherwise could turn a suit 
for breach of a collective bargaining agreement into a state tort or contract 
claim, thereby obtaining a state law holding that might result in an 
inconsistent interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement. (Id. at 
968-69.) 
In the context of a unionized workplace, the LMRA preempts claims for tortious 
infliction of emotional distress, except where the conduct at issue "is purely personal and does 
not implicate the exercise of supervisors auHiority/' Id at "»71 \\ henever the conduct at issue is 
not purely personal, but involves exercise of management authority, any tort claim regarding 
such conduct is barred by federal law. This is true even if the conduct constitutes an abuse of 
authority and is done "to toraient the plaintiff." Id This is so because such conduct, even if 
abusive and improper, implicates the collective bargaining agreement and the authority it grants 
to the employer. Id. at 971 -72. 
In the instant case, plaintiffs allege that the Company failed to provide Waddoups with 
adequate medical and psychological counseling after the fatal accident, implied that he was 
responsible for the accident, and threatened Sparrow with discharge Complaint Iffi 47-48 I hese 
alleged acts were not purely personjl hut alleged abuses of company or supervisory authority. 
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Id. Indeed, plaintiffs allege that the acts were within the scope and course of employment. Id. 
f 3. Because the conduct alleged by plaintiffs is not "purely personal" and does "implicate the 
exercise of supervisory authority," plaintiffs' emotional distress claims are barred by federal 
labor law. Retherford, 844 P.2d at 971-72 (affirming summary dismissal of intentional infliction 
of emotional distress claim based on alleged supervisory misconduct). 
C. Essential Elements of Plaintiffs' Emotional Distress Claims Are Without 
Support, 
The tort of intentional infliction of rmotional distress requires the defendant to have 
engaged in "very extreme" and "outrageous" conduct that "no reasonable person could be 
expected to endure." Hatfield v. Max Rouse & Sons Northwest, 606 P.2d 944, 954 (Idaho 1980); 
Davis v. Gage, 682 P.2d 1282, 1288 (Idaho \pp. 1984). The conduct alleged here — failing to 
provide Waddoups with adequate medical and psychological counseling, implying that 
Waddoups was responsible for the fatal accident since he was in charge of the machinery 
involved, and threatening to discharge Sparrow — does not constitute actionable "outrageous" 
conduct. Certainly, the only action that might even in theory escape the exclusive remedy 
provision of the Idaho workers' compensation statute — the slap with a yellow notebook — was 
not extreme and outrageous conduct. 
It is also an essential element of the tort that plaintiffs have suffered "severe" and 
"disabling" emotional distress. This requires more than ordinary distress, anyuish or depression: 
[Ejvidence showing that the plaintiff was upset, embarrassed, 
angered, bothered and depressed did not demonstrate a severely 
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disabling emotional condition adequate for intentional infliction of 
emotional distress damages. 
Walston v. Monumental Life Ins. Co., 923 P.2d 456, 464-65 (Idaho 1996) (internal quotations 
omitted). 
In the instant case, neither plaintiff suffered a "severely disabling emotional condition" as 
required by Idaho law. As pointed out above, Sparrow has been in good health, has ilot seen a 
doctor oi therapist, and was merely "bummed out" by his firing. Sparrow Depo. at 98-99. 
Waddoups likewise has worked since leaving Amalgamated Sugar, and has not been disabled. 
Waddoups Depo. at 8-20. 
In sum, there is no evidence to support two essential elements of plaintiffs' claim for 
intentional infliction of emotional distress. 
PLAINTIFFS' NEGLIGENT OR INTENTIONAL INTERFERED 
WITH PROSPECTIVE ECONOMIC ADVANTAGE CLAIM IS 
GROUNDLESS. 
Plaintiffs claim that by firing them for cause and with "knowledge or intent that such 
firing would severely hamper their opportunity for future employment," Amalgamated Sugar 
tortiously interfered with their prospective economic relations. Complaint at ^ 52. Plaintiffs do 
not identify any wrongful "interfering" conduct by Amalgamated Sugar, noi do they identify any 
contractual or business relationship (in which they were involved), which was interfered with by 
the Company. Id. ffl| 52-54. Both are required by Idaho law. Idaho Nat'l Bank v. Bliss Valley 
Foods. 824 P.2d 841, 860-61 (Idaho 1991) (defendant must tortiously interfere with "plaintiffs 
contractual or I:jusiness relationships"). The only relationship to which plaintiffs refer is their 
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"employment relationship" with Amalgamated Sugar. Complaint % 54. An employer cannot 
tortiously interfere with its relationship with its own employees. Orstrander v. Farm Bureau Mut. 
Ins. Co., 851 P.2d 946, 950 (1993) ("a party cannot tortiously interfere with its own contract"). 
Accordingly, this claim is factually groundless and legally without merit 
VIIL PLAINTIFFS' CONSPIRACY CLAIM SHOULD BE DISMISSED 
BECAUSE AMALGAMATED SUGAR CANNOT CONSPIRE WITH 
ITSEI ,F. 
Plaintiffs' claim that Amalgamated Sugar conspired with unidentified Doe defendants 1 
through 100. Complaint f^l| 55-57. However, in Paragraph 3 of the Complaint, plaintiffs allege 
"that each of the defendants was the agent of each other in all of the actions and matter set forth; 
and that at all of said times herein mentioned, each was acting as the agent of the other, was 
acting in the course and scope of its agency with its principal, and that e\ ery act of each 
defendant was within the scope of its authority was known to, authorized and ratified by the 
others." The law is well settled that an agent cannot conspire with its principal. Ostrander v. 
Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 851 P.2d at 948 ("the actions of an agent are the actions of the 
corporation"); Wiekhorst Bros. Excavating & Equip. Co. v. Ludewig. 529 N.W.2d 33, 40 (1995) 
(corporation cannot conspire with agent acting it scope of her authority). Plaintiffs have failed to 
identify anyone with whom Amalgam,itetl SULMF uinspired .u s'nulJ hnxc conspired. 
Accordingly, this claim is baseless. 
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IX. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, plaintiffs' Complaint and all causes of action contained therein 
should be dismissed with prejudice. 
DATED this 5th day of November, 1997. 
W. MARK GAVRE < 
MARGARET NIVER MCGANN 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for The Amalgamated Sugar Company 
178188.1 18 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 5th day of November, 1997, I caused to be hand-
delivered a true and correct copy of the foregoing MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, to: 
Trent J. Waddoups 
CARR & WADDOUPS 
8 East Broadway, Suite 201 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
•JO 
17R18K 1 
TabD 
Taylor D. Carr - (Bar No. 582) 
Trent J. Waddoups - (Bar No. 7657) 
CARR & WADDOUPS 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
8 East Broadway, Suite 201 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone (801) 363-0888 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, OGDEN DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 
BLAKE WILLIAM WADDOUPS, and ; 
JAMES EDWARD SPARROW JR., ; 
Plaintiffs, ] 
vs. ] 
THE AMALGAMATED SUGAR ; 
COMPANY, a Utah corporation, et al., ; 
Defendants. ] 
) PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM 
) IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S 
> MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
> JUDGMENT 
0£C o 3 BS7 
' Civil No. 950900441 
Judge Stanton M. Taylor 
Pursuant to Rule 4-501(l)(b) of the Code of Judicial Administration, Plaintiffs present the 
following points and authorities in opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
INTRODUCTION 
As can be ascertained from Defendant's own memorandum of points and authorities, the 
essential facts upon which each of the causes of action are based are readily understood by the 
Defendant. These facts are more than sufficient to establish each of the five causes of action 
alleged in Plaintiffs' complaint. 
Plaintiffs instituted this litigation arising out of their wrongful terminations from their 
employment with The Amalgamated Sugar Company ("Defendant"). After many years of loyal 
service to Defendant, Plaintiffs were discharged from their employment without just cause and 
for reasons involving violation of the laws and public policy of the State of Utah and of the 
United States. 
Defendant, using conclusory arguments and conclusory interpretations of Plaintiffs' 
complaint and depositions, claims that the primary reason Plaintiffs were discharged was because 
they broke Defendant's rule against acquiring three "unexcused" absences. Even assuming such 
as true, whether Plaintiffs broke the rules raises a fundamental factual dispute which completely 
precludes summary judgment. 
This Court well knows, pursuant to Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, it is the 
moving party's burden to remove all questions of material fact before summary judgment can be 
rendered. Defendant, rather than precluding any factual dispute as to whether Plaintiffs were 
fired for whistleblowing, completely fails to address the question. 
Plaintiffs' terminations were pretextual to the extent that they were arbitrary, and 
prompted by Plaintiffs refusals to engage in or cooperate with illegal and improper activity. 
Furthermore, It appears that Defendant has wilfully failed to comply with discovery, 
which should be an independent basis for denying its motion for summary judgment. The Court 
shall apply the strictest standard of review in reviewing this motion. The motion is premature 
and should be summarily denied. Many facts are in dispute and Plaintiffs have had insufficient 
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time and insufficient cooperation from Defendant to ascertain the facts forming the basis of their 
causes of action. 
The facts presented by Defendant as undisputed are taken out of context and are 
vigorously disputed. Defendant misrepresents the law and the applicable tests for each argument 
it makes, and it does not meet its burden of proving all elements of the tests which are applicable 
to the questions it presents. 
PLAINTIFFS' RESPONSES TO DEFENDANT'S "STATEMENT OF FACTS" 
1. Undisputed. 
2. Undisputed. 
3. Undisputed. 
4. Undisputed that the collective bargaining agreement provides a "just cause" standard 
under which Plaintiffs' firings will be reviewed in this Court. The "grievance process" has no 
relevance to the facts underlying Plaintiffs' claims 
5. Disputed. Undisputed that "three unexcused absences" was a "rule" that was often 
recited at the Twin Falls Factory and that the only wTitten memorialization of said rule reads as 
follows: 
You must come in, on time, every day your shift is scheduled to 
work. If you will be late, or absent, you must call in to the factory 
to report it. [ ] Failure to do this is grounds for immediate 
dismissal. It is your responsibility to get to work and he on time 
All reasons that you may choose to miss work for may not be 
excused. For example if you do not have a ride to work and you 
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miss the full shift this absence will be unexcused. It is your 
responsibility to clear all absences with you supervisor. The 
maximum number of unexcused absences you can receive before 
being terminated is three (3). 
6. Disputed. Undisputed that Mr. Sparrow was assessed "unexcused absences" on 
September 10, 1994 and March 25, 1995. 
7. Undisputed. On May 20, 1995, Mr. Sparrow was sick, and he properly called the 
factory in accordance with the rule quoted in ^ 5 above. 
8. Disputed. 
Q. [Mr. Gavre] So when you called in to the company in the morning [before 
6:00 a.m.], were you already planning on going to Nevada that day? 
A. [Mr. Sparrow] No. I had no idea. When I called in sick I was at my 
mother's house. I just had — I don't know, I had nerves in my stomach or 
something an I was still in bed up until 3:30 [p.m.]. My ex-wife came and 
asked me to go to Nevada with her, and I was still in bed at the time, and I 
said, I guess, so I went with her. 
Q. So you weren't so sick that you couldn't drive to Nevada? 
A. I didn't drive. I rode. 
* * * 
Q. So you could have gone to work that day? 
A. No. I couldn't have. 
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Sparrow Depo. at 209. Undisputed that Mr. Sparrow was cited for speeding in Nevada and was 
arrested because of aprior unpaid citation. Mr. Sparrow rode as a passenger with his ex-wife to 
Nevada and only drove after his ex-wife received a speeding ticket and refused to continue 
driving. Sparrow Depo. at 211-213. Disputed that Mr. Sparrow missed four days of work. As 
shown above, Mr. Sparrow was sick on May 20, 1995. Mr. Sparrow was fired on May 22, 1995. 
9. Disputed that Mr. Sparrow knew his absences were "unexcused" or that he had 
exceeded the "maximum number permitted." Undisputed that Mr. Sparrow testified that he 
thought the time in jail might have constituted "unexcused" absences. Disputed whether his time 
in jail constituted "unexcused" absences under Defendant's "rule." 
10. Disputed that Mr. Sparrow was discharged for having more than three "unexcused" 
absences. Undisputed that Mr. Sparrow was discharged on the pretextual basis that he had 
received "three unexcused absences." Undisputed also that his firing occurred on May 22, 1995. 
11. Undisputed. Any grievance procedure under the collective bargaining agreement 
has no relevance to the facts underlying Plaintiffs' claims. 
12. Undisputed. The October, 1986 warning has no relevance to the facts underlying 
Plaintiffs' claims 
13. Disputed. Undisputed that Mr. Waddoups was assessed an "unexcused" absence on 
March 19, 1988. 
14. Disputed. Mr. Waddoups testified that Larry Dayley was emotional on September 
28, 1993: 
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Q. [Mr. Gavre] But Larry Dayley did talk to you about poor attendance? 
A. . [Mr. Waddoups] I remember him coming up and saying something. It 
was short, it couldn't have been more than five or six words and took off. 
He was mad. 
Waddoups Depo. at 119 (emphasis added). 
15. Disputed. The written warning referenced by Defendant has no relevance to the 
facts underlying Plaintiffs' claims except to show procedures that Defendant did not follow when 
firing Plaintiffs. 
16. Disputed. Undisputed that on June 29, 1994, Mr. Waddoups was assessed an 
"unexcused" absence. Mr. Waddoups testified: 
Q. [Mr. Gavre] And then did you ask Bob Kinchelow if you could have a 
portion of the day off? 
A. [Mr. Waddoups] I believe the remainder, yes. 
Q. And what did Bob Kinchelow tell you? 
A. He, I thought, said yes.. . . 
* * * 
Q. This Exhibit 18 says [objected to on grounds of hearsay] that Bob told you 
that you needed to get Vince's approval and that you threw a fit? 
A. He lied. 
Waddoups Depo. at 123. 
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17. Disputed. Undisputed that on March 3, 1995, Mr. Waddoups was assessed an 
"unexcused" absence. Undisputed that Mr. Waddoups was sick on March 3, 1995 and properly 
complied with Defendant's "rule" which is quoted in f^ 5, above. Undisputed that Mr. Waddoups 
testified in his deposition that there was no use fighting the arbitrary characterization (as either 
"excused" or "unexcused") given to absences by Defendant. Waddoups Depo. at 243-44. 
18. Disputed. Undisputed that Mr. Waddoups was sick on May 28, 1995 and Mr. 
Waddoups was assessed an "unexcused" absence for being sick. "I had called in sick because I 
wasn't feeling well. I don't know how he added the rest of this up." Waddoups Depo. at 261. 
19. Disputed. Undisputed that Larry Dayley asserted the pretextual reason of 
"excessive absenteeism" when he fired Mr. Waddoups in violation of clear and substantial public 
policy on May 28, 1995. 
20. Disputed. Undisputed that over the course of many years of employment, tardiness 
and absenteeism had been discussed at different times in different forms. Undisputed also that 
Defendant applied its "rules" arbitrarily and capriciously. 
21. Undisputed. Any grievance procedure under the collective bargaining agreement 
has no relevance to the facts underlying Plaintiffs' claims. 
22. Disputed. Undisputed that on February 16, 1995, Michael Davis was fatally injured 
when his arm and most of the blood in his body entered Defendant's sugar production system. 
Undisputed that some cleaning of the system occurred. Disputed that sugar being loaded on the 
day of the accident was shipped to an animal feed producer. Undisputed that Defendant claimed 
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and claims that the Quarantined Sugar was sent to an animal feed producer. 
23. Undisputed that sugar stored in the Twin Falls factory was adulterated by human 
blood and flesh and was shipped for human consumption in violation of food safety laws. 
24. Disputed. Undisputed that Mr. Waddoups and Mr. Sparrow took advantage of all 
internal methods of resolving issues of contamination. Undisputed also that Defendant ignored 
the danger that its adulterated sugar posed to the public, and Defendant violated food safety laws 
Undisputed also that because of their attempt to resolve the contamination issues internally, Mr. 
Waddoups and Mr. Sparrow were unlawfully terminated before they were able to alert public 
authorities or the news media. 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD 
Summary judgment is not appropriate where "motive and intent play leading roles, the 
proof is largely in the hands of the [Defendant], and hostile witnesses thicken the plot." Poller v. 
Columbia Broadcasting System, Tnc.: 368 U.S. 464, 473 (1962). Defendant seeks the entry of a 
summary judgment where discovery has not progressed because of Defendant's own dilatory 
tactics. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(f); Downtown Athletic Club v. Horman: 740 P.2d 275 (Utah App.), 
cert, denied, 765 P.2d 1277 (1987). In addition, many facts which Defendant presents as 
undisputed are vigorously disputed and the facts and all reasonable inferences therefrom will be 
viewed by this Court in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs. Sandhergv Klein, 576 P.2d 1291 
(Utah 1978) (holding that where the parties were not in complete conflict as to certain facts, but 
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the understanding, intention, and consequences of those facts were vigorously disputed, the 
matter was not proper for summary judgment and could only be resolved by a trial). Because 
Defendant has not produced any explicit facts supported by affidavit or otherwise in support of 
its motion for summary judgment, Plaintiffs may rely on their pleadings. S££ Gadd v. Olson, 
685 P.2d 1041, 1045 (Utah 1984); Parrish v. Layton City Corp., 542 P.2d 1086, 1087 (Utah 
1975). 
In some very narrow situations, the Court may enter a summary judgment where no set of 
facts can be established justifying the relief sought. FMA Acceptance Co. v. Leatherhy Ins. Co.. 
594 P2d 1332, 1335 (Utah 1979) (Reversing the trial court's grant of summary judgment but 
recognizing that when the facts are undisputed and no more than one reasonable conclusion can 
be drawn, summary judgment might theoretically be permissible). 
ARGUMENT 
I. DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS 
PREMATURE 
Plaintiffs have had insufficient opportunity to conduct discovery. Defendant has been 
dilatory and uncooperative. On November 10, 1997, this Court conducted a Hearing on 
Plaintiffs' Motions to Compel (3), a Motion for Protective Order, and a Motion for discovery 
sanctions in the form of a Default Judgment. This is not the record of a case in which discovery 
has reached a stage where this Court may assume that the facts have been developed. 
All of the causes of action herein are fact-sensitive. All of the facts which Plaintiffs need 
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to support their argument are in the exclusive control of Defendant. See Affidavit of Trent J. 
Waddoups attached to Plaintiffs' Motion for a Continuance. 
II. PLAINTIFFS MAY AMEND THEIR COMPLAINT TO 
CONFORM TO THE EVIDENCE 
Pursuant to Rule 15 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, if Plaintiffs have not alleged 
sufficient facts, or if their causes of action do not allege proper bases upon which relief may be 
had, Plaintiffs may amend their complaint as justice requires. 
III. DEFENDANT BEARS THE BURDEN OF SUPPORTING ITS 
ASSERTION THAT IDAHO LAW APPLIES 
This Court is presumed not to know the law of foreign states. If Defendant desires to 
assert that Idaho law should apply to Plaintiffs' causes of action because of comity, it bears the 
burden of presenting notice of its assertion, it must establish its assertions about the contents of 
Idaho law, it must provide rules of decision upon which the Court may rely, and it must prepare 
the Court for all foreseeable problems associated with applying foreign law (such as if the Court 
attempts to apply foreign law, but is not able to discern the content of the foreign law). 
Defendant has wholly failed in its responsibility. Thus, the Court may summarily deny 
Defendant's choice of law assertion because the Court may apply the law of the forum in all 
cases by inferring that the panies stipulate thereto or by inferring that no conflict exists. Sfi£ Doe 
v. Nevada Crossing, Inc., 920 F.Supp 164, 167 (D.Utah 1996) (and cases cited therein). The 
State of Utah "possesses exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over persons and property within 
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its territory." Pennoyer v. Neflfl 95 U.S. 714 (1877). 
DEFENDANT'S POINT III. 
IV. PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS ARE GOVERNED BY THE LAW OF THE 
FORUM — UTAH LAW 
The Defendant is on a jurisdiction selecting expedition whereby it seeks to escape the 
application of Utah law to its tortious misconduct. While application of Idaho law may advance 
Idaho policies when Idaho is the forum, those policies would not be furthered by applying Idaho 
law in a Utah forum. For this reason, this Court will look solely to Utah law. 
In 1989, the Utah Supreme Court applied the "most significant relationship" test to a 
question regarding intra-familial tort immunity. Forsman v. Forsman. 779 P.2d 218 (Utah 1989) 
("As to the applicability of the doctrine of interspousal immunity heretofore espoused by this 
Court, by reason of the particular facts and circumstances of this case, it would appear that 
Utah law should not be applied." Id. at 219 (emphasis added)). The application of the "most 
significant relationship" test to an intra-familial tort did not necessarily extend the "adoption" of 
that test to all torts because the particular factors to be considered in a choice of law question 
vary greatly according to the cause of action which is brought. 
Nevertheless, various federal courts have made "Erie Guesses," and the Utah Court of 
Appeals has concluded that the Utah Supreme Court would probably apply the "most significant 
relationship" test as articulated in Section 145 of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws 
to all tort actions. $££ Record v. Bnggs. 887 P.2d 865 (Utah App. 1994); Doe v Nevada 
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Crossing, Inc.. 920 F.Supp 164 (D.Utah 1996). Plaintiffs do not dispute that this Court should 
apply the factors listed in § 6 of the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Law and consider the 
contacts listed in § 145. The approach the Court must take under the most significant contacts 
analysis is not the application of a bright-line test; but rather, its task is to ask all of the right 
questions. 
The merit of this approach is that it gives to the state having the most interest in the 
problem paramount control over the legal issues arising out of a particular factual context, thus 
allowing the forum to apply the policies of the jurisdiction "most intimately concerned with the 
outcome of [the] particular litigation." 3 Utah L.Rev., pp. 498-99. Moreover, by stressing the 
significant contacts, it enables the Court, not only to reflect the relative interests of the two 
jurisdictions involved, but also to give effect to pragmatic considerations of'Whether one rule or 
the other produces the best practical result." Swift & Co. v. Rankers Trust Co.. 19 N.E.2d 992, 
995 (N.Y. 1939). 
While Defendant properly asserts that the "most significant relationship" test may be 
applied to this matter, it improperly analyzes the facts by applying the discredited lex loci 
delictus test. £fi£ Forsman, 779 P.2d at 219-20 (rejecting Defendant's "law of the situs" 
analysis). Defendant simplistically avers that the parties were in Idaho, therefore, Idaho law 
applies. Defendant does not attempt to apply the factors listed in § 145, and it does not even 
fully quote § 145 to inform the Court that the contacts listed in § 145 are to be taken into account 
in applying the principles listed in § 6 in order to determine the central question: Which state has 
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the most significant interest in applying its law to the underlying facts? $££ Doe v. Nevada 
Crossing. Inc.. 920 F.Supp 164, 167 (D.Utah 1996). 
The proper application of all the factors listed below inescapably leads to the conclusion 
that Utah's substantive law is the governing law. Section 145 provides as follows: 
§ 145. The General Principle 
(1) The rights and liabilities of the parties with respect to an issue in 
tort are determined by the local law of the state which, with respect to that 
issue, has the most significant relationship to the occurrence and the 
parties under the principles stated in § 6. 
(2) Contacts to be taken into account in applying the principles of § 6 
to determine the law applicable to an issue include:1 
(a) the place where the injury occurred, 
(b) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred, 
(c) the domicil, residence, nationality, place of incorporation 
and place of business of the parties, and 
(d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties 
is centered. 
These contacts are to be evaluated according to their relative importance 
with respect to the particular issue. 
Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws, § 145. The Court will take the above-listed 
considerations into account when applying the principles listed below in § 6. 
§ 6. Choice-of-Law Principles 
(1) A court, subject to constitutional restrictions, will follow a statutory 
directive of its own state on choice of law. 
1
 Note that the list of contacts is not exhaustive; but rather, the significant contacts 
"include" a - d. 
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(2) When there is no such directive, the factors relevant to the choice of the 
applicable rule of law include: 
(a) the needs of the interstate and international systems. 
(b) the relevant policies of the forum, 
(c) the relevant policies of other interested states and the relative 
interests of those states in the determination of the particular issue, 
(d) the protection of justified expectations, 
(e) the basic policies underlying the particular field of law, 
(f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and 
(g) ease in the determination and application of the law to be applied. 
Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws, § 6. 
The value goals of § 6 and the contacts of § 145 should be "evaluated according to their 
relative importance with respect to" Plaintiffs' causes of action.2 The policies evaluated by the 
court in the intrafamilial cause of action discussed in Forsman are not the policies underlying the 
causes of action in this case. 
In this case, the most important factors are: (A) The place where the injury occurred, 
Restatement § 145(2)(a); (B) The relevant policies of the forum, Restatement § 6(2)(b); (C) The 
relevant policies of other interested states and the relative interests of those states in the 
determination of the particular issue, Restatement § 6(2)(b); (D) The basic policies underlying 
the particular field of law, Restatement § 6(2)(d); and (E) Ease in the determination and 
application of the law to be applied, Restatement § 6(2)(g). 
2
 Professor Weintraub of the University of Texas Law School proposes that: "If two or 
more states having contacts with the parties or the transactions will have the policies underlying 
their different tort rules advanced, apply the law that will favor the plaintiff . . . ." Russell 
Weintraub, Commentary on the Conflict of Laws at 360 (3d Ed. 1986) (emphasis added). 
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Defendant utterly failed to explain the relevant policies underlying Idaho law, to compare 
the relative interests x)f Idaho and Utah in the determination of the particular issues in this matter, 
or even to tell the Court what Idaho law is. Restatement § 6(2)(b). 
A. PURSUANT TO § 145(2)(a), THE INJURY OCCURRED IN UTAH, 
AND THIS COURT SHOULD APPLY UTAH LAW. 
The Defendant confuses the place where the injury occurred with the place where the 
Plaintiffs suffered their money damages for which Defendant is liable. At first blush, this 
rephrasing may appear cosmetic; however, it is fundamental to this choice of law issue under the 
most significant contacts analysis. 
The injury for which Plaintiffs seek redress under the law is Defendant's violation of 
Utah's clear and substantial public policies regarding food safety and the termination of 
employees who advance those public policies. The "injury" is not the amount of money damages 
that this Defendant will ultimately be required to pay to Plaintiffs as a result of its tortious 
misconduct. The "injury" is the contravention of Utah's vital state interests. The "injury" 
includes the damage to public health perpetrated by a Utah corporation, the damage to 
employment relationships where a Utah corporation punishes employees who refuse to commit 
an unlawful act, the damage to an unsuspecting public which is not protected by citizen 
crimefighters promoting clear and substantial Utah public policies, etc. The "injury" was caused 
by Defendant's reckless conduct which originated in Utah and was inflicted upon Plaintiffs in 
Idaho. Restatement §§ 145(2)(a), (b). The cause of action for wrongful discharge in violation of 
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public - ^ ould not exist but for the very high value which Utah places on food safety and 
the jobs 01 thubc who attempt to iu:;i;„' . . . :: . 
judiie Bovce\s analysis in Doe v. Nevada Crossing, inc.. 920 F.Supp lt>4 (D U:a^ 1 Q 0O 
gives proper guidance to this Court by distinguishing betwee: :.->:: . *v-^ ; ^ 
I'luntiit'-i and tin "rninr," v nm h nt nirred in the State of Utah. InQoe, the plaintiffs, a husband 
and wife, were violently assaulted in a hotel in Wendover, Nevada. LI a .... d.snute in 
D&£ centered :.:. ; „-,.. .'d a ciaim 101 loss oi 
consortium. Id* Utah does not recognize a cause of action for loss of consortium, while Nevada 
does. Id. The plaintiffs wanted to apph Nevada i<\\\ \\\w\> |hr ' tHpn.jjn" w IMICI f,- :?nnl\ l"i ,v< 
.
 v ... . *"'rjhe wrongful conduct of defendants occurred :r \ e \ aca The 
injury to the plaintiffs' persons from the assault was in Nevada . , -- -< *{..;*•.• 
consortiui \\ i i I il Id 1fih w mphiisi «. adih dm 1 he indue found that the injury 
complained of occurred in Utah because the marital union existed in Utah, and a consortium, 
claim., is a claim ot mjun tr Hit maiilal ..M.. .. LI I • ri.«11, fhr midec nwu ludrd !h;il 1 'tali law 
applies because "[t]he interest in choice of law is that of the states involved not the individual 
parties," and Utah has the more significant relationship in the niiiiiijl uni n ilia 
tlir \ lolent a .viul1 Id, (citing Restatement (Second1 C(^uic: OT I aws. c f.? jus: as M: and Mrs. 
Doe's consortium was injured in Utah, the injury k Liar s puD:iw :.OIK \ wrac;- * underlies 
pLtuinfts cLiifii1 iHI i IIM'MI in III I iinh. 
\ Cause of Action for Wrongful Termination in Violation 
of Public Policy Is a Claim That Defendant Violated Utah's 
Public Policy, Therefore, the Place of the Injury Is I Jtak,. 
Defendant's violation of public policy rendered an otherwise private matter repugnant to 
the public good. The public policy exception to the employment ai Wil l t i o i i l ' i i ie i,"" tilj d l i i l f i l v ! ii" 
hakoicr ih'f,j romnetmi: interests of society, employees and employers. When an employee is 
fired in a manner or for a reason that contravenes a clear and substantial public policy, society 
y ii impose Siinrtjoijs on itii i nipid' H "^  linns 'n in rmpl^vee which are protected under the 
public policy exception include: """(I) refusing to commit an illegal o:r wrongful act (2) 
performing a public obligation, 01 (.w extruding a icyai IILMII m HIT. IICLM Petersen. \^ 
Browning, 832 P.2d 1280, 1281 (Utah 1992).3 In sum, act ions by an employee merit legal 
protect ion in this State " w h e n the statutory language express ing the p u D ^ . consc ience is clear 
•i"it w ' v n ihr jfTVcted imprests of society are substant ia l ." l± at 1282. Defendant does not 
chal lenge Plaintiffs ' assertion that the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmet ics Act, the Utah 
Vi hole.sonu I in • i II in i MIMIU'T n i »<» '» i u i m i M < -
 l{\ 
substantial public nohc\ 2 ' ] S C S :5*': z: S££.. Utah Code Ann. ^ 4->U -: o ^ Utah Code 
A n n . ~ „ _ :? -: d i i M i M m i l H"fi„ij;f/(1 
to per.fo.rm acts that public policy would condemn. 
.- :r.ng tnose wno attempt to mrther clear and substantial public policy gives rise to a 
Piaintifts' conduct rcii into categories tTj & (3) Plaintiffs refused to commit criminal 
acts, and they promoted public voh:\ Cjte^cn < 2 •. usuu!i> applies to such conduct as 
performing jury duty. 
cause of action which sounds in tort because the injury caused by such an action is perpetrated 
against the public, as opposed to the parties \ >n I \ 
[T]he vindication of public policy worked by the tort cause of 
action cannot be accomplished by a contractual provision that 
prohibits discharges for any but just cause. Even when a contract 
prohibits conduct that also would violate public policy, the 
remedies for breach of that contract would satisfy only the private 
interests of the parties to the agreement, i.e., by restoring a 
wrongfully discharged employee to his or her position and making 
him or her whole. There is no reason to expect that these remedies 
would be as draconian as those that might be available under the 
tort cause of action, remedies that are designed not only to 
remedy the breach and make the employee whole but to deter 
and punish violations of vital state interest. While any employer 
violating a contractual just-cause standard of dismissal should be 
liable for breaking its promise to its employee, Peterson dictates 
that an employer who violates clear and substantial public policies 
should be liable for the more expansive penalties of tort, a 
potentially harsher liability commensurate with the greater wrong 
against society. When an employer's act violates both the 
contractual just-cause standard and a clear and substantial public 
policy, we see no reason to dilute the force of the double sanction. 
In such an instance, the employer is liable for two breaches, one in 
contract and one in tort. It therefore must bear the consequences of 
both. 
Rcthcrford v. AT & T Communications, 844 P.2d 949, 955 (Utah 1992) (emphasis added) (citing 
Peterson v. Browning. 832 P.2d 1280 (Utah 1992)). 
1 1: le toi t :)f w rongfi il discharge in violation of public policy affects the conduct of Utah's 
employers by imposing punitive damages,,,4 "[Potential punitive damages will exert, a valuable 
rhe Court should advance the forum's governmental interests by applying the "better 
rule of law" Utah lav • i; IJCI: Leflar, McDougal & Felix, American Conflicts 'Law.... 279 (4th ed. 
1986). 
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deterrent effect on employers who might otherwise subject their employees to a choice between 
violating the law or losing their job., h a m i i H SJ2 P 2\\ it 1 f,S , innpli.iMs added) The State 
df! T?MII hii • mi extremely strong state interest in providing "an incentive ror employers to refrain 
from using their unique economic position to coerce employee COHJL . . ~v \ r 
ana suDsiaiiii.il inmblik IHUR US Moreover, n will encourage employees to engage in lawful . 
conduct and report violations of the law." Id. (citing with approval, Boyle v, Vista Eyewear. 
Inc. ," , : - . . . , .» • * J un violation of 
federal Food and Drug Administration regulations)). Furthermore, Utah protects employees 
whether the applicable law forming the basi^ o: tne p^r . . :\ ... 
Lioveniment oi unoilvr stale " [ i at 1283. 
Utah has a very strong interest in protecting its clear and substantial public policies 
whereas Iciaii : 1 ia. ? i K ii itei • * it* n i tl le inji II } - suffered bj I Jtah's pi iblic The place of the conduct 
causing the injure Hears lit! j^ .- relation to the governmental interests of the two potentially 
interested states. * IU iniur-. :r. the instant . ^ •. > i 
food and its interest in protect ing those who are fired for p romot ing this clear and substantial 
Defendant bears the burden of showing that Idaho has any interest in this matter . In the 
absence of such a showing , the Court will conc lude that Idaho has no interest . "If the Court finds 
that one state has an interest in the application of its policy in the circumstances of the case and 
the other has none, it should apply the law of the interested state." Brainerd Currie, Notes on 
Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of I,aws : Duke L , l 171, 178 (1959). 
See also Restatement § 6(2)(c). 
I y 
public policy.6 
If Idaho law would also dictate liul f KJencIanni v\u\ iiml r\\ n ,md substantial public 
p. .h.:iri then the conflict between Idaho law and Utah law is a "false conflict" because both 
State's laws are the same. Where the Court encounters a :-:: •. , ' ' -^ 
- familial' and adept. Restatement at § o\2)ig'. :: :he r-rccess. 
the Court will advance predictability and uniformity of result and protect justified expeeiations. 
Restatement a: , 
In sum, the injury relating to the tort of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy 
occurred in Utah. Food vvhxh is contaminated in Idaho does no! skn in Idaho I"r muT*-*? in 
. i i*:^ a..v/n •' -hr-- food Drought into Utah by protecting employees who further that interest 
and seek protection in Utah courts gives Utah amore significant interest in protecting Plainulls 
than Idaho ' tia aiise Utah imposes se\ cut; penalties on responsible employers like Defendant, 
Utah has demonstrated its more significant interest, and Utah law applies, 
(
 In terms of the age-old example of shooting a bullet across state lines: The gun was 
located in Idaho, the tngger was pulled from Utah by a Utah corporation, the bullet wounded one 
Idaho domiciliary' and one Utah domiciliary in Idaho, then the bullet ricocheted off the two 
victims and severely wounded the State of Utah through injury to Utah's public policy. 
7
 "If the Court finds that a conflict between the legitimate interest of the two states is 
unavoidable, it should apply the law of the forum "' h::\ nerd Currie, Notes on Methods and 
Objectives in the Conflict of I aws. Duke L J. * "*! " * * v^> * 
B. PURSUANT lu:;\ 45(2)fb), THE CONDUCT CAUSING THE INJURY 
TO UTAH'S PUBLIC POLICY ORIGINATED WITH DEFENDANT'S 
MANAGEMFV^ ^vry ,c P A . S E D I N U T A H . 
The state of Utah has a strong interest in regulating the unlawful actions of its civrcr.s 
(Defendant) and in protecting its citizens from unla. : :-. :.:..::*: Mr--' 
Banian Coast mt rorpnrate niratcs. If a Utah corporation does business in other states where it 
wreaks havoc (especially when that havoc returns to Utah in the form of adulterated 
has a strong interest in appi»\\\v \\> i.i1*' in in '"ii'iaic and niotect its citizens.8 
Defendant is incorporated in Utah and manages its factories from its headquarters in 
Ogden, Utah. Defendant represents tfiai On.: is a ' WVAK i uniani a MM nif statr nf 1 Tiah. 
Common sense, standard business practices, and Plaintiffs' uncontested allegations dictate 
otherwise. The corporation's management located at its headquarters lonnulates and nitorces 
ihc busmen iHaiiaavj, mlti,, ,tml reinilatiini . that lie at the fore of Plaintiffs' causes of action in 
this case. Defendant's employees' and managers' attitudes and conduct regarding issues such as: 
"'adulterated K»ml " J L|uaiili! ui pnuim inri• i\ iwt* ilrvrlnprd ^ nil afnnice to the attitudes and 
conduct of Defendant's management at its headquarters. These attitudes and conduct fostered 
The United Mates supreme Court held in Steele v. Bulova Watch Co. that the United 
States is not barred by international law from governing the conduct of its citizens on the high 
seas or in foreign countries. 344 U.S. 280 (1952), 
For example, United States securities laws apply to fraud involving securities 
representing ownership interests in domestic corporations which are sold in foreign countries. 
This is true even where the only victims of the fraud are foreigners. The United States has a 
strong interest in punishing the misconduct of its own citizens for the disregard of its law and the 
misuse of United States' law which gives the appearance that the United States approves of such 
misconduct. 
the corporation's culture which requires conduct in conformity with developed corporate 
customs. Such developed customs are espu ... ' ' --on which, according 
ii i us 'AUKWfT^ 10 Plaintiffs' discover}' requests, has no written policies on very important matters. 
Those weaned on Defendant's culture approved of illegal!) scriuiny adulterated sugar ir he t\i\cn 
r»< diilMtetn aiiJ ilisajuMoved ofinnd fired) those who stood athwrart its bandwagon culture 
screaming "stop!"9 
Plamtilis Deiievc ami ainjgt1 tiui inr niitrTiri I'IIT ihem came directh from Ogden, Utah. 
Plaintiffs plan to develop this belief through additional discover}'. 
PURSUANT TO § 145(2)(c), THE DOMICIL OF PLAINTIFF BLAKE 
WADDOUPS IS UTAH AND THE DOMICIL OF DEFENDANT IS 
UTAH, THEREFORE UTAH LAW APPI IES. 
Plaintiff Blake Waddoups is a domiciliary of Utah. Ltah is Mi \\ addnai du.ii „ ik n( 
org. * f choice (he intends to return here). Defendant 
correctly argues that both Plaintiffs resided in Idaho at the time when Defendant tortious)} fired 
them. ... >. . -.. :- acile is determined 
large'11-- h\ the subjective intent of the parties.10 
v j ^ s 1S a m o . t l o n j 0 1 sunnuji. i"iilb'Mi^ |i| i^i-i I),M Court; will view all facts in the light 
most favorable to Plaintiffs. 
" Plaintiffs would present affidavits supporting their assertion that Mr. Waddoups is a 
Utah domiciliary; however, Plaintiffs do not bear that burden on this motion for summary 
judgment because Defendant merely made yet another conclusory statement. L tan K (V. P. 
56(e); See Gadd V.Olson, 685 P.2d 1041, 1045 (Utah 1984) (holding that the reuuirem-* i 
Rule 56(b) is inapplicable if the moving party does not support its motion witn affidavit - ZLLDL-
Parrish v. Layton CityjQix|L, 542 P.2d 1086'i(>S7 (I Jtah 1975). 
Two-thirds of the parties (Defendant and one-half of the Plaintiffs) are domiciled m the 
state of Utah. Utah has a predominant continuing interest in applying its laws to this case 
involving its citizens. 
D. PURSUANT TO § 145(2)(d), THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE 
PARTIES IS CENTERED IN UTAH, THEREFORE, UTAH LAW 
APPLIES. 
Even if two-thirds of the parties were not domiciled in Utah, Utah still has a predominant 
interest in applying its laws to "those who seek relief in its courts." Wallis v. Mrs. Smith's Pie 
Co.. 550 S.W.2d 453, 458 (Ark. 1977). The only place where a relationship exists between the 
parties is this Court. See Restatement § 145(2)(d) ("(d) the place where the relationship, if any, 
between the parties is centered.") (emphasis added). 
1. The Contract Is Not Relevant to Defendant's Tortious Conduct, 
Therefore, The Situs in Which The Contract Was Entered Is 
Irrelevant. 
"Because the public policy exception is imposed by law, the . . . agreement is involved 
only because it forms the basis of the relationship; the agreement is tangential to the" tortious 
misconduct. Peterson v. Browning. 832 P.2d 1280, 1284 (Utah 1992). The collective bargaining 
agreement entered into between Plaintiffs and Defendant formed the basis of the relationship 
between the parties; however, the breach of the just-cause term of the contract was merely 
tangential to Defendant's breach of its duty to the people of Utah which is imposed by Utah's 
clear and substantial public policy relating to food safety. Moreover, the detriment imposed 
upon Plaintiffs by Defendant "inure[s] to the [detriment] of the public." IdL 
DEFENDANT'S POINT IV. 
V. DEFENDANT VIOLATED CLEAR AND SUBSTANTIAL PUBLIC 
POLICY 
Defendant concludes that Plaintiffs have no cause of action for wrongful termination 
based upon its circular argument/conclusion set forth in its memorandum at Point IV, p. 10. 
Defendant's argument concludes, in essence: Idaho law applies because it is the law of the situs, 
thus Utah law does not apply, and hence Defendant should argue Idaho law regarding wrongful 
discharge; however, Plaintiffs' claim should be dismissed because Plaintiffs only alleged that 
Defendant violated Utah's public policy in their complaint. fk£ Defendant's memo, at p. 10 
(emphasis in original). BiiLsee, Records v, Briggs, 887 P.2d 864, 869 (Utah App. 1994) ("In 
characterizing a cause of action, Utah courts look to the nature of the action and not the pleading 
labels chosen.") Defendant cites no Idaho law indicating no cause of action in Idaho, no caselaw 
supporting the hypertechnical reading of complaints in notice-pleading jurisdictions, no statutes, 
no commentators, etc. 
DEFENDANT'S POINT V. 
VI. PLAINTIFFS' FAILURE TO REPORT DEFENDANT'S CRIMINAL 
CONDUCT TO GOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITIES DOES NOT BAR 
THEIR CLAIM 
Defendant grossly misstates the public policy exception to at-will employment and 
grossly misinterprets Fox v. MCI Communications Corp., 931 P.2d 857 (Utah 1997). The Utah 
Supreme Court stated in Heslop: 
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We do not agree that plaintiff cannot meet a public policy requirement 
simply because he did not report the violation to the Attorney General or 
to the Commissioner. Plaintiff pursued all internal methods for resolving 
the problem; he need not have gone outside the Bank to try to correct the 
policy violation. 
Hednpv Bankoflltah. 839 P.2d 828, 838 (Utah 1992). In Fox v, MCI, the Supreme Court 
held: 
[T]he termination of a private sector employee in retaliation for the good 
faith reporting to company management of alleged violations by co-
workers of Utah Code Ann. §§76-6-403, 76-6-405, 76-6-703, or 76-6-705 
(1995), does not implicate a clear and substantial public policy of the state 
ofUtah. 
Fox v. MCT Communications Corp.. 931 P.2d 857 (Utah 1997). Did the court overrule its 
holding in Heslop? No. 
In Heslop, the plaintiff claimed that the defendant fired him because of his insistence that 
the defendant bank comply with the Utah Financial Institutions Act found at Utah Code Ann. § 
7-1-318. The court concluded that the act "serves a substantial public policy because it protects 
the public as well as regulates the institutions themselves." Heslop 839 P.2d at 837 (emphasis 
added). 
In Fox v. MCI, the plaintiff claimed that the defendant fired her after she reported 
violations of criminal laws relating to "computer fraud." The computer fraud related to 
"churning" accounts to meet internal quotas and to earn higher commissions. In other words, the 
victim of the alleged crime was the defendant itself and not the public. "The churning and 
creation of 'new' accounts, while clearly intended to produce higher pay for the employees, was 
a practice defendant knew about and, by tolerating it, acquiesced in. For that reason, the 
corporation was not defrauded." Id. at 860. There was no fraud because the only effect of the 
conduct would be felt by the defendant (and not the public), therefore, the only "clear and 
substantial public policy" that plaintiff could state would be the public policy which encourages 
reporting criminal activity to public authorities which Ms. Fox did not do. 
Generally, whistleblowers who complain internally, but who have not contacted an 
appropriate enforcement authority are protected by state laws. "[T]he rationale . . . is that loyal 
employees, who do not go outside their organizations, should not have less protection than 
employees who could be considered more disruptive by complaining outside their 
organizations." Westman, Daniel P., Whistleblowing. The Law of Retaliatory Discharge at 114 
(1991). An employee working under Defendant's purported "rule of law" would be faced with 
the peril of reprisal without legal remedy in exchange for performing public obligations. 
Defendant's theory does not promote public policy. An employee's reporting unsanitary 
conditions within the workplace is action in furtherance of Utah's firmly held public policy 
favoring safe and clean food. Concomitantly, retaliation against the reporting employee as a 
punitive measure and a deterrent to other observers of unsanitary conditions directly affronts that 
policy. "[I]t would seem that a business ought to welcome an employee's disclosure of 
significant" product-quality problems unless, of course, it would unduly damage product-
quantity goals. Fox v. MCI, 931 P.2d at 859. 
After Fox v, MCI, Plaintiffs could not have based their claims on the public policy which 
26 
encourages reporting criminal activity to public authorities. Fortunately, Plaintiffs never alleged 
the violation of that public policy. Defendant pulled a chair out from under nobody. It did not 
unseat Plaintiffs' claims. 
In sum, Plaintiffs alleged that they threatened to reveal the unsanitary conditions of 
Defendant's inventory shortly before being fired.11 During the two months which passed 
between the contamination and Plaintiffs' firings, Plaintiffs made clear their refusals to engage in 
illegal activity and actively sought to determine whether merely holding adulterated food 
constitutes a criminal violation (it does). Plaintiffs demanded that Defendant conduct a thorough 
investigation (it pretended to investigate to placate Plaintiffs). Plaintiffs diligently demanded 
that Defendant follow its own rules on conducting investigations regarding contamination after 
they found out that Defendant performed a sham investigation (it never did). The foregoing 
states a claim for wrongful termination in violation of public policy because Plaintiffs furthered 
public policy and refused to engage in illegal activities. 
11
 &£ ££., Clifford v, Atchinson, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry„ 685 F.2d 1149 (9th Cir. 1982) 
(holding, in the Title VII context, that there is no legal distinction between filing a complaint and 
threatening to file a complaint). 
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DEFENDANT'S POINT VI. 
VII. PLAINTIFFS' CAUSE OF ACTION FOR EMOTIONAL DISTRESS IS 
NOT BARRED BY ANY STATUTORY SCHEME 
A. IDAHO COURTS RECOGNIZE INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF 
EMOTIONAL DISTRESS CLAIMS CONCURRENT WITH CLAIMS 
FOR WRONGFUL TERMINATION. 
There is no need for this Court to address Defendant's purported interpretation of the 
Idaho Workmen's Compensation Act because the Idaho courts have recognized claims for 
emotional distress concurrent with claims for wrongful termination. Sfi£ £ ^ , Holmes v. Union 
Oil Co of California. 760 P.2d 1189, 1197 (Idaho App. 1988). The rationale of these cases is 
that the actions were not part of the normal employment relationship. Rather, the misconduct 
constituted a pattern of pre-termination harassment in retaliation for internal complaints. 
Moreover, the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress is not a mechanism geared 
toward reimbursing a person for injury; but rather, it is an intentional tort which sanctions 
antisocial behavior. 
Under Idaho's Worker's Compensation statute, Defendant's arguments ring hollow. How 
does an intentional act come within the definition of an accident? 
"Accident" means an unexpected, undesigned, and unlooked for 
mishap, or untoward event connected with the industry in which it 
occurs, and which can be reasonably located as to time and place 
where it occurred causing an injury. 
I.C. § 72-102(14)(b). An intentional act which forms the basis of the tort of intentional infliction 
of emotional distress can never fit the definition of accident and is not pre-empted. 
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If the Court were to consider Defendant's argument, it would dismiss it because: 
Plaintiffs have not conducted enough discovery; Plaintiffs have not begun assessing the damages 
they sustained yet (including the amount or degree of their mental damages); The question of 
whether the physical abuse in question was authorized is a question of fact (even if the physical 
abuse was not authorized at the time, it may have been subsequently ratified by Defendant); 
Defendant's physical abuse constitutes the independent tort of battery-; etc. 
B. PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS ARE NOT SUBJECT TO THE LMRA UNDER THE 
RFTHFRFORD ANALYSIS. 
Defendant owed Plaintiffs the duty not to outrageously harass, humiliate, ridicule, and 
embarrass them.12 This duty did not arise from the collective bargaining agreement (the "CBA"); 
but rather. Defendant owes every member of society the same duty. Because Plaintiffs' cause of 
action exists separate and apart from the CBA (i.e., it is not a contract cause of action), the claim 
is not pre-empted by the LMRA. fke Farmery, United Brotherhood of Carpenters, 430 U.S. 
290, 305, 06 (1977) (holding that intentional infliction of emotional distress claim against union 
and officials was not pre-empted).13 
12
 See £ ^ , Knafel v, Pepsi-Cola Bottlers, Inc., 899 F.2d 1473 (6th Cir. 1990) (finding that 
plaintiffs claim that she was singled out to, inter aha, do jobs that the employer knew would 
exacerbate back condition was not pre-empted); Malone v. Safeway Stores, Inc.. 698 F.Supp. 
207 (D.Oregon 1977) (holding that claims which included threatening to "get rid o f plaintiff 
was outrageous conduct not covered by the CBA). 
13
 The test of LMRA preemption was also explained by the United States Supreme Court 
in Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202 (1985) (ruling that a state action asserting a right 
related to a CBA is not pre-empted unless it is "inextricably intertwined" with the CBA); and 
Linglc v, Norge Div. of Magic Chef. Inc., 486 U.S. 399 (1988) (holding that a retaliatory 
29 
Contrary to Defendant's assertion, the Retherford court did not dismiss all of Ms. 
Retherford's emotional distress claims. The court carefully considered Ms. Retherford's specific 
allegations and concluded that some of the allegations were pre-empted and some were not. 
Retherford. 844 P.2d at 971. The Retherford court explained the test as follows: "To Determine 
whether this tort claim is preempted, we must determine whether . . . there is any basis for 
concluding that defendant's conduct alleged to provide a basis for the tort claim might 
reasonably implicate any of the terms of the [CBA]." Retherford v. AT&T Communications. 
844 P.2d 949, 971 (Utah 1992) (citing Tingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef. Inc.. 486 U.S. 399 
(1988). 
The Retherford court adopted the distinction between "purely personal misconduct, as 
opposed to misconduct under color of possible contractual authority. . . . " Retherford. 844 P.2d 
at 972. Therefore, Defendant bears the burden of presenting this Court with specific provisions 
of the CBA which set forth contractual authority of its managers and which it claims will be in 
need of interpretation by this Court. Defendant has utterly failed to bear it burden and inform 
this Court. 
The mere conclusory assertion by Defendant that its actions were "supervisory" is not 
sufficient. Defendant concludes that its misconduct was supervisory: "Indeed, plaintiffs allege 
that the acts were within the scope and course of employment." Defendant's Memo, at p. 15. 
The Retherford court explained that (under a theory of negligent employment) there is "no need 
discharge action was not pre-empted). 
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to consult the [CBA] to determine whether [abusive employees] were acting within the scope o{ 
their employment." Retherford. 844 P.2d at 973. 
Retherford explained the method of categorizing Defendant's misconduct as either purely 
personal or the exercise of supervisory authority. The court concluded that certain conduct 
alleged by Ms. Retherford was "supervisory" and thus contractual: AT&T ordered Retherford to 
transfer to Boise, it told her to stop complaining, it told her where to sit, it assigned her certain 
tasks. Retherford. 844 P.2d at 972. The court concluded that certain other conduct alleged by 
Ms. Retherford was purely personal: following her around the office, making threatening faces, 
attempting to frighten her as she walked across the street. Retherford, 844 P.2d at 972. 
1. Defendant's Conduct Toward Plaintiffs Was Purely Personal, 
Defendant's misconduct was purely personal despite Defendant's conclusion that 
Plaintiffs allege "supervisory" abuse. Defendant concludes that three of Plaintiffs allegations are 
allegations of supervisory abuse, it ignores Plaintiffs' other allegations, and it has prevented 
discovery which could uncover additional violations. 
First, Defendant failed to provide Mr. Waddoups with psychological counseling and 
gamma globulin shots which were provided to all other employees. Complaint at ^ 47. It is true 
that the decision to offer psychological counseling is a supervisory function which would be pre-
empted; however, it is not a supervisory function to single-out one person to whom counseling 
and medical help would not be offered. At the very least, this is a material disputed fact. 
Second, Defendant implied that Mr. Waddoups was responsible for the death of his co-
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worker, that he was responsible for the contamination of all of the sugar in the factory, and he 
would be the scapegoat if criminal charges were brought. Complaint at 1147(a). It cannot be 
argued that the CBA somehow governs the great American pastime of "covering your ass." 
CYA is purely personal misconduct which is separate and distinct from the CBA. Defendant's 
"purely personal" desire to engage in purely personal attacks on co-workers does not implicate 
the CBA. If these managers had made a thorough investigation and had "exercised their 
contractual authority" by naming Mr. Waddoups as the culpable party, then their misconduct 
would be pre-empted. Defendant's managers practiced the art of career advancement through the 
well-placed shiv. Spreading unfounded rumors and making obnoxious innuendo is purely 
personal. 
Third, Mr. Sparrow's supervisor slapped him and asked him frequently: "Is today the day 
I get to fire you?" In Retherford, the court examined physical abuse (which is clearly personal) 
and threats of firing for complaining about a co-worker's homosexual advances. The court held 
that Ms. Retherford's supervisor exercised her supervisory authority when she told Ms. 
Retherford to stop complaining or she might be fired. It is true that the use of supervisory 
authority to quell dissension among employees is "supervisory" even if it is done improperly 
with an improper motive (for LMRA pre-emption purposes). In Douglas, the Seventh Circuit 
Court held that "supervisory" functions relate to "allegedly arbitrary denials of her requests for 
days off, an 'unjustified' final warning, and 'unwarranted and excessive' scrutiny of her work." 
Retherford, 844 P.2d at 972. If Plaintiffs simply alleged threats to fire, such an allegation would 
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be pre-empted. However, Plaintiffs allege threats to fire that are not based upon performance or 
made under the color of any contractual authority; but rather, are coupled with unwarranted 
physical abuse which (one assumes) is not the subject of any provision of the CBA. The threats 
to fire were made not to reprove Mr. Sparrow's conduct; but rather, Defendant made the threats 
in a sinister manner as if to say: "I would personally like to fire you today, but my supervisory 
authority does not allow it." 
Fourth, Defendant fails to mention Plaintiffs' allegation that one of Defendant's managers 
stood behind Mr. Waddoups during exercises and simulated a homosexual act. Complaint at 
1147(b). The reference of the obscene act was Mike Davis (the fatally injured co-worker who was 
gay) and the blame that the manager personally intended to place upon Mr. Waddoups for the 
death of his co-worker. Again, one assumes that simulated, homosexual sex-acts are not within 
the description of authority and responsibility as set forth in the CBA; however, because 
Defendant fails to point to any provision of the CBA which might be applicable, the Court is left 
to speculate. 
Whether a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress is preempted by the 
LMRA depends on the degree of outrageousness of the conduct and the manner in which the 
conduct was performed. $££ Fanner v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters, 430 U.S. 290, 305, 06 
(1977) (holding that intentional infliction of emotional distress claim against union and officials 
was not preempted by the LMRA under the "abusive manner" exception). The test is whether 
the state law cause of action is "inextricably intertwined" with the state law cause of action. In 
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this case, the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim requires that the Coin t look at the 
conduct of the employer with. ... >•..: - . 
C. WHETHER PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS ARE "INEXTRICABLY INTER I \\ I NED" 
WITH THE CBA IS A QUESTION OF FACT. 
The tort of ; xnuonal lnllutinii nt (..'motional distress requires that Plaintiffs prove that: 
"[Defendant intentionally engaged in some conduct toward the plaintiffs], (a) with the purpose 
of inflicting emotional distress, or (b) wf . .1 ave known that such 
\\ i 11 Id result and his actions are of such a nature as to be considered outrageous and intolerable 
in that they offend against the generally accepted standards ol decaia aiul inou'Li, Robertson 
v. Utah. F1...1-! 1 ,. SSU P M I *V 1 'RR (Utah \pp. 1995Mciting Samms v. Fccles. 358 P.2d "44 
347 (Utah 1961)). 
Defendant conclude:, uiiln ml c plaiutinn w inal'iSis tlul the conduct described above is 
not "outrageous." Defendant's Memo, at i 5 Accusing someone of negligent homicide is not 
outrageous, and as a matter of law a reasonable jur 
'-:--'* .ng someone with criminal sanctions unless he chooses to be a tfcteam 
player" and help ship $9 million dollars worth of adulterated sugar to the PUDIIL L tun 
iniiraL'cous, ajjn as -« m,mer m ! nv 1 reasonable jury could not find that such conduct was 
outrageous? Performing simulated, homosexual sex-acts on co-workers during company-
mandated exercises v> 11m uuihinnnr ,irui .1 \ nmP'*i m 1 iw j reasonable jury could not find that 
such conduct was outrageous? Slapping someone with a notebook and threatening him with 
being fired for pure entertainment value is not outrageous, and as a matter ol law a reasonable 
jury could not find thai such conduct was ouuageou'"" rvimdimt s conclusion that its conduct 
was acceptable is outrageous. 
Plaintiffs suffered disabling emotional distress. noi emotionalh bnn<j 
iiinisclt 10 took r'ni work for an entire month after his unlawful firing. 
Q. | Mr Gavre] And have you been in good health siru,^  .\ia> - -A ;.-.. .. a 
let I Amalgam a in I!"' 
A. | Mi. Sparrow] No. 
A. :>o; - physically, yes, but emotionally, no 
^ Can you explain that9 
1
" ill i si brim.1 fired it really bummed me out. It really made me feel like 
I was a nobody, a nothing, like I wasn't worth a fight for, to stay on there 
good job. li they 
knew how man> rr-jjK- ! missed an,: hcu\ mam times ! missed lunch to 
make them look goo*. .:: .- NI made 
me feel like I wasn't worth 1: dr\a :; jus: kind of made you go. Wow, you. 
know. 
Span '\\ F >ep* ,n "ViS-ry^  Mr Sparrow was disabled by his emotional distress. 
Q. [Mr. Gavre] When you left Amalgamated in May of 1995, did you 
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immediately begin looking for work? 
A. | Mi ^pdiios* | I winihl f.ikr -iboiit a month. 
Q s 0 y o u didn't look for work for about a month? 
A. Correct, 
Q ivvere y0U abie to work at that time? Aside from not looking for a 
1
 vere you able to work i( you had a job? 
A. •- -. :all> , > es, probably. Emotionally, probably not, no. 
\nd that's because, as you said, you were bummed out from being 
fired? 
A. Well, yeah, from the results from being fired. 
Sparrow Depo. at 270-71. Mr. Waddoups testified that his wik i miiil urn \icep in ilu- *anic bed 
w if h him because "I w, 'iild \v,ik: up screaming in the middle of the night in a cold sweat and 
actually hurt her just flopping around It all goes back to this Mike Davis crap Waddoups 
Depo. cii 262 
Plaintiffs have not received professional psychological counseling. Mr. Sparrow testified 
that he had thought about procuring aumsHiiii1 hut In* ami Mi V, •JII<IOU|V, ItHpnl llirnisHve*; by 
talking to each other and "helped themselves through a lot ' Sparrow Depo J: _" ( = 
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DEFENDANT'S POINT VII. 
\ Ill DEFENDANT INTENTIONALIA INTERFERED WITH PLAINTIFFS* 
PROSPECTIVE ECONOMIC ADVANTAGE. 
After Plaintiffs' firings, Mr. Sparrow applied to work with a contractor who did work for 
Defendants. - * ^ " l * * Defendant as his ex-employer, 
the contractor called Defendant. Defendant refused allow the contractor to bring Mr. Sparrow 
onto its premises, therefore, Mr. Sparrow was not lined. Spanuv\ I k;pi» ;n ,1 n\ \ A I M > 
Sp.irnm would have been hired at Oreida; however, after Oreida called Defendant, Oreida 
revokes :is offer Sn arrow Dene at 2^0-^4. 
•-— ' * t i ••** a reasons satisfies the elements of this tort. Any 
reasonable person tcnow s in*.*: v. ,-. person is fired forbad conduct, the person's work-history is 
stained and the bad smell in igei s ii ldefiniteh Defendant's pretexti lal firings interfered with 
Plaintiffs' ability to gain decent employment. In fact, both Plaintiffs continue to s t r j ^ : ; ^ un 
miserable jobs making miserable wages because of; defendant's miserable iniscoiid 
f hi cause of action is valid and properly alleged. Plaintiffs' allegations stand 
uncontro verted. 
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DEFENDANT'S POINT VII. 
IX. DEFENDANT CONSPIRED WITH UNIDENTIFIED INDIVIDUALS OR 
ENTITIES TO TERMINATE PLAINTIFFS 
Defendant correctly states that it cannot conspire with itselt Mow evei, I )etendan: makes 
another attempt to dismiss a cause oi urtmn b.i *n\ upun a stilted reading of Plaintiffs' complaint. 
Record;'; v. Briggs, 887 P.2d 864, 869 (Utah App. 19^4} ("In characterizing a cause of action, 
Utah courts ioor tr the nature oi the action ami noi die pie idine len:K ilinscn. ") 
• .: ;.irrel with the legal standard quoted by Defendant, More discover}' is 
needed to find evidence regarding those with whom. Defendant conspired Plaintiffs h:<\" m^ i 
identified co-amspirauis because Defendant has not cooperated with discovery. 
CONCLUSION 
Based "jpnp 'In loiTerim- Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment must be denied in 
its entirety. 
RfcSPF' TFU1X ) M 'BMI M N»Ihr - 3 da\ >>f December, 1997. 
CARR&WADDOUPS 
Attomevs for Plaintiffs 
MATTING CF.RTTFTCATE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY Ihal I caused a true unmornviuip ' m'Pl ATNTIFF'S 
\l hMORANP! ]M IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT to be mailed, postage prepaid, this day oi Decemb;.: 
Mr. W. Mark Gavre 
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER 
P.O. Box 45898 
Salt Lake Tin-. T" . . « - • 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
More than two years have passed since plaintiffs filed their lawsuit, and there is still no 
evidence supporting any of their claims. In their opposition memorandum1, plaintiffs continue to 
make wild allegations about Amalgamated Sugar supposedly shipping contaminated sugar. 
These allegations are as groundless as they were more than two years ago. Opposing counsel's 
inflammatory and offensive assertions are defamatory and would be actionable if they were made 
outside the legal process. Plaintiffs posture themselves as would-be whistleblowers. Yet it is 
undisputed that plaintiffs never reported any supposed contaminated sugar to the FDA, the media 
or anyone else (as they claim they were going to do), either while they were employed by 
Amalgamated Sugar or after their terminations. In sum, plaintiffs' lawsuit is groundless and 
borders on bad faith. 
In its opening memorandum. Amalgamated Sugar explained that plaintiffs' public policy 
wrongful discharge claim should be dismissed because it is asserted solely under Utah law, while 
Idaho law is controlling. (The claim would also be groundless under Utah law.) Plaintiffs' 
intentional infliction of emotional distress claim is barred by the Idaho Workmen's 
Compensation Act, is preempted by federal labor law. and lacks essential elements of the cause 
of action. Plaintiffs' interference with prospective economic advantage is also factually 
groundless. 
1
 Plaintiffs Memorandum In Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is hereinafter referred to as 
"PI. Opposition Memo, at ." Memorandum In Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is 
184512.1 
In their opposition memorandum, plaintiffs fail to create a genuine dispute of material 
fact, but instead raise specious arguments, misstate the law, and mischaracterize the record. As 
explained below, there is no basis for plaintiffs' opposition to Amalgamated Sugar's motion for 
summary judgment. 
II. PLAINTIFFS FAIL TO SHOW ANY GENUINE DISPUTE OF MATERIAL 
FACT. 
Plaintiffs purport to dispute certain facts, but fail to show any genuine issue of material 
fact. Rule 56(e) requires plaintiffs to go beyond "mere allegations or denials," and to set forth 
"specific facts" supported by affidavits or other admissible evidence in the record. For each fact 
that plaintiffs claim is in dispute, they must "specifically refer to those portions of the record 
upon which [they] rel[y]." Utah Code of Judicial Administration, Rule 4-501(2)(b). Plaintiffs do 
not comply with the requirements of the foregoing rules. Plaintiffs merely assert that certain 
facts are "disputed," but provide no citation to the record. PL Opposition Memo, at 3-8. 
Accordingly, the material facts relied on by Amalgamated Sugar "shall be deemed admitted for 
the purpose of summary judgment." Rule 4-501(2)(b).2 
Equally important, plaintiffs do not show any genuine dispute as to facts that are material 
hereinafter referred to as "Def. Opening Memo, at ." 
2
 Webster v. Sill. 675 P.2d 1170, 1172 (Utah 1983) ("The mere assertion that an issue of fact exists without a proper 
evidentiary foundation to support that assertion is insufficient to preclude the granting of a summary judgment 
motion."); Treloggan v. Treloggan. 699 P.2d 747, 748 (Utah 1985) (where non-movant's opposition is supported by 
"no evidentiary facts" and expresses "unsubstantiated opinions and conclusions," summary judgment properly 
granted); Thornock v. Cook, 604 P.2d 934, 936 (Utah 1979) (when summary judgment motion is based on 
plaintiffs deposition testimony and no affidavit was filed by plaintiff in response, summary judgment appropriate). 
184512.1 2 
to Amalgamated Sugar's motion. Much of what plaintiffs dispute (without basis in the record) 
are not material facts, but merely background information. The material facts are only those that 
pertain to Amalgamated Sugar's specific arguments for summary judgment with respect to 
plaintiffs' causes of action. As explained below, the facts actually relied on by Amalgamated 
Sugar are not genuinely disputed. 
III. IDAHO LAW GOVERNS PLAINTIFFS1 CLAIMS, AND PLAINTIFFS FAIL TO 
SHOW THAT UTAH LAW HAS ANY APPLICATION. 
In its opening memorandum. Amalgamated Sugar explained that Utah applies the "most 
significant relationship" test of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws to determine the 
governing law in a given case. Although plaintiffs attempt to muddy the issue, Utah courts have 
been clear on this point: 
We apply the "most significant relationship" approach, as 
described in the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws, in 
determining which state's law should apply in actions involving 
torts, contracts, property interests, and the like. See, e.g., Forsman 
v. Forsman, 779 P.2d 218, 219-20 (Utah 1989) (applying "most 
significant relationship" analysis to torts case). 
Records v. Briggs, 887 P.2d 864. 867 (Utah App. 1994). See also Pacheco v. Hercules, Inc., 61 
FEP Cases (BNA) 825, 826 (D. Utah 1993) (same); Doe v. Nevada Crossing, Inc., 920 F.Supp. 
164, 166 (D. Utah 1996) (same). 
Plaintiffs in substance admit that Utah applies the "most significant relationship" test in 
deciding choice of law questions. PI. Opposition Memo, at 11-12. The application of the "most 
significant relationship" test to the instant case makes clear that Idaho law governs plaintiffs' 
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claims because the parties, the events at issue, and the alleged injuries were all located in Idaho. 
Def. Opening Memo, at 8-9. Plaintiffs, however, attempt to avoid this obvious conclusion by 
misconstruing and misapplying the "most significant relationship" test. Despite plaintiffs' 
efforts, it is clear that all the relevant factors support the application of Idaho law to plaintiffs' 
lawsuit (which consists of three tort claims).3 
Under the "most significant relationship" test, the following factors determine which 
state's law to apply in tort cases: 
(1) The place where the injury occurred; 
(2) The place where the conduct causing the injury occurred; 
(3) The domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business 
of the parties; and 
(4) The place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered. 
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 145. 
The proper application of the above four factors is illustrated by Judge Greene's decision 
in Pacheco v. Hercules, Inc. In that case, Hercules hired the plaintiff in Utah in 1968 where he 
worked for 19 years, until he was transferred (temporarily) to a company facility in Georgia in 
1987. In Georgia, the plaintiff allegedly was subjected to tortious misconduct by a coworker and 
3
 Plaintiffs contest the application of Idaho law only with respect to their public policy wrongful discharge claim. 
Plaintiffs admit that Idaho law governs their intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, and are silent as to 
what law governs their interference with prospective economic advantage claim. PL Opposition Memo, at 28, 37. 
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a supervisor, suffered severe emotional injury, and eventually lost his job. The plaintiff sued his 
supervisor and Hercules based on tort and contract theories. Pacheco, 61 FEP Cases at 825. 
Applying the four factors of the "most significant relationship" test. Judge Greene 
concluded that Georgia law governed the plaintiffs claims: 
All four factors point to Georgia. The injury occurred in Georgia. 
The alleged conduct which caused the injury occurred in Georgia. 
At the time of the injury, plaintiff and defendant [supervisor] were 
domiciled in Georgia, and defendant Hercules, a Delaware 
corporation, had a place of business in Georgia. Finally, at the 
time of the injury, plaintiffs employment relationship was 
centered in Georgia. For these reasons, the court determines that 
Georgia lawr governs plaintiffs tort claim. 
Pacheco, 61 FEP Cases at 826. Judge Greene also determined that the plaintiffs contract claims 
were governed by Georgia law. Id. at 827. 
Application of the four factors to the instant case demonstrates that Idaho law governs 
plaintiffs' claims. The first factor is where the injury occurred. Plaintiffs allege that they were 
"wrongfully discharged" from their jobs at the Twin Falls, Idaho factory of Amalgamated Sugar 
in violation of public policy. Complaint fflj 6-7, 35, 37. For this alleged injury, plaintiffs seek, 
inter alia, damages for "loss of earnings" and "loss of future earnings." Complaint at p. 17. 
Plaintiffs' "wrongful discharge" injury occurred in Idaho where they were discharged. 
Plaintiffs also claim that they suffered emotional distress as a result of Amalgamated 
Sugar's treatment of them on the job at the Twin Falls factory. Complaint ffi[ 47-50. This alleged 
injury also occurred in Idaho. Finally, plaintiffs claim that Amalgamated Sugar tortiously 
interfered with their prospective economic advantage by terminating them "purportedly for 
184512.1 c 
cause" and thereby "hampering] their opportunity for future employment." Complaint * 52. 
Plaintiffs' subsequent unsuccessful attempts at employment took place in Idaho. Waddoups 
Depo. at 8-9; 11-20; Sparrow Depo. at 9-13; 16-17. This alleged injury (whether based on the 
Company's alleged conduct or its supposed consequences) also took place in Idaho. 
In response, plaintiffs argue that their "wrongful discharge" injury is not their discharges, 
but "the contravention of Utah's vital state interests." PI. Opposition Memo, at 15. This 
argument is nonsensical for numerous reasons. First, it begs the question of how Utah can have 
any "vital state interests" in plaintiffs' discharges in Twin Falls, Idaho. Plaintiffs invoke an 
alleged "injury suffered by Utah's public" (jd. at 19), but make no attempt to show how the Utah 
public was affected by plaintiffs' discharges. Second, plaintiffs are not "private attorneys 
general" suing on behalf of the Utah public, but individuals suing for themselves over their 
alleged wrongful discharges in Idaho. They are seeking damages for their "[lost] earnings, 
emotional injuries and mental injuries." Complaint at p. 17. Third, courts have uniformly held 
that when an employee claims he was wrongfully discharged, the injury is the discharge 
(regardless of the legal theory on which the alleged wrongfulness of the act is based) and occurs 
at the location where the employee is discharged. Pacheco, 61 FEP Cases at S26-27.4 In sum, 
plaintiffs' alleged injury is their discharges which took place in Idaho.5 
4
 See also Ashmore v Northeast Pipeline, 843 F.Supp. 759, 774 (D.Me. 1994) (using the most significant 
relationship test to determine tht appropriate law for a wrongful termination in violation of public policy claim, the 
court held that despite the fact that plaintiff lived in another state during the term of his employment, the law of the 
state where the termination occurred should apply because it was the place where both the conduct causing the 
injury and the injury occurred as well as the place where the employment relationship was negotiated and 
184512.1 6 
The second factor under the "most significant relationship" test is where the conduct 
causing the injury occurred. Plaintiffs' alleged wrongful discharge injuries were caused by 
Amalgamated Sugar's discharging them, which occurred in Twin Falls, Idaho. It is undisputed 
that Mr. Sparrow was discharged by Assistant Superintendent Bill Stuart and that Mr. Waddoups 
was discharged by Assistant Superintendent Larry Day ley in Twin Falls, Idaho. Def. Opening 
Memo, at 5 fl[ 10) and 7 fl[ 19); PL Opposition Memo, at 5 (t 10) and 7 fij 19). Despite 
plaintiffs' admissions that they were discharged in Idaho by their respective Assistant 
Superintendents, opposing counsel argues that the actions took place in Ogden, Utah. PL 
Opposition Memo, at 21-22. Opposing counsel provides no support for this contention which 
contradicts plaintiffs' own testimony. Counsel's unsupported contention does not comply with 
the requirement of Rule 56(e) that an opposition to summary judgment must go beyond "mere 
allegations or denials" and must set forth "specific facts" supported by affidavits or other 
admissible evidence in the record. In sum, the alleged injurious conduct occurred in Idaho. 
commenced and where the plaintiffs supervisors were located). 
5
 Plaintiffs cite Doe v. Nevada Crossing in support of their argument for the application of Utah law (PI. Opposition 
Memo, at 16), but Doe actually demonstrates that Idaho law governs plaintiffs' claims. In Doe, the plaintiffs 
asserted a claim for "breach of the spousal relationship." 920 F. Supp. at 166. The court determined that Utah law 
governed this claim because the plaintiffs were "Utah residents who are husband and wife living in Utah," "the 
center of [the plaintiffs' spousal] relationship ... is in Utah" and therefore "Utah is where the damage to the 
relationship of [the] plaintiffs was experienced." In contrast, the plaintiffs were in "Wendover, Nevada a few miles 
from the Utah border" for "less than 24 hours." Because "Utah is the most significant place of [the plaintiffs'] 
interpersonal relationship," the court concluded that Utah law governed their claim for breach of their spousal 
relationship. Doe, 920 F.Supp. at 165. 167. The court reached this conclusion despite the fact Utah law does not 
recognize the cause of action at issue. The court then dismissed the plaintiffs' claim. 920 F. Supp. at 169. 
Given that plaintiffs in the instant case lived, worked and were discharged in Idaho (and continue to live 
and work in Idaho) and that Amalgamated Sugar's factory which employed plaintiffs is located in Idaho, the 
reasoning of Doe supports the application of Idaho law to plaintiffs' lawsuit. 
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The third factor is the domicile, residence, place of incorporation and place of business of 
the parties. Plaintiffs' residence and domicile during the time of their employment and discharge 
by Amalgamated Sugar was Idaho. Plaintiffs' Complaint states: 
Plaintiffs, Mr. Waddoups and Mr. Sparrow, at all times material 
hereto, worked and resided in the County of Twin Falls, State of 
Idaho. 
Complaint U 7.6 While Amalgamated Sugar is incorporated in Utah, its relevant place of business 
(where plaintiffs were employed) is Twin Falls, Idaho. Complaint ]j 6. Thus, the third factor 
supports the application of Idaho law to plaintiffs' claims. 
The fourth factor is where the relationship between the parties is centered. Because 
plaintiffs were employed by Amalgamated Sugar in Twin Falls, Idaho and because the only 
relationship between the parties was the employment relationship, their relationship was centered 
in Idaho. In response, plaintiffs argue that their relationship with Amalgamated Sugar is centered 
in Utah because they filed their lawsuit in Utah. PL Opposition Memo, at 23. This is an absurd 
argument because (1) the relationship at issue is that between the parties at the time of the events 
giving rise to the lawsuit, and (2) if plaintiffs' argument were valid they could create and 
"center" a relationship with anyone anywhere in the country merely by choosing where to file 
suit. 
Opposing counsel alleges that Mr. Waddoups' domicile is Utah because he intends to move to Utah. PI. 
Opposition Memo, at 22. This argument is without merit because (1) the assertion about Mr. Waddoups1 alleged 
intent is without foundation in the record, and (2) the relevant time period for Mr. Waddoups' domicile or residence 
is when the events at issue occurred, i.e., when he worked and was discharged in Idaho. See, e.g., Pacheco, 61 FEP 
Cases at 826 ("At the time of the injury, plaintiff [was] domiciled in Georgia."). Moreover, in his deposition, Mr. 
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All four factors support the application of Idaho law to plaintiffs' claims. There is no 
basis for plaintiffs' attempt to have Utah law extended beyond its borders so as to intrude upon 
the affairs of Idaho. As Judge Greene observed (citing an earlier decision), the law of the state in 
which the employment relationship existed and the dispute arose must be applied because 
otherwise the state would be deprived of the ability to govern the conduct of persons, particularly 
foreign corporations, within its own territory. 
[T]he important interest [Idaho] has in wrongful termination cases 
which are based upon conduct arising inside the state [must be 
recognized]: The Court bases its determination on the fact that 
[Idaho] law governed [the company's] conduct within the state. 
That authority necessarily resulted in application of [Idaho] law to 
all other aspects of [the company's] relations with its employees. 
Failure to apply [Idaho] law concerning wrongful termination in 
this case, therefore, would produce an unprincipled exception to 
[Idaho's] ability to govern the affairs of foreign corporations 
operating within the state. 
Pacheco, 61 FEP Cases at 827 n. 6 (citation omitted). 
In sum, Idaho has the most significant relationship to plaintiffs' claims and therefore 
provides the governing law applicable to those claims. 
IV. PLAINTIFFS' PUBLIC POLICY WRONGFUL DISCHARGE CLAIM FAILS 
BECAUSE IT IS ASSERTED UNDER UTAH LAW, NOT IDAHO LAW. 
Plaintiffs' public policy wrongful discharge claim should be dismissed because it is 
asserted under Utah law, while Idaho law governs plaintiffs' lawsuit. Plaintiffs do not dispute, 
indeed insist, that their public policy wrongful discharge claim is based on Utah law. PI. 
Waddoups testified that after leaving Amaigamaied Sugar, he worked m Idaho, lived in Utah for a brief period and 
then returned to Idaho where he now lives Waddoups Depo. at 8-9; ! 1-20. 
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Opposition Memo, at 11-24. Because plaintiffs rely on inapplicable law (and deliberately ignore 
the governing law), their public policy wrongful discharge claim must be dismissed as legally 
groundless. 
Plaintiffs apparently believe that if Utah law is not applied, they cannot assert a public 
policy claim. Such is not the case. Idaho recognizes a cause of action for public policy wrongful 
discharge7, and therefore plaintiffs can file a motion to amend their complaint to assert a public 
policy wrongful discharge claim under Idaho law. However, so long as plaintiffs insist that their 
claim is based on Utah law and ignore governing Idaho law, their claim for public policy 
wrongful discharge should be dismissed. 
V. PLAINTIFFS' PUBLIC POLICY CLAIM WOULD FAIL EVEN IF IT WERE 
GOVERNED BY UTAH LAW. 
While plaintiffs' public policy wrongful discharge claim is legally groundless because 
they refuse to assert it under Idaho law, it is also the case that the claim would be meritless if it 
were governed by Utah law (which it is not). This is so because in 1997 the Utah Supreme Court 
clarified Utah law governing public policy wrongful discharge claims brought by 
"whistleblowing" employees. In Fox v. MCI Communications, the Supreme Court held that 
where an employee complains or "blows the whistle" on alleged criminal conduct and is fired as 
a consequence, the employee fails to state a public policy claim unless he reported the alleged 
7
 See. ££i> Jackson v. Minidoka irrigation District, 563 P.2d 54 (Idaho 1977); Hummer v. Evans, 923 P.2d 981 
(Idaho 1996). The Idaho public policy wrongful discharge cause of action sounds in contract while the Utah cause 
of action sounds in tort. Hummer. 923 P.2d at 987; Peterson v. Browning, 832 P.2d 1280, 1284-85 (Utah 1992). 
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criminal conduct to the public authorities. If the employee complains only to the company itself, 
he has not engaged in activity that is sufficiently public in character to be protected by Utah law. 
In Fox, the plaintiff alleged that she was fired because she reported to company 
management that employees were engaged in criminal conduct. The Supreme Court held that 
such facts, even if true, are not sufficient to state a claim for wrongful discharge in violation of 
Utah public policy: 
[I]f an employee reports a criminal violation to an employer, rather 
than to public authorities, and is fired for making such reports, that 
does not, in our view, contravene a clear and substantial public 
policy. 
Fox v. MCI Communications Corp., 931 P.2d 857, 861 (Utah 1997).8 
Plaintiffs assert that Amalgamated Sugar engaged in criminal conduct, specifically 
shipping adulterated sugar in violation of the federal Food Drug and Cosmetics Act. Complaint 
% 25 ("unlawful shipments" and "fraudulent sales" of sugar), t 40 ("illegal activity") ^ 44 
(shipping "adulterated" sugar "unlawful under the FDCA, 21 U.S.C. § 331 et seg.M). Plaintiffs 
claim that they were fired because they "threaten[ed] to expose [Amalgamated Sugar's] illegal 
activity" by threatening to report it to "food safety agencies of the State of Idaho and the United 
States or in the alternative to advise the media." Id. ^ 33, 40. Because plaintiffs posture 
8
 Other jurisdictions also require employees to report suspected criminal conduct to law enforcement authorities for 
there to be a viable public policy wrongful discharge claim. See, e.g., Faust v. Ryder Commercial Leasing, 13 IER 
Cases (BNA) 226, 232 (Mo. App. 1997) (affirming dismissal of public policy wrongful discharge claim where the 
plaintiff reported the alleged criminal conduct to management, but not the public authorities, and hence no "clear 
mandate of public policy is effectuated"). 
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themselves as whistleblowers of criminal conduct, their claim is directly governed by the rule of 
law stated in Fox v. MCI Communications. 
Plaintiffs attempt to avoid the holding of Fox by citing to an earlier case and ignoring the 
fact that Fox states the law in Utah governing "whistleblowing" claims. They also try to obscure 
the holding in Fox by citing to comments made in dicta, and ignore the actual rule of lavs-
announced by the Supreme Court in Fox (quoted above). PI. Opposition Memo, at 25-26. 
Plaintiffs also attempt to escape the application of Fox by claiming that they were 
discharged not only for their threatened whistleblowing but also because they "refused to engage 
in illegal activities." PI. Opposition Memo, at 27. Plaintiffs provide no evidentiary support 
whatsoever for this assertion. They do not identify any "illegal activities" they were supposedly 
requested to perform or any refusal on their part to engage in such activity. Id. 
The reason for the groundlessness of plaintiffs' assertion is obvious: There was no illegal 
activity that plaintiffs were required to or even could have performed. Plaintiffs were "bulk 
loaders," responsible for loading sugar in rail cars. They had no responsibility to determine the 
purity of sugar, and did not certify or in any way validate the condition of sugar. They did not 
determine where the sugar was shipped or whether it was intended for human or animal 
consumption or any other use. They merely loaded rail cars with sugar and filled out bulk 
loading forms indicating that the cars were loaded and that the car openings were closed and 
sealed. Waddoups Depo. at 87-88; 135-137 and Ex. 21 thereto; Sparrow Depo. at 177-179; 
183-184; 186-191 and Ex. 5-6 thereto. 
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In their depositions, plaintiffs did not testify that they were requested to engage in illegal 
activities, nor did they claim to have refused to perform illegal activities. Rather, they loaded rail 
cars and filled out the standard forms as normal bulk loaders. Sparrow testified: 
Q. [A]t any time after the Mike Davis accident did you bring 
up any concern you had about possible contaminated 
sugar? 
A. No. 
Q. You never brought it up to anyone? 
A. No. 
*** 
Q. [D]id you ever tell anyone at Amalgamated that you did not 
want to sign off on shipments of adulterated sugar? 
A. No. 
*** 
Q. So you never told anyone at Amalgamated Sugar that you 
didn't want to sign off on shipments of sugar because it had 
sugar contaminated from the Mike Davis accident? 
A. No. 
*** 
Q. Did you ever object to signing some form? 
A. No. 
*** 
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Q. Did you at any later date tell anyone at Amalgamated that 
you didn't want to sign some form? 
A. No. 
Q. So as you continued to work as a bulk loader, for each rail 
car you would get a [bulk loading] form like Exhibit 6, is 
that correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you would fill it out as this one is filled out, is that 
correct? 
A. Yes. 
* * * 
Q. And then you would sign on the form that is Exhibit 6 on 
the line that says Final Inspection and Sealed, is that 
correct? 
A. Yes. I would sign it and the foreman would sign it. 
Q. Is there any occasion when you refused to sign it? 
A. Refused, no. 
Q. Was there any occasion in which you said to anyone you 
didn't want to sign it? 
A. No. 
Sparrow Depo. at 172, 249, 250, 256-58. 
In sum, plaintiffs' "refusal to engage in illegal activity" argument is without any factual 
basis and, indeed, is contradicted by the record. Plaintiffs' public policy wrongful discharge 
claim rests solely on their contention that they threatened to "blow the whistle" on supposed 
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illegal activity. Therefore, if plaintiffs' public policy wrongful discharge claim were governed by 
Utah law (which it is not), it would fail to state a claim because plaintiffs did not report the 
alleged criminal activity to the public authorities. 
VI. PLAINTIFFS1 INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS 
CLAIM IS GROUNDLESS. 
A. Plaintiffs' Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress Claim is Barred bv the 
Idaho Workmen's Compensation Act. 
Plaintiffs assert a claim for intentional infliction of emotion distress based on how they 
were supposedly treated on the job after the Mike Davis fatality. Complaint ^ 47-50. In its 
opening memorandum. Amalgamated Sugar explained that plaintiffs' emotional distress claim is 
barred by the Idaho Workmen's Compensation Act.9 Def. Opening Memo, at 12-13. 
In response, plaintiffs cite just one case, Holmes v. Union Oil Co. of California, 760 P.2d 
1189 (Idaho App. 1988), which does not have anything to do with the Idaho Workmen's 
Compensation Act or the application of its exclusive remedy provision. Holmes merely ruled 
that an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim asserted by a former employee based 
upon his discharge was "without merif and properly dismissed at summary judgment because 
9
 Plaintiffs' infliction of emotional distress claims would also be barred by the exclusive remedy provision of the 
Utah Workers' Compensation Act. See, e.u.. Brvan v. Utah Int'l, 533 P.2d 892, 893-94 (Utah 1975) (injured 
employee's tort claims against employer barred by Workers' Compensation Act, even though injuries were 
allegedly caused by supervisors intentional harassing conduct); Lantz v. Nafl Semiconductor Corp., 775 P.2d 937, 
939-40 (Utah App. 1989) (affirming summary dismissal of ton claims against employer based upon injuries 
allegedly resulting from supervisor's conduct); Mounteer v Utah Power & Light Co., 823 P.2d 1055, 1058-59 
(Utah 1991) (affirming summary dismissal of intentional infliction of emotional distress claim as barred by the Utah 
Workers' Compensation Act). 
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the discharge was not "extreme and outrageous conduct" as required by the tort. 760 P.2d at 
1197. 
Plaintiffs next argue that because their emotional distress claim is based on alleged 
intentional harassment (not an unintentional accident), their claim can never be barred by the 
Idaho Workmen's Compensation Act. PL Opposition Memo, at 28. There is no merit to 
plaintiffs' argument. The statute expressly states that workers compensation is the exclusive 
remedy for job-related injuries except where an injury is "caused by the willful or unprovoked 
physical aggression." Idaho Code § 72-209(3) (emphasis added). The Idaho Supreme Coun has 
made clear that the statute means what it says: 
[Tjhe Idaho worker's compensation law provides the exclusive remedy for 
injuries arising out of and in the course of employment. . . . If the employee is 
unable to prove that the injury was caused the willful or unprovoked physical 
aggression of the employer, the employee will not be entitled to damages. 
Kearnev v. Denker, 760 P.2d 1171, 1173 (Idaho 1988). Plaintiffs do not allege any severe 
emotional distress as a result of willful or unprovoked physical aggression, and therefore their 
claim is barred. Def Opening Memo, at 13. 
Moreover, the Idaho Supreme Court has expressly rejected plaintiffs' argument that an 
intentional tort claim should not be barred because alleged intentional misconduct is not an 
accident. The Court has repeatedly affirmed summary dismissal of intentional tort claims as 
barred by the Workmen's Compensation Act, as long as the claimed injuries do not result from 
"willful or unprovoked physical aggression." See, e£., Yeend v. United Parcel Service, Inc.. 659 
P.2d 87, 88-90 (Idaho 1982) (affirming summary dismissal of intentional tort claims as barred by 
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the Idaho Workmen's Compensation Act, even though the plaintiff alleged that the defendant 
"intentionally and recklessly subjected the Plaintiff to severe emotional distress, pain and 
suffering," and rejecting dissent's suggestion that an intentional act may not come within the 
statutory definition of "accident"); Henderson v. State, 715 P.2d 978, 979 (Idaho 1986) 
(affirming summary dismissal of intentional tort claims asserted by discharged employee who 
alleged that he had been "harassed" and mistreated on the job, which treatment caused him 
mental and physical injuries. Despite the plaintiffs allegations of intentional misconduct, his 
tort claims were barred by the Workmen's Compensation Act because his injuries did not result 
from physical aggression); DeMoss v. Citv of Coeur D'Alene, 795 P.2d 875, 877 (Idaho 1990) 
(affirming summary dismissal of tort and "assault and battery" claims based on injuries allegedly 
resulting from supervisor's intentional conduct because there was no evidence of "unprovoked 
physical aggression"). 
In sum, plaintiffs' emotional distress claims are barred by the exclusive remedy provision 
of the Idaho Workmen's Compensation Act. 
B. Plaintiffs' Emotional Distress Claims Are Preempted bv Federal Labor Law. 
In its Opening Memorandum, Amalgamated Sugar explained that the federal Labor 
Management Relations Act ("LMRA") preempts plaintiffs' emotional distress claims because 
plaintiffs' allegations about supposed supervisory harassment implicates the collective 
bargaining agreement (governing plaintiffs' employment and supervisory authority), which is 
exclusively governed by federal law. Def. Opening Memo, at 13-15. Courts have routinely 
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dismissed, on the basis of LMRA preemption, emotional distress claims based on alleged 
supervisory misconduct in unionized workplaces. See, e ^ , Johnson v. Beatrice Foods Co., 921 
F.2d 1015, 1017-18, 1020, 1022 (10th Cir. 1990) (affirming summary dismissal of infliction of 
emotional distress claim as preempted by LMRA where the plaintiff alleged that his supervisor 
harassed him, publicly ridiculed him, verbally abused him, and improperly disciplined him). 
Federal labor law preempts tort claims whenever the claims "implicate the exercise of 
supervisory authority," that is, whenever the misconduct alleged is "misconduct under color of 
possible contractual authority." Only if the alleged misconduct is "purely personal" and "does 
not implicate the exercise of supervisory authority" can the claim escape being preempted by the 
LMRA. Retherfordv. AT&T Communications, 844 P.2d 949, 971-72 (Utah 1992) 
(summarizing federal labor law preemption under LMRA). Infliction of emotional distress 
claims, in particular, are preempted for the additional reason that the issue of the outrageousness 
of the alleged conduct cannot be resolved without reference to the labor agreement: 
[A]ll aspects of [the plaintiffs] employment, including the terms of 
the Collective] Bfargaining] Agreement], must be considered 
when evaluating whether [the employer's] conduct was outrageous. 
Johnson, 921 F.2d at 1020 (citation omitted). 
Plaintiffs attempt to escape federal labor law preemption by recharacterizing their 
emotional distress claim as involving only "personal" matters. PI. Opposition Memo, at 31-33. 
In doing so, plaintiffs misstate the law and mischaracterize the facts on which they rely. For 
conduct to be "personal" so as to escape federal labor law preemption, it must be based on 
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conduct that is unrelated to employment and is personal to the particular individuals involved. 
For example, a tort.claim based on a supervisor's "comments about the sexual activities of [the 
plaintiffs] wife" which "escalated into a fist fight" was held not preempted. Retherford, 844 
P.2d at 972. Plaintiffs do not allege such personal conflicts. 
Moreover, if the conduct at issue were truly personal so as to avoid federal labor law 
preemption, it would merely allow plaintiffs to assert claims against other persons in their 
individual capacity, not claims against the Company. Retherford, 844 P.2d at 972 (emotional 
distress claims against three co-workers not preempted because based on their personal behavior 
towards the plaintiff). In other words, if plaintiffs were to succeed in their "it was only a 
personal matter" argument, they would have no basis for their tort claim against Amalgamated 
Sugar. 
The asserted factual basis for plaintiffs' emotional distress claim demonstrates that the 
claim is not personal in character. Plaintiffs allege that Amalgamated Sugar "offered counseling 
and gamma globulin shots after the [Mike Davis] accident to any employee who desired them, 
[but] failed to offer this help to Mr. Waddoups" (who was on a regularly scheduled 7-day break 
after the accident). Complaint j^ 47; Waddoups Depo. at 134. The allegation is factually 
incorrect because Mr. Waddoups testified that the Company made two psychiatrists available at 
the factory on the day of the accident, and that he met with one of them. Waddoups Depo. at 
217-18. In any case, the allegation does not concern any alleged "purely personal" dispute 
between Mr. Waddoups and any other individual, but describes how the company supposedly 
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responded to the accident. Plaintiffs also allege that Amalgamated Sugar "implied" that "Mr. 
Waddoups was responsible for the fatal accident" due to "Mr. Waddoups* control over the 
movement of the bulk-loading system." Complaint U 47(a). Again, there is nothing in this 
allegation of a "purely personal" nature. It merely asserts a supposed management judgment 
about Mr. Waddoups' responsibility in light of the fact that he was in charge of the machinery 
that caused the accident.10 
With respect to Mr. Sparrow, plaintiffs allege that a supervisor slapped him with a yellow 
notebook and threatened to terminate him for "messing up." Complaint ^ 48(a); Sparrow Depo. 
at 98. This allegation clearly implicates the exercise of supervisory authority and therefore is 
preempted by federal labor law. Retherford, 844 P.2d at 972 (emotional distress claim based on 
supervisors' alleged "reprimanding]" the plaintiff and threatening that she would "lose her job" 
preempted by federal labor law because claim "raises questions about [the supervisors'] authority 
under the collective bargaining agreement"); Johnson, 921 F.2d at 1017-18 (emotional distress 
claim based on supervisor's alleged harassment, ridicule, and improper disciplining of the 
plaintiff preempted by federal labor law); Douglas v. American Info. Technologies Corp., 877 
F.2d 565, 572-73 (7th Cir. 1989) (infliction of emotional distress claim based on employer's 
alleged "arbitrary," "unjustified," and "excessive" disciplinary actions towards the plaintiff 
preempted by federal labor law). 
10
 Plaintiffs allege that an unidentified John Doe "defendant" simulated a homosexual act with Mr. Waddoups. 
Complaint f 47(b). Because this allegation involves an unidentified and unknown person (and not a manager, as 
opposing counsel asserts), it cannot be the basis of a valid claim against the Company. 
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In sum, plaintiffs' infliction of emotional distress claims are preempted by federal labor 
law. 
C. Plaintiffs Cannot Establish Essential Elements of Their Emotional Distress 
Claim. 
Plaintiffs fail to show that the alleged conduct was extreme, uncivilized and outrageous as 
required for their claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress. Def. Opening Memo, at 
15. Plaintiffs cite no case law in support of their position, but merely ask rhetorical questions. 
PI. Opposition Memo, at 34-35. 
Equally important, plaintiffs cannot establish another required element of their claim -
that they suffered severe, disabling emotional distress. Proof of i%a severely disabling emotional 
condition'" is an essential element of the cause of action, and not merely an aspect of damages: 
[E]vidence showing that the plaintiff was upset, embarrassed, 
angered, bothered and depressed did not demonstrate a severely 
disabling emotional condition adequate for intentional infliction of 
emotional distress damages. 
Walston v. Monumental Life Ins. Co., 923 P.2d 456, 464-65 (Idaho 1996). Plaintiffs merely 
allege that Mr. Sparrow felt 4*bummed out" about being discharged,11 and did not work for 4wabout 
n
 Plaintiffs' discharges are not pan of their emotional distress claim (Complaint ^47-50), and therefore it is 
irrelevant that Mr. Sparrow was "bummed out" b\ his discharge Moreover, a discharge is not extreme and 
outrageous conduct actionable under the ton of intentional infliction of emotional distress See, e.g., Holmes v. 
Union Oil Co of California. 760 P.2d 1189. 1 197 (Idaho App 1988) (affirming summar> dismissal of intentional 
infliction of emotional distress claim based on the plaintiffs discharge because discharge is not "extreme and 
outrageous conduct"): Sperber v Gahgher Ash Co 747 P.2d 1025. 1028-29 (Utah 1987) (discharge from 
employment, even when the employee is given a taisc reason for the action, "does not constitute outrageous or 
intolerable conduct bv an employer." While "ever> employee who believes he has a legitimate grievance 
concerning his discharge from employment experiences some emotional anguish," such does not give rise to "a 
claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress") 
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a month." PL Opposition Memo, at 35-36. Both plaintiffs have worked regularly since leaving 
Amalgamated Sugar. Waddoups Depo. at 8-9; 11-20; Sparrow Depo. at 9-16. In short, plaintiffs 
have not suffered any "severely disabling" condition, and therefore their intentional infliction of 
emotional distress claim is groundless, and should be dismissed. 
VII. PLAINTIFFS' INTERFERENCE WITH PROSPECTIVE ECONOMIC 
ADVANTAGE CLAIM IS GROUNDLESS. 
In its opening memorandum, Amalgamated Sugar pointed out that plaintiffs* interference 
with prospective economic advantage claim is groundless because they do not identify, let alone 
substantiate, any conduct by Amalgamated Sugar that interfered with any actual or potential 
economic relationship between either plaintiff and any third party. Def. Opening Memo, at 16. 
Proof of such interfering conduct that disrupts an actual or potential economic relationship 
between a plaintiff and a specific third party is a required element of the cause of action. Idaho 
Nat'l Bank v. Bliss Vallev Foods, 824 P.2d 841, 860-61 (Idaho 1991). 
In response, opposing counsel misstates the record in order to claim that Mr. Sparrow was 
turned down for two jobs because of Amalgamated Sugar. PI. Opposition Memo, at 37. 
Counsel's claim is contradicted by Mr. Sparrow's deposition testimony. The first job in question 
was at Amalgamated Sugar itself, specifically at its "beet dump" where sugar beets are stored for 
later use in the Company's factories. Sparrow Depo. at 17, 270. This alleged incident does not 
support plaintiffs' claim because a party to a contract (actual or potential) cannot tortiously 
interfere with it. Orstrander v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 851 P.2d 846, 850 (Idaho 1993). 
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The second job referred to was at Oreida Foods, about which Mr. Sparrow testified he 
does not know of any contact between Oreida Foods and Amalgamated Sugar regarding himself. 
Sparrow Depo. at 272-73. Moreover, Mr. Sparrow testified that Oreida Foods informed him that 
he was not being hired because "they weren't hiring" and "they had everybody they needed." 14 
at 273-74. In sum, there is no support for opposing counsel's claims about Mr. Sparrow. With 
respect to Mr. Waddoups, counsel does not even claim that Amalgamated Sugar interfered with 
any potential employment or other opportunity. PL Opposition Memo, at 37. 
Moreover, plaintiffs testified affirmatively that they are unaware of any contacts between 
Amalgamated Sugar and any of their subsequent actual or potential employers. Mr. Sparrow 
testified: 
Q. So you don't know of any communications between anyone 
at Amalgamated Sugar and any other employer regarding 
you, is that correct? 
A. Correct. (Sparrow Depo. at 276-77.) 
Mr. Waddoups testified: 
Q. So as far as you know. Amalgamated Sugar has not been in 
contact with any of your employers since — 
A. As far as I know. 
Q. Do you know if Amalgamated Sugar has been in contact 
with any of the companies you applied at? 
A. I would not know that. (Waddoups Depo. at 310.) 
In sum, there is no basis for plaintiffs' interference with prospective economic advantage 
claim. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above and stated in Amalgamated Sugar's opening memorandum. 
plaintiffs' Complaint and all claims stated therein should be dismissed with prejudice. 
•2 , DATED t J H ^ y day of December. 1997. 
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W. MARK GAVRE 
MARGARET NIVETMCGANN 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for The Amalgamated Sugar Company 
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Attorneys for Defendant 
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P. 0. Box 45898 
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Telephone: (801) 532-1234 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * 
&< 
9 fl*& 
BLAKE WILLIAM WADDOUPS and 
JAMES EDWARD SPARROW, JR., 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
THE AMALGAMATED SUGAR 
COMPANY, a Utah corporation, et al., 
Defendant. 
Case No. 950900441 
Judge Stanton M. Taylor 
ORDER GRANTING 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
* * * * * * * 
This matter came on for hearing before the Court on Monday, March 23, 1998. Pending 
before the Court were defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and plaintiffs Motion for a 
Continuance. 
Defendant The Amalgamated Sugar Company was represented by W. Mark Gavre of 
Parsons Behle & Latimer. Plaintiffs Blake William Waddoups and James Edward Sparrow, Jr. 
were represented by Trent J. Waddoups of Can* & Waddoups. 
9;s 
Having considered the memoranda, affidavit, and exhibits filed by the parties and having 
heard oral argument from counsel, the Court hereby makes the following decision, based upon 
undisputed facts, and enters the following Order: 
1. Plaintiffs' claims are governed by Idaho law, not Utah law. As the forum state, 
Utah applies the "most significant relationship" test of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of 
Laws to determine the governing law in a given case. In the instant case, plaintiffs resided and 
worked in Idaho during all material times. Plaintiffs were discharged by Amalgamated Sugar in 
Idaho, and the alleged wrongful and injurious acts took place in Idaho. While Amalgamated 
Sugar's headquarters is in Utah, there is no evidence in the record of any conduct by 
Amalgamated Sugar in Utah related to plaintiffs. Accordingly, applying the "most significant 
relationship" test, the Court finds that Idaho law governs plaintiffs' claims. 
2. Plaintiffs claim for wrongful discharge in violation of Utah public policy is 
dismissed with prejudice because, being based on Utah law, it fails to state a claim under Idaho 
law. Plaintiffs are hereby granted leave to file an amended complaint asserting a claim under 
Idaho law for wrongful discharge in violation of Idaho public policy. 
3. Plaintiffs' claim for intentional and/or negligent infliction of emotional distress is 
dismissed with prejudice on the ground that it is preempted and therefore barred by the Labor 
Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a). Plaintiffs were union members working for 
defendant at its Twin Falls, Idaho plant under a collective bargaining agreement between 
defendant and plaintiffs' union, The American Federation of Grain Millers Union. The collective 
bargaining agreement provided a grievance and arbitration process for handling disputes between 
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defendant and union-represented employees. Plaintiffs' allegations under this claim all concern 
supervisory conduct related to the operation or management of defendant's plant and hence 
concern the exercise of supervisory authority under the collective bargaining agreement. 
Plaintiffs' claim for intentional and/or negligent infliction of emotional distress is also dismissed on 
the ground that there is no evidence that either plaintiff suffered a severe or disabling emotional 
condition as a result of alleged conduct by defendant, as required by Idaho law. 
4. Plaintiffs' claim for interference with prospective economic advantage is dismissed 
with prejudice because there is no evidence of conduct by defendant interfering with any actual or 
potential contract, employment relationship, or other economic relationship between either 
plaintiff and any other person. 
5. Plaintiffs' claim for civil conspiracy is dismissed with prejudice because there is no 
evidence of defendant conspiring or interacting with any other person regarding plaintiffs. 
Based upon the foregoing and good cause appearing therefor, IT IS HEREBY 
ORDERED that defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted, p^^tiffn^^frnp^m^and 
all causes oHxxkmzm&z^^ therein, is herebyrdismissed-with prgud^f and plaintiffs 
are granted leave to file an amended complaint asserting a claim under Idaho law for wrongful 
discharge in violation of Idaho public policy. 
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DATED this / day of N&feh, 1998 
BY THE COURT: 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
STANTON M/JA 
Second District Co 
<*£. 
Trettfl Waddoups 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
On April 7, 1998 the Court issued an order granting summary judgment in favor of The 
Amalgamated Sugar Company ("Amalgamated Sugar" or the "Company"). The Court dismissed 
with prejudice plaintiffs' claims for (a) wrongful discharge in violation of Utah public policy, (b) 
intentional and/or negligent inflection of emotional distress, (c) interference with prospective 
economic advantage, and (d) civil conspiracy. Plaintiffs were granted leave to file an amended 
complaint asserting a claim under Idaho law for wrongful discharge in violation of Idaho public 
policy. See Order Granting Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment at 2-3. 
Plaintiffs have now filed their Amended Complaint, which reasserts all the claims that the 
Court already dismissed with prejudice, and also asserts a claim for wrongful discharge in violation 
of Idaho public policy. The dismissed claims will not be addressed in this memorandum because 
plaintiffs cannot reassert these claims, especially in light of the fact that the Court has already 
denied plaintiffs' motion to revive the claims.1 
Plaintiffs' one remaining claim — wrongful discharge in violation of Idaho public policy — 
should be dismissed with prejudice because (a) it fails to state a claim under Idaho law, and (b) the 
claim is barred under § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a). 
On April 17, 1998, plaintiffs filed a Motion for a New Tnal or to Alter or Amend Judgment in which they 
attempted to persuade the Court to reverse its order granting summary judgment. On August 12, 1998, the Court 
issued its Ruling denying plaintiffs' motion. 
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Plaintiffs are former union-represented employees of Amalgamated Sugar who worked in 
Twin Falls, Idaho. Plaintiffs' employment was governed by a collective bargaining agreement 
between their union and Amalgamated Sugar. The collective bargaining agreement contained a 
"just cause" standard for termination, and also provided a grievance and arbitration process for 
resolving work-related disputes, including discharges. On May 22 and 28, 1995, plaintiffs were 
separately discharged by the Company for excessive absenteeism. Specifically, they each had more 
than three unexcused absences, the maximum allowed by Company policy. Although plaintiffs 
claim that they were discharged Without just cause," they did not contest their discharges or 
attempt to use the grievance and arbitration process that was available to them. 
Now plaintiffs claim that they were potential "whistleblowers," who were- supposedly 
discharged for threatening to publicize the Company's alleged criminal shipping of contaminated 
sugar. On this basis, they claim that they were wrongfully discharged in violation of Idaho public 
policy. There is no legal merit or factual basis to plaintiffs' claim. 
Idaho law recognizes a "public policy wrongful discharge" claim as a breach of implied-in-
law contract claim in the context of at-will employment. Plaintiffs fail to state a claim under Idaho 
law because (a) Idaho law does not recognize a public policy wrongful discharge claim where 
employees are employed under a collective bargaining agreement with a "just cause" standard for 
termination, and (b) as supposed "whistleblowers," plaintiffs never "blew the whistle," i.e., they 
never reported the alleged wrongdoing at .Amalgamated Sugar to any public authority. Idaho law 
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does not recognize a public policy '^histleblower" claim except where the employee-plaintiff 
reports the alleged wrongdoing to an appropriate governmental entity. 
Additionally, plaintiffs' "public policy" claim is barred under the Labor Management 
Relations Act. Plaintiffs' employment contract with Amalgamated Sugar was the collective 
bargaining agreement that governed their employment. Collective bargaining agreements 
(including all related claims whether pled in tort or contract) are governed exclusively by federal 
labor law. Consequently, plaintiffs' claim, an implied contract claim, is barred because it is based 
on plaintiffs' actual employment contract, the collective bargaining agreement, and plaintiffs failed 
to timely exercise their rights under the collective bargaining agreement. Alternatively, if 
plaintiffs' claim is construed as asserting separate implied right distinct from the collective 
bargaining agreement, it is barred because such claims are not permitted by federal labor law. 
II. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiffs' Employment 
1. Amalgamated Sugar hired Blake Waddoups ("Waddoups") in 1985 and James 
Sparrow ("Sparrow") in 1989 to work at the Company's sugar manufacturing facility in Twin 
Falls, Idaho. Amended Complaint ^ 8, 10. 
2. "Plaintiffs, Mr. Waddoups and Mr. Sparrow, at all times material hereto worked 
and resided in the County of Twin Falls, State of Idaho." Amended Complaint j^ 7. 
3. Plaintiffs' employment with Amalgamated Sugar was governed by a collective 
bargaining agreement between The American Federation of Grain Millers Union ("the Union") 
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and the Company, and both plaintiffs were members of the Union. Plaintiffs received copies of 
the collective bargaining agreement. Deposition of James E. Sparrow, Jr. at 28-29 (hereinafter 
"Sparrow Depo. at _ " ) ; Deposition of Blake William Waddoups at 95-96 (hereinafter 
"Waddoups Depo. at _ " ) . 
4. Under the collective bargaining agreement, employees may be discharged only for 
"just cause," and a discharged employee may file a grievance if he believes that his discharge 
was not justified. The grievance process culminates in binding arbitration. The collective 
bargaining agreement states: 
The Company has the right to discipline or discharge employees 
for just cause. . . . An employee who believes his discipline or 
discharge is not justified shall have recourse to the grievance 
procedure under the Agreement. . . . An employee claiming a 
grievance shall put his grievance in writing to his Steward within 
five (5) scheduled working days of the Employee's knowledge of 
the occurrence to be grieved . . . Time is of the essence and all 
grievances must be handled within the prescribed time limits set 
forth herein. Failure to do so shall constitute forfeitures of the 
written grievance by either party failing to do so. . . . If a grievance 
is to be carried to arbitration, . . . [the arbitrator's] decision shall be 
final and binding on all parties involved. 
Ex. 4, at pp. 4-5, to Sparrow Depo.; Ex. 9, at pp. 4-5, to Waddoups Depo. 
5. Plaintiffs' employment was subject to the rule that "The maximum number of 
unexcused absences you can receive before being terminated is three (3)." Ex. 3 to Sparrow 
Depo. Plaintiffs were familiar with this rule. Sparrow testified: 
Q. Do you recall being informed of the rule that you could 
have no more than three unexcused absences? 
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A. Yes. 
Q. When do you recall being informed of that rule? 
A. All the time. 
*** 
A. [Pjeople were always talking about it, you know, foremen, 
supervisors. 
Sparrow Depo. at 27-28. 
Sparrow's Unexcused Absences 
6. Sparrow had unexcused absences on September 10, 1994 and March 24, 1995. 
Sparrow Depo. at 201-03 and Ex. 7, at pp. 1-2, thereto. 
7. On May 20, 1995, Sparrow did not report to work, but called in sick. Sparrow 
explained: 
A. I just - it was just nerves in my stomach. I just felt really 
queasy and I just didn't feel like going to work mostly. It was just 
the place had gotten to me and I just didn't feel like being there. 
Q. So you called in sick? 
A. Yes. 
Sparrow Depo. at 210 (emphasis added). 
8. On the afternoon of the same day, Sparrow drove to Nevada and was caught 
speeding. Because he had an outstanding warrant for a prior unpaid speeding ticket, Sparrow 
was arrested and not released from jail until May 25, 1995. Sparrow missed four days of work, 
May 20, 21, 23, and 24, 1995. Sparrow Depo. at 211-16. 
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9. Sparrow knew that his absences were unexcused and that he had exceeded the 
maximum number permitted. When he returned to Twin Falls, Sparrow telephoned his foreman 
and asked him if he was fired: 
Q. Why did you ask him if you were fired? 
A. Because I spent three days in jail and I should have worked. 
I work Friday. I missed three days of work. That's unexcused. 
Plus I knew I had one before and that's four, and I knew I could be 
terminated for that. 
Q. You knew you could be terminated for unexcused absences 
and you had enough to be terminated? 
A. Yeah. 
*** 
Q. Was there any question in your mind that being absent from 
work because you're in jail is an unexcused absence? 
A. I have always believed before that it was. 
Q. [You] always believed that it was an unexcused absence? 
A. Yes. 
Q. So by the time you got back to work on the 25th and your 
shift was finished you had four unexcused absences; is that 
correct? 
A. Correct. 
Sparrow Depo. at 217, 222. 
10. Sparrow was discharged on May 22, 1995 by Assistant Superintendent Bill Stuart 
for having more than three unexcused absences. Sparrow Depo. at 219. 
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11. Sparrow alleges that he was discharged "without just cause" and without being 
given an "opportunity to respond or be heard on the purported basis [of his discharge] that he had 
abused his sick leave." Amended Complaint ffif 39, 37. 
12. Sparrow did not file a grievance under the collective bargaining agreement 
regarding his discharge. Sparrow testified: 
Q. Did you know that an employee who is discharged who 
does not think it's fair or justified can have a grievance filed? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You knew you could file a grievance upon being 
discharged? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And did you know that there was a grievance procedure? 
A. Yes. 
*** 
Q. And did you know that. . . there was at the end of the 
process an arbitration procedure? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And did you know these things in May 1995 when you 
were discharged? 
A. Yes. 
*** 
Q. When you got fired did you file a grievance with the union? 
A. No. 
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Sparrow Depo. at 43-44, 175. 
Waddoups' Unexcused Absences 
13. On October 10, 1986, Waddoups received a written warning for excessive 
absenteeism because of the large number of sick leave days he had taken. He was told that he 
would need medical verification for any future sick leave absences. He was also warned: "If 
excessive absenteeism continues you will be discharged." Ex. 10 to Waddoups Depo. 
14. Waddoups had an unexcused absence on March 19, 1988. Waddoups Depo. at 
113 and Ex. 12 thereto. 
15. On September 28, 1993, Waddoups was verbally warned about his poor 
attendance. Waddoups Depo. at 118-19 and Ex. 15 thereto. 
16. On December 28, 1993, Waddoups received another written warning about his 
attendance, and he was again required to have medical verification for sick leave absences. Ex. 
17 to Waddoups Depo. 
17. On June 29, 1994, Waddoups had an unexcused absence. Waddoups Depo. at 123 
and Ex. 18 thereto. 
18. On March 3, 1995, Waddoups had an unexcused absence. WTaddoups Depo. at 
243 and Ex. 23 thereto. 
19. On May 28, 1995, Waddoups did not report to work. At 10:00 a.m., four hours 
after his work shift had begun, Waddoups called in saying he was sick. Waddoups then spoke to 
Assistant Superintendent Larry Dayley, and gave him a different explanation: "I told him that I 
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had personal problems. I didn't know why the alarm didn't go off, but I had over slept. I had 
called in sick because I wasn't feeling well." Waddoups Depo. at 258, 260-61 and Ex. 26 
thereto. 
20. Assistant Superintendent Larry Dayley terminated Waddoups for excessive 
absenteeism. Waddoups Depo. at 22-23 and Ex. 2, at p.l, thereto. 
21. In his application for unemployment benefits, Waddoups admitted that he had 
been warned "2-3 times" that his absence rate was reaching unacceptable levels. Waddoups 
Depo. at 31 and Ex. 2, at p. 2, thereto. 
22. Waddoups alleges that he was discharged "without just cause" and without being 
given an "opportunity to respond or be heard on the purported basis [of his discharge] that he had 
been tardy too often." Amended Complaint ffl[ 39, 35. 
23. Waddoups did not file a grievance under the collective bargaining agreement 
regarding his discharge although he was aware of the grievance process. Waddoups Depo. at 98, 
107. 
Plaintiffs' Whistleblowing Allegation 
24. On February 16, 1995, there was an accident at Amalgamated Sugar's Twin Falls 
facility in which employee Mike Davis was killed. The facility was shut down and cleaned for 
three days after the accident. Sugar that was being loaded on the day of the accident was 
subsequently shipped to an animal feed producer. Complaint %% 15, 22; Sparrow Depo. at 64, 
126-27. 
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25. Plaintiffs claim that sugar stored at the Twin Falls facility was contaminated by 
the fatal accident, and was subsequently shipped to customers for human consumption, a 
criminal violation of the federal Food. Drug and Cosmetics Act. Complaint % 44; Sparrow Depo. 
at 46-7. 
26. Plaintiffs claim that they "threatened] to expose the [Company's] illegal activity" 
of shipping supposedly contaminated sugar. Complaint ^ 40. However, neither plaintiff ever 
contacted the Food and Drug Administration, any federal authority, any state authority, or the 
media about the Company's supposed shipping of contaminated sugar. Sparrow Depo. at 173-
74; Waddoups Depo. at 65; Complaint ffl[ 23-44. 
27. Sparrow testified that he never raised with anyone the issue of supposedly 
contaminated sugar being shipped: 
Q. [A]t any time after the Mike Davis accident, did you bring 
up any concern you had about possibly contaminated sugar? 
A. No. 
Q. You never brought it up to anyone? 
A. No. 
*** 
Q. So with respect to Mike Davis's death, did you raise any 
issue of contamination with anyone? 
A. No. 
Sparrow Depo. at 172, 173-74. 
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28. On May 31, 1995, after they had been discharged, plaintiffs returned to 
Amalgamated Sugar's Twin Falls facility to pick up their personal belongings. Waddoups got 
into an argument with plant manager Vic Jaro about supposed sugar contamination. Sparrow 
Depo. at 145-47. Waddoups testified: 
Q. Were you saying you were thinking of going to the news or 
to the FDA? 
A. I never said that. 
Waddoups Depo. at 65. 
ARGUMENT 
III. PLAINTIFFS FAIL TO STATE A CLAIM FOR PUBLIC POLICY WRONGFUL 
DISCHARGE UNDER IDAHO LAW 
A. Idaho Law on Public Policy Wrongful Discharge. 
Idaho law recognizes a public policy wrongful discharge claim only as (a) contract claim 
(b) based on an implied-in-law restriction that limits an employer's otherwise unfettered right to 
discharge an individual employed under an at-will employment contract. 
[T]his Court [declares its] intent to classify a cause of action for 
wrongful termination in violation of public policy as a breach of 
contract rather than a tort. All employment contracts terminable at 
will are subject to the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. A 
breach of the covenant is a breach of the employment contract, and 
is not a tort. The potential recovery results in contract damages, 
not tort damages. Similarly, a cause of action for wrongful 
termination of a contract of employment at will based on a 
violation of public policy is a contract cause of action which results 
in contract damages. 
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Hummer v. Evans, 923 P.2d 981, 987 (Idaho 1996) (citations and internal quotations marks 
omitted; emphasis added). 
The Idaho Supreme Court has expressly followed the New Hampshire Supreme Court in 
recognizing a public policy wrongful discharge claim as a contract claim that applies to at-will 
employment contracts. 
We hold that a termination by an employer of a contract of 
employment at will which [violates public policy] constitutes a 
breach of the employment contract. 
Jackson v. Minidoka Irrigation District, 563 P.2d 54, 58 (Idaho 1977) (quoting Monge v. Beebe 
Rubber Co., 316 A.2d 549 (N.H. 1974). See also Hummer, 923 P.2d at 987 (citing Monge on 
same point). 
It is because an at-will employment contract gives the employer complete freedom to 
discharge an employee for any reason that the Idaho Supreme Court has recognized an implied 
contractual restriction on the employer's freedom of action where a termination would violate 
public policy. See Hummer, 923 P.2d at 986-87 (employer may terminate at-will employment 
contract for any reason without incurring liability unless termination violates public policy); 
Ostrander v. Farm Bureau Mutual Ins. Co., 851 P.2d 946, 949 (Idaho 1993) (Idaho law 
recognizes "an exception to employment-at-will contracts where a discharge is for a reason 
contravening public policy."); Staggie v. Idaho Falls Consolidated Hospitals. Inc.. 715 P.2d 
1019, 1021-22 (Idaho App. 1986) ("either the employer or the employee may terminate [an at-
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will] employment agreement at any time without liability, except that the employer may not 
discharge the employee for a reason contravening public policy"). 
Where the employer does not have unfettered freedom to discharge an employee and 
hence the freedom to violate public policy, the need for an implied-in-law contractual restriction 
(to protect public policy) is absent. The Idaho Supreme Court has not ruled on a claim of public 
policy wrongful discharge in the context of a collective bargaining agreement containing a "just 
cause" standard for termination. Nonetheless, it is reasonable to conclude that the Supreme 
Court would not recognize a public policy claim where a "just cause" contract term already 
prohibits the employer from terminating an employee in contravention of public policy. See, 
e.g.. Laramee v. French & Bean Co., 830 F. Supp. 803, 806 (D. Vt. 1993) (at-will employees 
protected from terminations that violate public policy. "That protection however is not provided 
to employees whose discharge is contractually protected by a just cause provision of a collective 
bargaining agreement.") 
In sum, a public policy wrongful discharge claim under Idaho law is a contract claim 
based on a contractual restriction that by operation of law is implied into the underlying at-will 
employment contract. Idaho has not recognized a public policy wrongful discharge claim outside 
the context of at-will employment. 
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B. Plaintiffs Fail to State a Public Policy Wrongful Discharge Claim Because Their 
Employment Contract Protected Them From Discharge Except for "Just Cause." 
The collective bargaining agreement that governed plaintiffs * employment with 
Amalgamated Sugar prohibited the Company from terminating employees except where there 
was "just cause" for termination: 
The Company has the right to discipline or discharge employees 
for just cause. 
Facts K 4. If an employee did not believe that there was "just cause" for his discipline or 
discharge, the employee could file a grievance and, with the support of the Union, take the matter 
to binding arbitration. Id. While, plaintiffs claim that they were discharged "without just cause," 
they did not attempt to use the grievance and arbitration process. Id. ^ 11, 12, 22, 23. 
On the facts of this case, plaintiffs cannot state a claim under Idaho law for public policy 
wrongful discharge. As explained above, Idaho has recognized the cause of action only in the 
context of at-will employment, where the employee has no contractual protection from being 
wrongfully discharged. Plaintiffs in the instant case were fully protected from being wrongfully 
discharged. Not only did their employment contract contain a substantive "just cause" standard 
for discharge, it also provided a grievance and arbitration procedure for resolving the merits of 
disputed discharges. Facts % 4. In light of these contractual provisions, the rationale for 
implying an additional contractual restriction into the employment contract has no application. 
Moreover, if plaintiffs were to be allowed to assert a public policy wrongful discharge claim it 
would mean that they could ignore their actual employment contract and the remedies it 
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provides, and yet assert in court a contract claim based on a dispute (termination of employment) 
expressly covered by plaintiffs' own employment contract. There is no support in Idaho law for 
what plaintiffs are attempting to do, and their claim should be dismissed with prejudice. 
C. Plaintiffs Fail to State a Public Policy "Whistleblower" Claim Because Thev 
Never Reported the Alleged Wrongdoing to Public Authorities. 
Plaintiffs assert their public policy wrongful discharge claim on the ground that they were 
potential "whistleblowers." Facts If 26. However, plaintiffs never reported to any public 
authority, state or federal, the criminal conduct (supposed shipment of contaminated sugar) they 
now allege. Id. Indeed, Sparrow never raised the issue with anyone at the Company or 
elsewhere (id. % 27), and Waddoups mentioned the issue at the Company only obliquely. Id. 
128. 
Idaho has recognized a "whistleblower" public policy wrongful discharge claim only 
where the plaintiff-employee actually reported the alleged wrongdoing to the appropriate public 
agency. See Rav v. Nampa School District No. 131. 814 P.2d 17, 21 (Idaho 1991) (public policy 
wrongful discharge claim stated by at-will employee where his "employment was terminated 
because he had reported certain safety code violations to the state electrical engineer"). Idaho 
has not recognized a "whistleblower" claim where the employee failed to report the alleged 
wrongdoing to a governmental agency or raised the issue only internally within the company. 
Courts generally have refused to recognize "whistleblower" claims where the employee 
did not report the alleged wrongdoing to a public authority. This is especially true where, as 
here, criminal conduct by the employer is alleged. Only where the alleged wrongful conduct is 
reported to a public authority is there the requisite "public'' dimension to the employee's conduct 
necessary to sustain a "public policy" claim. An employee who reports wrongful or criminal 
conduct to his employer is engaged only in private conduct. See, e.g.. Fox v. MCI 
Communications Corp., 931 P.2d 857, 861 (Utah 1997) ("[I]f an employee reports a criminal 
violation to an employer, rather than to public authorities, and is fired for making such reports, 
that does not, in our view, contravene a clear and substantial public policy." summary dismissal 
of public policy claim affirmed); Schlang v. Kev Airlines, Inc., 794 F. Supp. 1493, 1504 (D. 
Nev. 1992) ("[A] complaint registered with the employer is a private or proprietary action that is 
not entitled to public policy protection."); Wiltsie v. Babv Grand Corp., 774 P.2d 432, 433 (Nev. 
1989) ("Because appellant chose to report the [alleged illegal] activity to his supervisor rather 
than the appropriate authorities, he was merely acting in a private or proprietary manner." 
summary dismissal of public policy wrongful discharge claim upheld); Zaniecki v. P. A. Bergner 
& Co., 493 N.E. 2d 419, 421-22 (111. App. 1986) (Reporting illegal activity to a supervisor is a 
purely private action because "the critical element of public authority involvement is lacking."). 
In sum, because plaintiffs did not report the alleged criminal conduct to any public 
authority, plaintiffs fail to state a "whistleblower" public policy wrongful discharge claim. 
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IV. PLAINTIFFS' PUBLIC POLICY CLAIM IS BARRED UNDER FEDERAL 
LABOR LAW 
A. Federal Law Governing Collective Bargaining Agreements. 
Claims relating to a collective bargaining agreement are governed exclusively by federal 
labor law under § 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a).: Such 
claims "must be brought under § 301 and be resolved by reference to federal law." Allis-
Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 210 (1985). See also Textile Workers Union of 
American v. Lincoln Mills of Alabama, 353 U.S. 448, 451 (1957) (§ 301 vests exclusive power in 
"federal courts to fashion a body of federal law for the enforcement of these collective bargaining 
agreements."); Sperber v. Galigher Ash Co., 747 P.2d 1025, 1027 (Utah 1987) (summarizing 
federal labor law). 
There are two prerequisites that must be satisfied before a breach of a collective 
bargaining agreement claim (or related claim) can be brought. First, the plaintiff-employee must 
exhaust or attempt to exhaust his grievance and arbitration remedies under the collective 
bargaining agreement. See Del Costello v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 
151, 163 (1983) ("an employee is required to attempt to exhaust any grievance or arbitration 
remedies provided in the collective-bargaining agreement."); Sperber. 747 P.2d at 1027 ("Under 
federal law, an employee is required to exhaust the grievance and arbitration remedies provided 
~ Section 301 states in relevant pan: "Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization 
representing employees . . . may be brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the 
(Footnote Continued on Next Page) 
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in the collective bargaining agreement between his union and his employer."); Republic Steel 
Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650 (1965). 
Second, the plaintiff-employee must allege and prove that his union, as his agent and 
representative, breached its duty of fair representation to him by its conduct under the collective 
bargaining agreement. Del Costello, 462 U.S. at 165 ("To prevail against... the 
Company . . . [employee-plaintiffs] must not only show that their discharge was contrary to the 
contract but must also carry the burden of demonstrating breach of duty by the Union.") (internal 
quotation marks omitted; bracketed words in original). The reason for this "breach of duty of 
fair representation" prerequisite is that the collective bargaining agreement already provides 
union employees with a remedy and a procedure for obtaining the remedy, and. therefore an 
employee may not go beyond the grievance and arbitration procedure (by suing in court) unless 
he can demonstrate that his union made a sham of his contractual remedies. 
Unless an employee proves that he has not been fairly represented 
by his union under the collective bargaining agreement, the 
grievance and arbitration procedures set forth in the collective 
bargaining agreement are the employee's exclusive remedy. 
Sperber. 747 P.2d at 1027. See also Del Costello, 462 U.S. at 165 (breach of union's duty of fair 
representation must be proven because lawsuit constitutes "a direct challenge to the private 
(Continued from Previous Page) 
parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties." 29 U.S.C. 
§ 185(a) (1947). 
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settlement of disputes under the collective-bargaining agreement") (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act not only exclusively governs claims 
for breach of collective bargaining agreements, it also preempts and therefore bars state-law 
claims that relate to collective bargaining agreements. The justification for § 301 preemption is 
the ease with which an aggrieved employee otherwise could turn a breach of a collective 
bargaining agreement into a state tort or contract claim, thereby possibly obtaining a state law 
remedy inconsistent with the collective bargaining agreement. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 471 U.S. 
at 209-11 (tkthe preemptive effect of §301 must extend beyond suits alleging [collective 
bargaining agreement] violations" to encompass state-law claims that fckwould frustrate the federal 
labor-contract scheme established in § 301"). 
Under Section 301, a broad range of state-law claims are regularly dismissed as 
preempted by federal labor law. See, e.g.. Steel workers v. Rawson, 495 U.S. 362, 370-72 (1990) 
(wrongful death claim under Idaho law against union, based on union's alleged negligence in 
conducting safety inspections, preempted by § 301 despite fact that Idaho Supreme Court ruled that 
union's duty to reasonably conduct safety inspections had an independent basis in state law 
unrelated to the collective bargaining agreement); Park Citv Education Ass^n v. Board of 
Education, 879 P.2d 267, 273 (Utah App. 1994) (dismissal of contract claims upheld as barred by 
federal labor law); Rissetto v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local 343, 94 F.3d 597, 599 (9th Cir, 
1996) (discharged employee's breach of contract and breach of implied covenant claims 
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preempted by § 301); Mock v. T.G.&Y. Stores Co., 971 F.2d 522 (10th Cir. 1992) (emotional 
distress claim preempted by §301); Jackson v. Southern California Gas Co., 881 F.2d 638. 
644-45 (9th Cir. 1989) (implied covenant claim preempted by collective bargaining agreement 
containing terms governing grounds for discharge); Herman v. Carpenters Local Q"7!, 
60F.3d 1375, 1385 (9th Cir. 1995) (affirming summary dismissal of implied covenant claim 
where collective bargaining agreement prohibited terminations without just cause). Because of 
the expansive scope of § 301 preemption, barred state-law claims are either dismissed or may be 
reconsidered as if they were pled under § 301. In the latter case, the claim would have to satisfy-
all requirements for a § 310 claim. Sperber, 747 P.2d at 1027-28 (preempted state-law contract 
claim reconsidered as if it were a § 301 claim, and then dismissed under § 301). 
B. Because Plaintiffs' Claim Is Based on Their Collective Bargaining Agreement, 
the Claim Is Barred Under Federal Labor Law 
As explained above, plaintiffs' public policy wrongful discharge claim is an implied 
contract claim (analogous to an implied covenant claim) based upon plaintiffs' underlying 
employment contract. See Section IIIA above. As also explained above, Idaho has not 
recognized a public policy wrongful discharge claim except on the basis of an at-will 
employment contract. Id. Nonetheless, if it is assumed for purposes of discussion that Idaho 
might recognize plaintiffs' claim in the context of their collective bargaining agreement, the 
claim would be barred under federal labor law. This is so because plaintiffs7 claim asserts a 
contractual restriction that is implied in plaintiffs' underlying contract, the collective bargaining 
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agreement. Plaintiffs' claim is thus a claim concerning the collective bargaining agreement.' 
Accordingly, plaintiffs' claim must comply with the requirements of § 301. 
Plaintiffs cannot satisfy any of the prerequisites to a valid claim under § 301. First, 
plaintiffs did not file a grievance or attempt to use their contractual remedies under the collective 
bargaining agreement. Facts ffi[ 12, 23. Second, plaintiffs do not allege, let alone attempt to 
prove, that their union breached its duty of fair representation to them. Accordingly, plaintiffs' 
claim is barred under § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act. 
C. If Plaintiffs' Claim Were Characterized as Separate from the Collective 
Bargaining Agreement, It Would Still Be Barred bv Federal Labor Law. 
As an implied contract claim, plaintiffs' state-law claim is clearly dependent on their 
collective bargaining agreement. However, if plaintiffs were to try to characterize their claim as 
separate from the collective bargaining agreement, the claim would still be barred by § 301. This 
is so because the Labor Management Relations Act does not permit a separate contract (express 
3
 A collective bargaining agreement is not limited to the four corners of the written contract, but encompasses 
additional matters by implication United Steelworkers \ Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 581-82 
(1960) (terms of collective bargaining agreement "not confined to the express provisions of the contract"); Eitmann 
v. New Orleans Public Service, Inc., 730 F.2d 359, 363 (9th Cir. 1984) (company conduct "not explicitly covered 
by the collective bargaining agreement is properly within the scope of the contractual grievance procedure"). 
Consequently, an implied contract claim, like an implied covenant claim, is based on the collective bargaining 
agreement itself because it is based on a provision that is implied into the labor agreement. Rissetto, 94 F.2d at 599 
("claim for breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing is also clearly preempted because such covenant is an 
implied term of [the plaintiffs] CBA"). 
The dependence of plaintiffs' claim on their collective bargaining agreement is confirmed by the fact that 
they allege that they were discharged "without just cause" and without an "opportunity to respond or be heard" on 
the reasons for their discharges. Facts «|c 11, 22 Both the "just cause" standard for discharge and the "opportunity 
to respond or be heard" on the reason for a discharge are provided by the collective bargaining agreement and its 
grievance and arbitration process 
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or implied) to coexist with a collective bargaining agreement where the purported contract would 
be inconsistent with or more advantageous than the collective bargaining agreement. See, ej^, 
Chmiel v. Beverlv Wilshire Hotel Co., 873 F.2d 1283, 1285 (9th Cir. 1989) ("Section 301 
preempts any individual labor contract inconsistent with a collective bargaining agreement"). 
An implied contract claim is inconsistent with the collective bargaining agreement if it 
does not require the employee to use and exhaust the grievance and arbitration remedies or if it 
can be brought after a claim could be asserted under the collective bargaining agreement. 
Eitmann v. New Orleans Public Service, Inc., 730 F.2d 359, 362 (9th Cir. 1984) (implied 
contract claim preempted as inconsistent with collective bargaining agreement where it would 
"supersede" the "contractual grievance procedure" in the collective bargaining agreement and 
allow employee to assert claim without exhausting contractual remedies). 
Federal labor law does not permit inconsistent claims, such as asserted by plaintiffs, 
because to do so would undermine the role of labor unions as representatives of unionized 
employees and would also undermine the collective bargaining process. The Utah Supreme 
Court has explained this point in detail: 
Under federal labor law, only duly authorized union 
representatives can bargain for the terms and conditions of 
employment for those within the bargaining unit. . . . [Any] 
separate contract must be consistent with the collective bargaining 
agreement negotiated by the union. Thus, inconsistent separate 
agreements are not enforceable Nothing could undermine the 
authority of the collective bargaining unit more thoroughly than 
allowing individuals or cohorts of employees to enforce separate 
contracts that were more advantageous to those employees than 
was the collective bargaining agreement itself.... Accordingly, 
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we decline to [allow] individual agreements to undercut the union 
as the bargaining agent. In the instant case, providing anv remedy 
under an implied contract when no remedy is available under the 
collective bargaining agreement — because the time for arbitration 
has passed — obviously would put fthe plaintiff! in a more 
advantageous position than [union] employees bound bv the 
collective bargaining agreement, thereby undermining the 
collective bargaining unit. Consequently, [the plaintiffs] alleged 
implied contract is unenforceable. 
Retherford v. AT&T Communications, 844 P.2d 949, 970 (Utah 1992) (citations omitted; 
emphasis added). 
In the instant case, plaintiffs' purported implied contract claim (if treated as separate from 
the collective bargaining agreement) would be inconsistent with the collective bargaining 
agreement governing plaintiffs' employment. Specifically, plaintiffs' claim would,permit them 
to ignore the grievance and arbitration process and would also permit them to bring a lawsuit 
well beyond the time in which a claim could be asserted under the collective bargaining 
agreement. Accordingly, plaintiffs' state-law claim is barred under § 301 of the Labor 
Management Relations Act. 
V, CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, plaintiffs' public policy wrongful discharge claim based on 
Idaho law should be dismissed with prejudice. 
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DATED this 4th day of January, 1999. 
/• 
W. MARK GAVRE 
MARGARET NIYER MCGANN 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for The Amalgamated Sugar Company 
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JAMES EDWARD SPARROW, JR., IN OPPOSITION TO 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO 
Plaintiffs, DISMISS PLAINTIFFS' AMENDED 
COMPLAINT 
v s
- • ) 
) •' \ . \ V . - " 
THE AMALGAMATED SUGAR 
COMPANY, a Utah corporation, et al., 
~
 r , ' Judge Stanton M. Tavlor 
Defendants. ) 
) 
I'ursiwihi hi R1111 • -1 - '>( H (1 )(b) of the Code of Judicial Administration, Plaintiffs present 
the following points and authorities m opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss 
Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint. 
INTRODUCTION 
Defendant Amalgamated argues, in effect, that Idaho allows a business to violate its 
public policy so long as the business employs its workers under a union contract. This 
assertion is supposedh hast J mi mr Lid tfi.it h 1 ti 1111 'mn \iirs i nnfarl i1;im;u'f<. is th( icrncriv 
available under the cause of action for wrongful discharge in violation oi public pohc\ In 
other words. Amalgamated asserts thai pastm^ wim h;n v pm nr remedies arr nioi entitled to 
-\clusivitv argument, however, is not supported by law or 
logical reasoning. It is supported only by non-decision of the Idaho supreme court which this 
Defendant attempts to elevate to the level of controlling precedent. 
. \ c. ..: : - *v "* •"•*•- A~- ^-eempted by federal 
defendant r^ ies that Planning pmaie rights under the:: collective bargaining 
agreement supplanted the state right of action provided for the purpose of protecting public 
nghts Ii.c I. mice Males ^apreniL . :..:. .-. ^dirssal this aryumein and siMirnik p ' r^n i 
'
 [u re lucrative for this Defendant (its real 
argument; is immaterial. Because the cause of action of wrongful discharge in violation of 
public policy and the acts, rules, and regulations 01 v ongress can be easily reconciled, tl ici e 
is no pi eu 11 if n HI mi in llns case. 
n 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
When ruling on a motion to dismiss, the Court "must commit- ihr complaint in the 
liyln rni^t tin ornble to the p1:unHff[s] and indulge all reasonable inferences in [their] favor." 
Mounteer v. Utah Power & Light Co.. 823 P.2d 1055, 1058 (Utah 19011 The Court may 
grant a motion to dismiss "only where it appears that the : . . . . • 
to relief undi. . . »T«* * *" * :'-;• - eouid pi o\c to support their 
" " Robe-son '• Gem im Co., S2S P.2d 496, 499 (Utah App. 1992) (quoting Prows v. 
State, 822 ?.2d "f>4. ^66 (Utah 1991)). 
\j». kjL M L X - r 
I. rlL A\ AIL ABILITY OF ADMINISTRATIVE RIGHTS 
NEGOTIATED FOR AND INCLUDED IN THE CBA IS N O T 
F \ ANT TO THIS STATE-LAW ACTION 
Deieituun; •\:;;aigamjiea argu;. luiii.'ltjl disch.inM > .uisf of 
action '»' ,I<.M ,ii -'nr'l'n'ces precludes the existence of a wrongful discharge cause of action 
for employees who have negotiated any type of restraint on an employer's discharge rights. 
Defendant cites no authority supporting its conclusion except .host: », HM-> .nAmm |( di HIL- l.hx 
caust. ot uciKiii 11»i ,II " ili '-»nplo\t-t." 
Although this Defendant consistently refuses to acknowledge the public policy behind 
the public policy exception, it is the public policy that is relevant — and not the discharge. 
3 
: ;ie discharge itself (and the "just cause" requirement under the CBA) only gives rise to 
private interests between the employee and the ernpl*» i i I In |»11b11L \m\u:\ I'wcptiun 
requires < i put »lic aspect ti ) tl ic: ' firing which makes the firing unlawful. See Peterson \ 
Browning, 832 P.2d 1280, 1282 (Utah 1992) (quoting Foley v Interactive Data Corp.. 4 
Cal. 3d 654,"65 P 2d 3^3. ?"7Q. 2*4 Ca> ki/. - . ^ " ^ > 
not the underpinning of the cause of action.l The public policy exception (through an award 
of damages pursuant to state law) regulates as effectively as forms of preventive relief See 
San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 3:>^  I1 ^. 2.UJ M " i r'^M 1 iiu - inn umrh 
hd\ t: pro\ ided J wionujul elisrhan?e remedy to protect the public interests, whereas the 
unions created a just cause remedy to protect the private interests of union members. 
1
 " I o make out a prima facie case of wrongful discharge, an employee mus* >/n ^  
that his employer terminated him; (ii) that a clear and substantial public policy existed, \II:J 
that the employee's conduct brought the policy into play; and (iv) that the discharge and the 
conduct bringing the policy into play are causally connected. Cf. Heslop, 839 P.2d at 837); 
Wilmot v Kaiser Alum. & Chem. Corp,, 118 Wash. 2d 46, 82^  P 2d 18, 28-29 (Wash. 1991); 
Henry H. Pemtt, Jr., "The Future of Wrongful Dismissal Claims: Where Does Employer Self 
Interest Lie?," 58 U. Cinn. L. Rev. 397, 398-99 (1989). As to subpart (iv), the employee 
initially need only show that the conduct bringing the public policy into play fclwas a cause of 
the firing." See Wilmot, 821 P.2d at 29. If the employee establishes a prima facie case, the 
employer must then articulate a legitimate reason for the discharge. See id. When faced with 
evidence of a legitimate reason for termination, the employee must prove that engaging in the 
protected conduct was a "suostantial factor" in the employer's motivation to discharge the 
employee. See id. ai "*<• " Rvan v Dan's Food Stores. _ P.2d _ _ ; 350 I Jtah Adv 
Rep. 3(Utar 'QQC 
4 
Defendant Amalgamated asserts that this Court should speculate that the Idaho 
supreme court would not provide a cause of actioi : tc union * orkers pi otected t : ] * a "ji ist 
— •• -- - v ; jeiendant's memo, at p 13. The Idaho supreme court, on the 
other hand, stated: 
In Watson v. Idaho Falls Consol. Hosps., inc.* 11, lu^m —, "20 P.2d 
632 (1986), this Court upheld a jury instruction which instructed that a 
termination based on legal union activities would be contrary to public 
policy established by the Legislature. 
Hummer v. Evans, 923 P.2d 981, 986 (Idaho 1996): see also Rosencrans v. Intermountain 
Soap Co., 605 P.2d 963 (Idaho 1980) (imposing a gooc ;aiin rcuuiremeni on .::; .;_ri -
employee puiMi.mt lu <i contrail nt a iiefiniU" *" ac^rc, MeicJ: \ ;:::errrk ur.iLir uas- Co.. 
77S P.2d 744 at n. 1 (Idaho 1989) (reversing summary judgment oeeause a rnabie issue o: 
fact existed with respect to the existence of a contract and approvingly allowing the breach of 
contract claim to be tried together s lolation oi puoi. 
du knowledged md dors acknow ledee the right of union workers to maintain a cause of action 
based upon state law. 
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—HRTING AMALGAMATED^ CRIMINAL CONDLCI 10 
PL BLIC AUTHORITIES IS NOT NECESSARY TO STATE A 
CLAIM BECAUSE PLAINTIFFS DO NOT BASE THEIR CLAIMS 
ON THE PARTICULAR PUBLIC POLICY WHICH ADDRESSES 
THE ENFORCEMENT OF CRIMINAL STATUTES. 
Plaintiffs do not allege that the enforcement of criminal statutes is the public policy 
upon which their claims rest. Furthermore, Plaintiffs do not allege that their conduct 
advanced this jyrtiuiLi! puhlu. polk II Ins, is nur ilrsruir; AnmliNimnmrs earnest desire to 
show that such an allegation, if made, would fail. 
The public policy upon which Plaintiffs rely is the policy favoring untainted, 
unpoisoned, uncontaminatec I^J J .•„.: .. ;\>:;c\ ... .:;. ... ,\ ...^: ' 'Urn 
;. ••• -.' • ? e s ( ' " /omc-:':or^ beiendant's conclusion that the 
gja. 01 clean food cannot be obtained without government involvement is a non sequitur, at 
best, "a nonsensical distinction," at worst. 
s ..j chooses to approach his employer should not be 
j.c:.:t;w - . J::.C J> simply because a direct report to law enforcement 
agencies might effectuate the exposure of crime more quickly. This 
would be a nonsensical distinction. 
Parr v. triplet! I orv.. 1 i . iupp 1 [Cjj\ 1 U)(>-,,M ! M ) 111 M'Siuj ] he allegations regarding 
1
 "The purpose of [food safety statutes] is clearh the protection of the public health 
and safety. The accomplishment of that purpose is of prime importance and must ve 
vigorously championed, The high degree of danger and serious consequences latent in the 
distribution of food to the public require the imposition of the duty amounting to the creation 
of the strictest liability'." Niemann v. Grand Central Market, Inc.. 337 P 2d 424 (I Jtah 1959). 
6 
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Amalgamated's violation of public policy interest "are not dependent on reporting them, to an 
outside agency; they stand on then ow i i ' " v ei duz^» * general Dynamics., "?9, 
562 (S D C": .1 1990); accord K lover v. Allen Freight Lines, Inc.. 885 P.2d 391, 395 (Kan. 
App. 1994) ("[A]n employee may report a serious infraction of a rule, regulation, or law to 
either company management or law enforcement officials.") 
Ddcn.i.iiii iuuiliMiii.ili.lt1 lies MuM (he rn n« ' Ml" .\'i ,r -t< <r n< \fi "r uipports its 
conclusion. Defendant Amalgamated errs as Plaintiffs explained previously in opposition to 
this Defendant's motion for summary judgment. 
Fox did not nver-J: r : r * .. .. .VJI- V a:;^ v. Pro-Tech 
Restoration, 909 p " J "~ : """•- ? : .y ^:. ^ w ; i: exnressmg unwillingness to read case to 
overrule another sub silentio because "the two situations are so different"),, The Utah 
Supreme Court specifically stated in Heslop: 
^ e - * ^ ' ^ ; .1'. ":* *a mo. m ^ . « puLi.v po;;^- i^uirement 
MI:;D*_ -. . aubc tic uiu nui icpor the vioianon to the Attorney General 
or tG the Commissioner. Plaintiff pursued all internal methods for 
resolving the problem: he need not have gone outside the Bank to try to 
correct the policy violation. 
Heslop \ Bai lk of Utah. 839 P 2d 828, 838 ( I Ital i 1992; ;i i< MM ,g li :iat ti ic aci coi isiden ;d 
served a substantial public policy because it protects the public as well as regulating financial 
institutions themselves),. The analysis in Fox relied upon by this Defenaan: c::h addresses 
the public policy of criminal law enforcement — not the policy achie* c,; r , :IK iaw By 
7 
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their nature, cnminal laws cannot be enforced unless reported. On the other hand, loud can 
be kept clean and the public can be kepi IieaUlii w iillitniiil repoii1- in puhlu .inthnniin in ihh 
situation: 
[A] fundamental public interest is implicated whether or not the 
plaintiff reports any alleged wrongdoing to an outside agency, and 
whether or not a statute has been violated. 
V erduzcu. nJ '"' I "Mj(i(i <tt 'i(>l, accord Moskal \ Fist' I ennessee Bank *1 c S.W.2d 509 
(Term. App. 1991) (acknowledging cause of action asserted by employee who refused to 
participate, continue to participate, or remain silent about illegal activities). 
8 
>AHO'S VERSION OF THE PUBLIC POLICY EXCEP 1 IU\ IS 
EXTREMELY BROAD 
Idaho has described tin i n '. i uv|iln>ii and' \\\\ \\w\\ uftiood faith and fair • 
dealing as "principles under which freedom of contract of private dealing is resmcied by law 
for the good of the community." Jackson v. Minidoka Irrigation Pis:.. 56? P Z^ :-~, ^ 
(Idahc 1 °'77^ (quoting Petermann v. Inte* -_ :?:uiiicnmu<j » i^iiiat^a 
•^ -*j_iiL, lJolic\ ,it " j . maiiu b puDiic pohc\ exception is based 
upon the constructive duties of good faith and *ai: dealing which "are implied obligation.^  of 
every contract/' Luzar v Western Surety Co., 692 F _~ J3T\ 340 (Idaho 1984): see also 
Metcair \. lrucrmuu: —.. »jq> v •». • - . :* 'io 1989) (recognizing that Idaho 
joined "the minority view in this country. . . ."). 
The duty of good faith and fair dealing imposed on employment contracts is 
J Xhe Idaho Legislature has expressed its public policy: 
Economic insecurity due to unemployment is a serious menace to the 
health, morals and welfare of the people of this state. Involuntary 
unemployment is therefore a subject of national and state interest and 
concern which requires appropriate action to prevent its spread and to 
lighten its burden which now so often falls with crushing force upon the 
unemployed worker and his family. The achievement of social security 
requires protection against this greatest hazard of our economic :\ix: 
This can be provided by encouraging employers to provide more stable 
employment 
Idaho ( ode .-Mil, ' I iili). 
9 
extremely broad in Idaho. Idaho's supreme court stated: 
[W]e conclude that any action by either party which violates, nullifies 
or significantly impairs any benefit of the employment contract is a 
violation of the implied-in-law covenant of good faith and fair dealing 
which we adopt today. 
Metcalf v. Intermountain Gas Co.. 778 P.2d 744, 750 (Idaho 1989). A dissenting justice 
described this standard as "far too liberal and loose a standard." Id Nevertheless, the 
foregoing is Idaho law. 
In addition, the Idaho supreme court has explained that the breach of the duty of good 
faith is a violation "separate and apart from the a breach of contract per se and . . . damages 
may be recovered for the [violation] and for the contract breach." White v. Unigard Mut. Ins. 
Co.. 730 P.2d 1014, 1017 (Idaho 1986) (discussing the tort of bad faith breach of an 
insurance contract) (quoting Anderson v. Continental Ins. Co., 271 N.W.2d 368, 374 (Wis. 
1978)). In other words, Plaintiffs' claims are based on Amalgamated's breach of its duties 
which arose because of its contract with Plaintiffs, but the claims are not claims "on the 
contract." Id. at 1020. Plaintiffs' claims are separate and distinct arising under legal 
obligations imposed by state law.4 
4
 Another example of this type of cause of action arising because of a contract but not 
being a suit on the contract is the doctrine of respondeat superior. See also Interwest 
Construction v. Palmer. 923 P.2d 1350 (Utah 1996) (explaining that the duty to perform 
contractual duties in such a manner as to not injure persons or property arises from law, not 
contract); see also Restatement (Second) of Torts §324A (1965). 
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Under Idaho law, public policy is implicated by any firing "motivated by bad faith or 
malice or based on retaliation [because such conduct] is not the best interest of the economic 
system or the public good." Jackson v. Minidoka Irrigation Dist, 563 P.2d 54, 58 (Idaho 
1977) see also Burdick v. American Express Co., 677 F.Supp 228 (S.D. N. Y. 1988) (noting 
that a distinction between "preventive" and "retaliatory" dismissals would serve no useful 
purpose). The sine qua non of Plaintiffs' claims against Amalgamated is Amalgamated's 
misconduct with respect to clean food and Plaintiffs' staunch opposition thereto. Amended 
Complaint at ffi[ 19-30; 32-34; 40-44. Plaintiffs' claims do not depend upon any contractual 
term negotiated for and included in the CBA. 
Amalgamated fired Plaintiffs on pretextual bases because Messrs. Waddoups and 
Sparrow refused to shut up and be "team players" with respect to the Adulterated Sugar. It is 
this opposition to Amalgamated's misconduct which furthered the public policy of clean, 
unadulterated food and which gives nse to Plaintiffs' claims. It is Amalgamated's evil 
motive (a prototypical question of fact) in firing Plaintiffs for their advancement and defense 
of public policy that is the basis of Plaintiffs' claims. The motivation for Plaintiffs' firings 
was to hide Amalgamated's public policy malfeasance (as opposed to contractual 
nonfeasance); therefore, Plaintiffs clearly and unequivocally state a claim: 
[A]n employee may claim damages for wrongful discharge when the 
motivation for the firing contravenes public policy. 
11 
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Jackson, 563 P.2d at 57. Despite Amalgamated's desperate efforts to mischaractenze their 
claims,5 Plaintiffs clearly allege that they complained about contaminated sugar and opposed 
Amalgamated's cover-up. As a direct result of their complaints, Mr. Waddoups was 
suspended for three days and summarily fired on his next work day. See, e ^ , Bovle v. Vista 
Eyewear, Inc., 700 S.W.2d 859 (Mo. App. 1985) (holding that allegation of employer's 
violation of FDA standards was basis of public policy exception where fired employee 
warned and threatened employer, continued to attempt to comply with FDA regulations and 
eventually reported her employer to the FDA. "[A]ny one of those allegations would state a 
cause of action." Id at 877); Sheets v. Teddv's Frosted Foods, Inc., 427 A.2d 385 (Conn. 
1980) (holding that employee had a cause of action for wrongful discharge in violation of 
public policy where he urged his employer to comply with state FDCA); Garibaldi v. Lucky 
Food Stores, Inc., 726 F.2d 1367 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding that an employee who was 
discharged where complaints concerned his employer's sale and delivery of adulterated milk 
stated a claim under California law). Mr. Sparrow was harassed for cooperating with and 
supporting Mr. Waddoups and was fired only days before Mr. Waddoups's suspension. See, 
e.g., Reich v. Cambndgeport Air Systems. Inc.. 26 F.3d 1187 (1st Cir. 1994) (addressing 
questions of fact raised by joint actors in employee-housecleaning meant "to impress on 
5
 When ruling on a motion to dismiss, the Court "must construe the complaint in the 
light most favorable to the plaintiffs] and indulge all reasonable inferences in [their] favor." 
Mounteer v. Utah Power & Light Co., 823 P.2d 1055, 1058 (Utah 1991). 
12 
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employees not to be palsy with bad actors."). 
IV. FEDERAL LAW DOES NOT PREEMPT IDAHO'S CAUSE OF 
ACTION FOR WRONGFUL DISCHARGE IN VIOLATION OF 
PUBLIC POLICY BECAUSE THE COURT WILL NOT BE 
REQUIRED TO INTERPRET THE CBA. 
Defendant Amalgamated concludes, and asks this Court to infer, that Section 301 
preempts Plaintiffs' causes of action because Idaho bases the cause of action of wrongful 
discharge in violation of public policy on the parties' duties of good faith and fair dealing 
inherent in the employment contract.6 However, "pre-emption cannot be inferred." 
Wisconsin Public Intervenor v. Mortier. 115 L. Ed. 2d 532, 111 S. Ct. 2476, 2486 (1991). 
Moreover, the United States Supreme Court has concluded that: 
[E]ven if dispute resolution pursuant to a collective-bargaining 
agreement, on the one hand, and state law, on the other, would require 
addressing precisely the same set of facts, as long as the state-law claim 
can be resolved without interpreting the agreement itself, the claim is 
"independenfof the agreement for § 301 pre-emption purposes. 
Retherford v. AT & T Communications, 844 P.2d 949, 955 (Utah 1992) (quoting Lingle v. 
Norge Div. of Magic Chef Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 409-10 (1988). Under the circumstances of 
this case, there is no section 301 preemption. 
In Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, the United States Supreme Court held that "when 
6
 Defendant asserts that the basis of the Idaho cause of action on the duty of good faith 
and fair dealing is extremely significant. The Idaho supreme court, on the other hand, refer 
to such criticism as "hairsplitting" having no merit. Metcalf 778 P.2d at 752. 
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resolution of a state-law claim is substantially dependent upon analysis of the terms of an 
agreement made between the parties in a labor contract," the claim is preempted by § 301. 
Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 220 (1985) (holding that § 301 preempted a 
state law tort action for bad-faith delay in making disability-benefit payments due under a 
collective bargaining agreement). 
The Allis-Chalmers Court drew the following distinction between Plaintiffs' claims 
and claims arising out of agreements negotiated by the parties to a collective bargaining 
agreement: 
Section 301 on its face says nothing about the substance of what private 
parties may agree to in a labor contract. Nor is there any suggestion 
that Congress, in adopting § 301, wished to give the substantive 
provisions of private agreements the force of federal law, ousting any 
inconsistent state regulation. Such a rule of law would delegate to 
unions and unionized employers the power to exempt themselves 
from whatever state labor standards they disfavored. Clearly, 
§ 301 does not grant the parties to a collective-bargaining 
agreement the ability to contract for what is illegal under state law. 
In extending the pre-emptive effect of § 301 beyond suits for breach of 
contract, it would be inconsistent with congressional intent under 
that section to pre-empt state rules that proscribe conduct, or 
establish rights and obligations, independent of a labor contract. 
* * * 
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Therefore, state-law rights and obligations that do not exist 
independently of private agreements, and that as a result can be waived 
or altered by agreement of private parties, are pre-empted by those 
agreements. Our analysis must focus, then, on whether the 
Wisconsin tort action for breach of the duty of good faith as applied 
here confers nonnegotiable state-law rights on employers or 
employees independent of any right established by contract, or, 
instead, whether evaluation of the tort claim is inextricably intertwined 
with consideration of the terms of the labor contract. 
Id at 211-13 (footnotes and citation omitted) (emphasis added). 
In other words, in lieu of its breathless argument, Defendant Amalgamated merely 
needed to demonstrate that the right to conduct its business in a manner otherwise proscribed 
by Idaho law was negotiated and made part of the Amalgamated collective bargaining 
agreement. Plaintiffs cannot locate such a clause in the CBA. 
Such a clause cannot be negotiated. The Utah Court of Appeals has explained that the 
duty of good faith and fair dealing is non-negotiable: 
"While it is true that courts impose an obligation of good faith in every 
aspect of the contractual relationship . . . the obligation of good faith is 
'constructive' rather than 'implied'" because the obligation is imposed 
by law and cannot be disclaimed. 
PDO Lube Ctr., Inc. v. Huber. 949 P.2d 792 (Utah App. 1997) (quoting Olympus Hills 
Shopping Ctr.. Ltd. v. Smith's Food & Drug Ctrs.. Inc.. 889 P.2d 445, 450 n.4 (Utah App. 
1994) (quoting 3A Arthur L. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts § 654A(B) (2d ed. 1993) 
(emphasis added))); see also Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exch.. 701 P.2d 795, 801 at n. 4 (Utah 
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1985) (in first-party contract, the "duty to perform the contract in good faith cannot, by 
definition, be waived by either party to the agreement") Because the duty of good faith 
and fair dealing is non-negotiable, Plaintiffs' causes of action are not preempted under Allis-
Chalmers because this Coun can determine whether the defendants have engaged in conduct 
prohibited by Idaho law without referring to or interpreting the collective bargaining 
agreement. 
Defendant Amalgamated might be trying to assert — as an affirmative defense which 
cannot form the basis of a motion to dismiss7 — that through the CBA and the adoption of 
the grievance procedures, Plaintiffs consented to its state-law violations or waived their state-
law rights.8 Again, however, the United States Supreme Court has considered and rejected 
such a conclusion. The Court set forth a point of law that this Defendant is in dire need of 
learning — that Plaintiffs are masters of their complaint and this Defendant's shadowboxing9 
with out-of-context terms cannot change this fact: 
7
 "As with any affirmative defense, [Amalgamated has] the burden of proving every 
element necessary to establish that [its argument] bars" Plaintiffs' claims. Seale v. Gowans. 
923 P.2d 1361, 1363 (Utah 1996). 
8
 Because, under any other theory, its references to grievance procedures would have 
no merit with respect to the state-law causes of action. 
9
 See, e.g.. Defendant's Memo, at n. 3. 
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It is true that when a defense to a state claim is based on the terms of a 
collective-bargaining agreement, the state court will have to interpret 
that agreement to decide whether the state claim survives. But the 
presence of a federal question, even a § 301 question, in a defensive 
argument does not overcome the paramount policies embodied in the 
well-pleaded complaint rule - that the plaintiff is the master of the 
complaint, that a federal question must appear on the face of the 
complaint, and that the plaintiff may, by eschewing claims based on 
federal law, choose to have the cause heard in state court. When a 
plaintiff invokes a right created by a collective-bargaining agreement, 
the plaintiff has chosen to plead what we have held must be regarded as 
a federal claim, and removal is at the defendant's option. But a 
defendant cannot, merely by injecting a federal question into an action 
that asserts what is plainly a state-law claim, transform the action into 
one arising under federal law, thereby selecting the forum in which the 
claim shall be litigated. If a defendant could do so, the plaintiff would 
be master of nothing. 
Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams. 482 U.S. 386, 395 (1987). 
In sum, Plaintiffs' claims are based upon state law. The Court will not need to refer 
to the collective bargaining agreement in order to rule that firing employees who attempt to 
remedy Amalgamated's poisoning of the food supply is conduct that Idaho does not condone. 
17 
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CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment must be 
denied in its entirety. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / ^ d a y of January, 1999. 
CARR & WADDOUPS 
iNT/T WADDOl 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In its opening memorandum, Amalgamated Sugar explained that plaintiffs' public policy 
wrongful discharge claim should be dismissed because it fails to state a claim under Idaho law 
and because it is preempted by federal law. Under Idaho law, plaintiffs' claim fails for two 
reasons. First, the claim is based on an implied contractual obligation not to terminate an 
employee's employment in violation of public policy. Idaho courts have not found such an 
implied contractual obligation where, as here, plaintiffs already had a collective bargaining 
agreement that protected them from discharge without "just cause." Second, assuming arguendo 
that plaintiffs can assert the claim, the claim nonetheless fails because plaintiffs did not engage in 
public conduct which is required to state a public policy claim under Idaho law. In particular, 
while plaintiffs argue that they were potential "whistleblowers," they never "blew the whistle" on 
the Company. 
Plaintiffs' claim is preempted by federal labor law because the claim is an implied 
contract claim and plaintiffs' employment contract was a collective bargaining agreement 
governed by federal labor law. Accordingly, the claim can only be asserted as a breach of the 
collective bargaining agreement claim under federal law. Plaintiffs do not assert such a claim. 
Instead, plaintiffs posture their claim as a separate state-law contract claim in an effort to avoid 
the preemptive effect of federal labor law. Plaintiffs' effort is unavailing because their claim is 
necessarily dependent on their collective bargaining agreement (and hence governed by federal 
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law) and because even as a purported state-law contract claim, the claim is preempted by federal 
labor law. 
Plaintiffs' opposition memorandum makes a variety of arguments, but does not present 
either law or facts sufficient to alter the conclusion that plaintiffs fail to state a claim under Idaho 
law and that their purported claim is barred by federal law.1 
ARGUMENT 
II. PLAINTIFFS FAIL TO STATE A CLAIM UNDER IDAHO LAW 
A. IDAHO LAW DOES NOT RECOGNIZE PLAINTIFFS' CLAIM 
BECAUSE PLAINTIFFS5 EMPLOYMENT WAS GOVERNED BY 
A COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT. 
Idaho law recognizes a cause of action for public policy wrongful discharge where an at-
will employee is discharged in violation of Idaho public policy. Additionally, a public policy 
wrongful discharge claim, like a claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing, is a contract claim, not a tort claim. Both claims rest on an implied contractual 
obligation that is read into the underlying contract between the employee and the employer. 
[T]his Court [declares its] intent to classify a cause of action for 
wrongful termination in violation of public policy as a breach of 
contract rather than a tort. All employment contracts terminable at 
will are subject to the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. A 
breach of the covenant is a breach of the employment contract, and 
is not a tort. The potential recovery results in contract damages, 
1
 Amalgamated Sugar's Motion is a summary judgment motion because it goes beyond the pleadings and relies on 
plaintiffs' depositions for certain basic facts. Plaintiffs cannot avoid summary judgment by relying on mere 
allegations, nor can they dispute their own testimony. 
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not tort damages. Similarly, a cause of action for wrongful 
termination of a contract of employment at will based on a 
violation of public policy is a contract cause of action which results 
in contract damages. 
Hummer v. Evans, 923 P.2d 981, 987 (Idaho 1996) (citations and internal quotations marks 
omitted; emphasis added). 
Idaho courts have not recognized an implied contractual obligation not to discharge in 
violation of public policy where the employee is already protected by a just cause provision in a 
collective bargaining agreement.2 See cases cited in Def. Opening Memo, at 12. Plaintiffs assert 
that "Idaho acknowledged and does acknowledge the right of union workers to maintain a cause 
of action based upon state law." PL Opposition Memo, at 5. Plaintiffs are incorrect, at least with 
respect to the claim they assert. The one case cited by plaintiffs in support of their position 
actually undermines it. Id. In Watson v. Idaho Falls Consolidated Hospitals, Inc., the plaintiff 
"attempted] to unionize the hospital," but was unsuccessful when "a majority of the employees 
rejected the attempt to unionize the hospital." 720 P.2d 632, 633 (Idaho 1986). Subsequently, 
the plaintiff was allegedly discharged in "retaliation for [her] pro-union activities." Id. at 636. 
On these facts, the plaintiff asserted that her discharge violated public policy. The plaintiffs 
employment was never governed by a collective bargaining agreement, nor was the plaintiff 
2
 The one court to have addressed such a claim, rejected it: While at-will employees are protected from terminations 
that violate public policy, "[tjhat protection however is not provided to employees whose discharge is contractually 
protected by a just cause provision of a collective bargaining agreement." Laramee v. French & Bean Co.. 830 
F. Supp. 803, 806 (D. Vt. 1993). 
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protected by a "just cause" standard for discharge. In allowing the plaintiff to assert her public 
policy claim, the Idaho Supreme Court made clear that it was recognizing the claim in the 
context of at-will employment: "An employee at will may not. . . be discharged for a reason 
contravening public policy." Id. at 634 (emphasis added). 
In sum, there is no support in Idaho law for the notion that an implied contractual 
obligation not to discharge in violation of public policy should be read into plaintiffs' collective 
bargaining agreement which already protected plaintiffs' employment by permitting discharge 
only where there was "just cause." Given that no Idaho case supports plaintiffs' argument, that 
plaintiffs were already protected from wrongful discharge by their collective bargaining 
agreement and that plaintiffs' employment contract was governed by federal law, there is no 
reason for this Court to expand Idaho law in the novel manner urged by plaintiffs. 
B. PLAINTIFFS FAIL TO STATE A "WHISTLEBLOWER" PUBLIC 
POLICY CLAIM UNDER IDAHO LAW, 
Under Idaho law, a public policy wrongful discharge claim may be stated where an 
employee engages in certain protected conduct of a public nature and is discharged because of 
that conduct. There are three situations in which employees' conduct may be entitled to public 
policy protection: 
1. Where employees "refuse to commit unlawful acts"; 
2. Where employees "perform an important public obligation"; and 
3. Where employees "exercise certain legal rights or privileges." 
260342.1 4 
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Sorensen v. Comm Tek, Inc., 799 P.2d 70, 74 (Idaho 1990); see also Anderson v. Farm Bureau 
Mutual Ins. Co. of Idaho, 732 P.2d 699, 707 (Idaho App. 1987) (same). In light of the above 
three criteria, a claim for public policy wrongful discharge may be stated where an employee is 
discharged for refusing to commit perjury, for filing a worker's compensation claim, for serving 
on a jury, or for complying with a court-issued subpoena. Id.; Hummer v. Evans, 923 P.2d 981, 
986-87 (Idaho 1996). 
A "whistleblower" public policy wrongful discharge claim may be stated where an 
employee reports a significant statutory or regulatory violation to the appropriate public 
authority. In Rav v. Nampa School District No. 131, a maintenance electrician reported "several 
electrical and building code violations to the state inspector." 814 P.2d 17,21 (Idaho 1991). The 
employee was allegedly discharged for reporting these safety violations to the public official. IdL 
Given the plaintiffs position and the public official to whom he reported the violations, the 
Idaho Supreme Court ruled that the employee could state a public policy claim as a 
whistleblower. Id 
In the instant case, plaintiffs allege that Amalgamated Sugar committed a federal crime 
by shipping contaminated sugar for human consumption in interstate commerce in violation of 
the Food, Drug & Cosmetics Act. Amended Complaint ^ 44; Sparrow Depo. at 46-7. While the 
Amended Complaint alleges that plaintiffs were potential whistleblowers in that they supposedly 
"threatened] to expose the [Company's] illegal activity," neither plaintiff contacted the FDA or 
any other public authority. Sparrow Depo. at 173-74; Waddoups Depo. at 65; Amended 
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Complaint fflf 23-44. In his deposition Sparrow testified that he did not raise the issue of 
contaminated sugar with anyone at any time. Waddoups in his deposition testified that he 
"never" said to the Company that he was thinking of going public with any concern about 
contaminated sugar. See Def. Opening Memo, at 10-11 (quoting plaintiffs' deposition 
testimony). 
Given that plaintiffs did not report their supposed concern about contaminated sugar to 
any public authority, they cannot state a whistleblower public policy claim under Idaho law. 
Plaintiffs cannot satisfy any of the three criteria for protected public conduct. Plaintiffs did not 
refuse to commit an unlawful act (such as perjury) and did not exercise any public right or 
privilege (such as serving on the jury). The third criteria — "performing] an important public 
obligation" — is likewise not satisfied because plaintiffs do not even allege they did anything 
public. Where, as here, an employee accuses company management of criminal conduct, the 
employee can hardly claim to "perform an important public obligation" by talking to the criminal 
about its own crime. Neither the public nor any regulatory or law enforcement authority would 
be alerted to any matter of public concern by such conduct. In any case, there is no evidence of 
any such communication in the instant case. Finally, plaintiffs do not cite any Idaho case law in 
support of the notion that they may be public policy whistleblowers without "blowing the 
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whistle" or taking any public action.3 PL Opposition Memo, at 6-7. Plaintiffs' claim is simply 
groundless. 
Amalgamated Sugar pointed out that generally states, including Utah, require 
whistleblowing to be public, Le., the employee must report the employer's improper conduct to 
the public authorities. This is especially true where, as here, the employer is accused of criminal 
conduct. See Def. Opening Memo, at 15-16. In response, plaintiffs attempt to recharacterize 
their claim and misstate Utah law on point. PL Opposition Memo, at 6-7. 
In their Amended Complaint, plaintiffs accuse Amalgamated Sugar of violating the 
criminal section of the federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, and claim that they were 
discharged for threatening to expose that "illegal activity." Amended Complaint ^ 40, 44. Now 
plaintiffs argue that their public policy claim does not rest on "the enforcement of criminal 
statutes," and admit that "their conduct [did not] advance[] this particular public policy." 
PL Opposition Memo, at 6. Not only is this new position inconsistent with plaintiffs' Amended 
Complaint, it also deprives their claim of any public policy foundation. Having given up the 
Food, Drug and Cosmetics Act and having failed to invoke any Idaho statute or court decision, 
plaintiffs have no basis for their purported public policy. They merely assert a free floating, 
3
 Plaintiffs argue that "Idaho's version of the public policy exception is extremely broad." PL Opposition Memo, at 
9. In support of this assertion, plaintiffs cite to Idaho Code § 72-1302 (preface to unemployment benefits statute). 
Id. at 9n.3. This statutory provision does not support plaintiffs' position because the Idaho Supreme Court has ruled 
that a public policy wrongful discharge claim based on § 72-1302 is "without merit." Section 72-1302 "does not 
rise to the level of a statement of public policy which would prevent an employer from discharging an employee at 
will." Rav v. Nampa School Dist.. 814 P.2d at 22. 
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nonspecific policy favoring "uncontaminated food." Plaintiffs provide no foundation for this 
supposed public policy, and make no effort to show that Idaho recognizes it as a basis for a 
private right of action. PI. Opposition Memo, at 6. In short, in trying to escape the consequences 
of their failure to report to any public authority the criminal conduct they allege, plaintiffs make 
clear the groundlessness of their public policy claim. 
With respect to Utah law, plaintiffs argue that a whistleblower need not report criminal 
conduct to the public authorities. PL Opposition Memo, at 7. Plaintiffs rely on the out-of-date 
Heslop v. Bank of Utah case for their argument. Id. In the subsequent Fox v. MCI 
Communications decision, the Utah Supreme Court ruled that "if an employee reports a criminal 
violation to an employer, rather than to public authorities, and is fired for making such reports, 
that does not, in our view, contravene a clear and substantial public policy." 931 P.2d 857, 861 
(Utah 1997). More recently, the Utah Supreme Court reiterated that in order to state a 
whistleblower claim, an employee alleging criminal conduct must report the conduct to the 
public authorities. Rvan v. Dan's Food Stores, 350 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 8 (1998) ("reporting to a 
public authority criminal activity of the employer.... brings into play a clear and substantial 
public policy"). The Utah Supreme Court also clarified its earlier decision by pointing out that in 
Heslop both state and federal authorities were informed of the employer's illegal activities, the 
plaintiff met with the Utah Attorney General's office as part of its investigation of employer, and 
the plaintiffs internal reporting took place in this context. Id. at 10 n. 7. 
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Utah law clearly requires a whistleblower, alleging criminal misconduct by his employer, 
to report the illegal activity to the public authorities in order to state a claim. While plaintiffs' 
claim is not based on Utah law, there is no reason to think that Idaho law would be any different 
in light of its requirement that a whistleblower "perform an important public obligation" in order 
to state a claim. Given that plaintiffs did not report the alleged illegal activity to any public 
authority and did not even tell the Company they were thinking of doing so, there is simply no 
basis for plaintiffs' public policy wrongful discharge claim. 
III. PLAINTIFFS' CLAIM IS PREEMPTED BY FEDERAL LABOR LAW 
A. FEDERAL LAW GOVERNING COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 
AGREEMENTS. 
Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29U.S.C. § 185, exclusively 
governs claims for breach of collective bargaining agreements and also claims relating to 
collective bargaining agreements. The United States Supreme Court has explained: 
[This] Court has made clear that § 301 is a potent source of federal 
labor law, for though state courts have concurrent jurisdiction over 
controversies involving collective bargaining agreements,... state 
courts must apply federal law in deciding those claims, and indeed 
any state-law cause of action for violation of collective bargaining 
agreements is entirely displaced by federal law under § 301. State 
law is thus ''preempted" by § 301 in that only the federal law 
fashioned by the courts under § 301 governs the interpretation and 
application of collective bargaining agreements. 
Steelworkers v. Rawson. 495 U.S. 362, 368 (1990) (citations omitted). 
While an individual may sue in state court on a claim relating to a collective bargaining 
agreement, he must do so in compliance with the requirements of § 301. Where, as here, there is 
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a grievance and arbitration provision in the collective bargaining agreement, a § 301 claim may 
be asserted in court only where the plaintiff exhausted or attempted to exhaust the grievance and 
arbitration procedure, the plaintiff pleads and proves that his union breached its duty of fair 
representation to him, and the claim is brought within the six month statute of limitations period. 
See Def. Opening Memo, at 16-18 (summarizing federal labor law); Del Costello v. International 
Brotherhood of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151,172 (1983) (6-month statute of limitations). 
B. PLAINTIFFS' CLAIM CAN ONLY BE A S 301 CLAIM, 
As explained above, plaintiffs' claim is an implied contract claim under Idaho law. See 
p.3 above. The duty not to discharge an employee in violation of public policy is an implied 
contractual obligation read into the underlying contract between the parties. As with the implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, a public policy claim is a claim for "breach of the 
employment contract." Hummer v. Evans. 923 P.2d at 987. Because plaintiffs' employment 
contract was a collective bargaining agreement, the implied contractual obligation at issue here is 
read into the collective bargaining agreement. Therefore, plaintiffs' claim is a claim for breach 
of the collective bargaining agreement and is governed by § 301. 
Plaintiffs clearly had opportunities to seek a remedy and to assert a proper claim under 
§ 301. Plaintiffs could have filed grievances under the collective bargaining agreement which 
would have favored them in many ways. The grievance process is efficient and would not have 
cost plaintiffs anything. Plaintiffs would have been represented by their own union, and the 
Company would have had the burden of persuasion on the issue of "just cause" for plaintiffs' 
260342.1 10 
1 1 Q 1 
discharge. The grievance process culminates in binding arbitration, and plaintiffs could have 
been reinstated with back pay if they prevailed. If the outcome of arbitration were unfavorable to 
plaintiffs, they still could have sought a remedy in court under § 301. Plaintiffs, however, did 
none of the above. They ignored their contractual remedies under the collective bargaining 
agreement and failed to assert a proper claim under § 301. 
Plaintiffs appear to misunderstand how § 301 governs claims relating to collective 
bargaining agreements. Plaintiffs declare that Amalgamated Sugar must argue (or must be 
arguing) that plaintiffs relinquished all their state-law rights in the collective bargaining process 
in order for their current claim to be governed by § 301. Plaintiffs insist that they did not 
negotiate away their state-law rights, and therefore their current claim is unaffected by § 301. PL 
Opposition Memo, at 15, 16. Plaintiffs are mistaken both about the law and the Company's 
position. 
Under § 301, an implied contract claim relating to collective bargaining agreement is 
cognizable as a contract claim under § 301. Since collective bargaining agreements are not 
confined to the four corners of labor agreement documents, implied contractual rights are 
routinely asserted before labor arbitrators and in court under § 301. See Def. Opening Memo, at 
20 n.3. Under the collective bargaining agreement in the instant case, plaintiffs' claim could 
clearly have been asserted in the grievance and arbitration process and subsequently in court 
under § 301. For example, in 1998 a union employee, who was discharged by Amalgamated 
Sugar, filed a grievance which was taken to arbitration. The employee claimed that she was 
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discharged in retaliation for planning to file a sex discrimination charge under state law. The 
arbitrator ruled on the merits of the employee's retaliation claim. Although the arbitrator found 
no retaliation on the facts of the case, he ordered Amalgamated Sugar to reinstate the employee 
because of certain due process deficiencies in the Company's discipline of the employee. 
Amalgamated Sugar Co. (Humphreys 1998) at 5,15-18, 30-31, enclosed herewith. 
In sum, plaintiffs' implied contract claim is cognizable, and only cognizable, under 
§ 301/ Plaintiffs could have pursued their claim through the grievance and arbitration process 
and in court under § 301. They chose not to do so. 
C. PLAINTIFFS' CLAIM. AS A STATE-LAW CLAIM, IS 
PREEMPTED BY S 301. 
Plaintiffs appear to recognize that their claim, as a state-law claim, is preempted by § 301. 
They therefore attempt to recharacterize their claim so as to escape federal labor law preemption. 
Plaintiffs argue alternatively that their claim is a non-contract claim or is a contract claim wholly 
unrelated to the collective bargaining agreement. Neither argument has any merit. 
4
 Plaintiffs argue that because the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is read into a contract by operation 
of law, it gives rise to an independent right that may not be "disclaimed" or "waived." PL Opposition Memo, at 15-
16. On this basis plaintiffs apparently conclude that their claim is immune from the operation of § 301. Id. 
Plaintiffs' argument misses the point. An implied contractual obligation is part of the underlying contract. If there 
is a breach of the implied contractual obligation, a remedy may be sought as with any other breach of the contract. 
Such a remedy, however, must be pursued in conformity with the terms of the contract and the governing law. 
Amalgamated Sugar is not arguing that plaintiffs gave up or waived their rights to seek a remedy for the implied 
contractual breach they allege, but only that they must pursue the remedy properly under § 301 which governs their 
claim. The Ninth Circuit has made clear that an implied covenant claim is cognizable only as a claim based on the 
collective bargaining agreement under federal law, and if such a claim is pursued under state law, it is preempted by 
§301. Rissetto v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local 343. 94 F.3d 597, 599 (9th Cir. 1996) ("claim for breach of 
(footnote continued on next page) 
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First, plaintiffs argue that their claim, while admittedly based on their collective 
bargaining agreement with the Company, is nonetheless not a contract claim: 
Plaintiffs' claims are based on Amalgamated's breach of its duties 
which arose because of its contract with Plaintiffs, but the claims 
are not claims "on the contract." 
PL Opposition Memo, at 10. Any duties of Amalgamated Sugar arising out of its contract with 
plaintiffs are clearly contract duties. They cannot be anything else. It is nonsensical for 
plaintiffs to argue that a claim based upon contractual duties is not a contract claim. 
Second, plaintiffs argue that their implied contract claim is "separate and independent" 
from the collective bargaining agreement. This argument is without foundation either in logic or 
in case law. Given that the Idaho Supreme Court has ruled that a public policy wrongful 
discharge claim, like an implied covenant claim, is a claim for "breach of the employment 
contract," plaintiffs' argument is without merit. Not surprisingly, plaintiffs do not cite a single 
case holding that an implied contract claim of any kind is independent and separate from the 
underlying contract. The Ninth Circuit (which provides the controlling federal labor law 
applicable to Idaho) has ruled that state-law implied contract and implied covenant claims are 
preempted by § 301 because the implied contractual obligations are part of the collective 
bargaining agreement. See, e.g., Rissetto v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local 343, 94 F.3d 597, 
(footnote continued from previous page) 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing is also clearly preempted because such covenant is an implied term of [the 
plaintiffs] CBA"). 
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599 (9th Cir. 1996) ("claim for breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing is . . . preempted 
because such covenant is an implied term of [the plaintiffs] CBA")-5 
Even as a purported "separate" contract claim, plaintiffs' claim is still preempted by 
§ 301. There are two grounds for the preemption of any such "separate" contract claim. First, 
the claim concerns the employment of individuals covered by a collective bargaining agreement 
that already contains a termination provision. Any resolution of the state-law claim would 
involve construing the collective bargaining agreement, if only to comply with its procedural 
requirements. See, e.g., Chmiel v. Beverly Wilshire Hotel Co., 873 F.2d 1283, 1286 (9th Cir. 
1989) (when independent contract claim "concerns a job position governed by the [CBA], it is 
completely preempted by Section 301"); Olguin v. Inspiration Consolidated Copper Co.. 740 
F.2d 1468, 1474 (9th Cir. 1984) ("any independent agreement of employment could be 
5
 Plaintiffs cite the U.S. Supreme Court's Allis-Chalmers decision for the proposition that claims based upon 
independent, nonnegotiable state-law rights are not preempted by § 301. PL Opposition Memo, at 14-15. Plaintiffs 
misunderstand Allis-Chalmers. which has no application to plaintiffs' claim. Allis-Chalmers concerned a state-law 
tort claim, not a contract claim, and in that context the Supreme Court inquired whether the state tort action 
conferred a "nonnegotiable state-law right" that was "independent of any right established by contract." Clearly, an 
implied contract obligation, even one imposed by operation of law, is not "independent o f but an integral part of 
the contract, and therefore clearly within the scope of Section 301. In any case, in Allis-Chalmers the Supreme 
Court found the tort action in question, bad-faith denial of disability benefits, preempted under § 301. See Allis-
Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck. 471 U.S. 202,212-13,220 (1985). 
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effective only as part of the collective bargaining agreement" and is therefore preempted by 
§301). 
Second, plaintiffs' claim is inconsistent with their collective bargaining agreement and is 
preempted by § 301 on that additional ground. Plaintiffs' claim would not require them to use or 
exhaust the grievance and arbitration procedure and would not require them to assert a claim in 
court within the limitation period applicable to their collective bargaining agreement. Because of 
such inconsistencies, permitting plaintiffs' claim would frustrate and undermine the federal 
system of labor relations and collective bargaining. Accordingly, the claim is preempted under 
§301. Laramee, 830 F.Supp. at 807 (public policy wrongful discharge claim preempted by 
§ 301: "An employee who sidesteps the grievance machinery provided in the [labor] contract 
will have his independent suit against the employer... dismissed"); see also Def. Opening 
Memo, at 21-22 (citing and quoting cases). 
IV. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons and the reasons stated in Amalgamated Sugar's opening 
memorandum, plaintiffs' public policy wrongful discharge claim under Idaho law should be 
dismissed with prejudice. Accordingly, plaintiffs' Amended Complaint should also be dismissed 
with prejudice. 
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DATED this( \ ' '-day of March, 1999. 
W. MARK GAVRE 
MARGARET NIVER MCGANN 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for The Amalgamated Sugar Company 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this t°fi day of March, 1999,1 caused to be hand-delivered a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS' AMENDED COMPLAINT, to: 
Trent J. Waddoups 
CARR&WADDOUPS 
8 East Broadway, Suite 201 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
A Professional Law Corporation 
One Utah Center 
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800 
P.O. Box 45898 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0898 
Telephone 801-532-1234 $ Facsimile 801-536-6111 
March 19,1999 
W. Mark Gavre, Esq. 
CLERK OF THE COURT 
SECOND DISTRICT COURT 
2525 Grant Avenue 
Ogden,Utah 84401 
RE: DOCUMENTS TO BE FILED 
ENCLOSURES: • Reply Memorandum in Support of 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss 
Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint 
• Return, self-addressed stamped 
envelope 
INSTRUCTIONS: Please file the Reply Memorandum and 
return the date/time-stamped copy in the 
enclosed envelope. Thank you very much for 
your assistance. 
CLIENT NO.: Waddoups/Sparrow v. Amalgamated 
(00190.001) 
By: WMG/Lani 
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SECOND DISTRICT COURT 
fl»RKUS AU'-UI 
W. MARK GAVRE (4577) 
MARGARET NIVER MCGANN (7951) 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Defendant 
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800 
P. O. Box 45898 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0898 
Telephone: (801) 532-1234 
MAY 2 4 2i 
m THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
# sje j|e s|e j|e s|e * 
BLAKE WILLIAM WADDOUPS and 
JAMES EDWARD SPARROW, JR., 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
THE AMALGAMATED SUGAR 
COMPANY, a Utah corporation, et al., 
Defendant. 
Case No. 950900441 
Judge Stanton M. Taylor 
ORDER DISMISSING 
PLAINTIFFS' AMENDED 
COMPLAINT 
* * * * * * * 
This matter came on for hearing before the Court on Monday, March 29, 1999. 
Defendant The Amalgamated Sugar Company was represented by W. Mark Gavre of Parsons 
Behle & Latimer. Plaintiffs Blake William Waddoups and James Edward Sparrow, Jr. were 
represented by Trent J. Waddoups of Carr & Waddoups. In a telephone conference call with 
counsel for plaintiffs and defendant on Thursday, April 8, 1999, the Court orally issued its 
decision in this case. 
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On April 7, 1998, the Court granted defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, 
dismissing all of plaintiffs' claims, but granting leave to plaintiffs to file an amended complaint 
stating a claim under Idaho law for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. On 
December 2, 1998, plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint asserting a claim for wrongful discha^e 
in violation of Idaho public policy. Plaintiffs allege that defendant illegally shipped contaminated 
sugar, and that they were wrongfully discharged for objecting to or threatening to "blow the 
whistle" on defendant's alleged conduct. On January 6, 1999 defendant filed its Motion to 
Dismiss Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint, which motion has been fully briefed and argued. 
Having considered the memoranda and arguments of counsel, the Court makes the 
following decision. Plaintiffs' claim for public policy wrongful discharge under Idaho law is 
dismissed with prejudice. There are three grounds for this dismissal: (a) Idaho law has 
recognized the cause of action for public policy wrongful discharge only in the context of at-will 
employment, and plaintiffs were employed under a collective bargaining agreement and were not 
at-will employees; (b) plaintiffs did not report the alleged wrongdoing by defendant to any public 
authority and therefore fail to state a whistleblower public policy wrongful discharge claim under 
Idaho law; and (c) plaintiffs' claim is preempted by federal labor law, specifically the Labor 
Relations Management Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185. 
Based upon the foregoing and good cause appearing therefore, IT IS HEREBY 
ORDERED that defendant's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint is granted, and 
plaintiffs' Amended Complaint, and all claims and causes of action therein, is dismissed with 
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prejudice. 
DATED this /^dayofApi4 
40* 6 
BY THE COURT 
STANTON M. TAYD 
Second District Court Judgi 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
Trei 'Waddoupsv^5^ 
brney for Plaintiffs 
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